


FEBRUARY 1952



# JOURNAL



## Royal United Service Institution

WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1


ALL RIGHTS  
RESERVED

PUBLISHED  
QUARTERLY

*Price Ten Shillings*

Advertisement Manager

A. W. G. BARRETT, 15 CHARTERHOUSE St., E.C.1. Telephone: HOLBORN 8655-6









# EISENHOWER AND MONTGOMERY IN COMMAND AGAIN

How did it work last time?

In the most important book yet written about World War II, Chester Wilmot studies not only the highly contrasting personalities of the two great Allied commanders but the differences in their basic military outlook, and indeed in the whole approach to military and political strategy of the British and Americans.

He shows how these differences affected the course of the war and the chances of victory in 1944; and, above all, how they settled the pattern of post-war Europe. He shows how Stalin bluffed Eisenhower into restraining the Allied advance while Russia scooped the three major capitals of central Europe; and how, with all the military trumps in his hand, Stalin was able at the Yalta Conference to take all the political tricks.

READ

## THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE by CHESTER WILMOT

*Published by Collins*

---

### PRIORITY ORDER FORM

TO SECURE A COPY ORDER NOW FROM  
**WILDING & SON LTD., 33, CASTLE STREET, SHREWSBURY**

Please supply on publication.....First Edition copies of THE STRUGGLE  
FOR EUROPE, at 26s., post free\*, for which I enclose £       s.       d.

FROM .....

.....RUJ

\*Orders for 2 or more copies, 25s. each, post free. Cheques should be made out to WILDING & SON LTD.



## SMALL-GAME SHOOTING

(EXPERIENCES OF AN ORDINARY SHOT)

by

**Lt.-Col. G. P. EVANS, C.B.E.**

"Small-Game Shooting" will give pleasure to many . . . . There is no elementary instruction in the 200 odd pages but a wealth of reflection and information, often concealed in reminiscence, which will appeal strongly to the experienced shot. Well written, the book avoids being dogmatic. The chapters on gun-fitting and aiming are particularly helpful and out of the ordinary, while those on the various game-birds contain the fruits of long experience."

"SPORT & COUNTRY"

*Cloth bound. 224 pages. 15 full page photographs,  
with line decorations by Ian Grey. 17/6d. net.*

OF ALL BOOKSELLERS

**WARD LOCK**

## REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

In the production of Regimental Histories the same qualities are needed as in the production of ordinary first-class books: attention to detail, good materials, craftsmanship—and much more besides. It is necessary to have facilities for drawing and printing maps (by letterpress or lithography), for producing coloured and line sketches, as well as a wide knowledge of the uniforms, traditions and customs of the Army. All these we can supply in full measure and, in addition and perhaps most important of all, that background which is the result of three-quarters of a century of military printing, we are at your service

**GALE & POLDEN LTD**

*The Printers and Publishers to the Services*

**THE WELLINGTON PRESS**

**ALDERSHOT**

Aldershot 2

**LONDON  
PORTSMOUTH**

**CHATHAM  
CAMBERLEY**



*In Defence of the Realm*

NUMBER 2 IN A SERIES



There's no question about it. Tomorrow's aircraft will be Deltas. And it's not a revolution. It's an evolution in design. The normal, orderly process of development which strides from today into tomorrow. Given immense jet power—the design, the shape, the planform of future aircraft naturally becomes a Delta. Here is the answer for long range, high altitude, high speed aircraft with a heavy payload. Pioneer in Deltas is A. V. Roe of Manchester. Their successful research and flight testing programmes with the 707 A and B have captured the imagination of the world. They have proved, among other things which unfortunately must be secret, that the Delta handles like any other good aeroplane, easy to fly, easy to land. A. V. Roe is a member company of the Hawker Siddeley Group, that industrial commonwealth of companies, largest of its kind, whose resources are pledged to building the prosperity and defensive strength of the Free World.

## Hawker Siddeley Group

PIONEER . . . AND WORLD LEADER IN AVIATION



Group Head Offices: 18 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1  
A. V. ROE, GLOSTER, ARMSTRONG WHITWORTH, HAWKER,  
AVRO CANADA, ARMSTRONG SIDDELEY, HAWKSLEY, BROCKWORTH  
ENGINEERING, AIR SERVICE TRAINING AND HIGH DUTY ALLOYS

# GODFREY DAVIS

*the first name in car hire*

anywhere . . .  
anytime . . .



**chauffeur-driven  
self-drive**

Europe's largest car hire operators—Established 30 years.

Special short-term contract rates for periods of three months or longer between September and May.

CALL  
WRITE  
TELEPHONE  
CABLE

**7 ECCLESTON STREET, LONDON, S.W.1**

TELEPHONE: SLOane 0022 Cables: Quickmiles, London  
Also at Neasden Lane, London, N.W.10. Telephone: GLAdstone 6474

PICTURE  
BY  
APPOINTMENT



DEALERS  
TO  
H.M. THE KING

**REGIMENTAL PAINTINGS  
PRINTS, CURIOS AND  
MILITARY BATTLES**



**THE PARKER GALLERY**

**2, ALBEMARLE ST., LONDON, W.1**  
(adjoining Piccadilly)  
ESTABLISHED 1750

Telephone: REGent 2785 Cables: "TAYCHPEE, LONDON"  
CATALOGUE FREE ON APPLICATION

By Appointment: Naval



Outfitters to H.M. The King

Gieves Ltd.

**UNIFORM  
AND  
PLAIN CLOTHES**

**Gieves**  
LIMITED

Established 1785

**27 OLD BOND STREET,  
LONDON, W.1**

Telephone: Regent 2276

BRANCHES

Perthmouth, Southampton, Bournemouth, Chatham, Bath,  
Falmouth, Plymouth, Liverpool, Edinburgh, London, Derby  
Maid, Gibraltar



**NAAFI**

FOR CUPS, MEDALS, PLAQUES

*and all sports trophies*

**NAAFI**


for the finest sports kit, equipment  
and an unrivalled service for the  
sportsman.

PRICE LISTS AND PARTICULARS ON APPLICATION

**NAAFI**

SPORTS BRANCH, IMPERIAL COURT, LONDON, S.E.11

Telephone : Reliance 1200



Lifeboatmen volunteer  
their lives . . . you  
can volunteer a  
contribution

Help them to carry on  
this voluntary work of  
saving lives by sending  
a contribution however  
small

## ROYAL NATIONAL LIFE-BOAT INSTITUTION

42, GROSVENOR GARDENS, LONDON, S.W.1

The Duke of Montrose, K.T., C.B., C.V.O., V.D., Treasurer  
Col. A. D. Burnett Brown, M.C., T.D., M.A., Secretary



## DIVING APPARATUS

*of all types including self-  
contained "Frogman" apparatus*

**UNDERWATER CUTTING & WELDING EQUIPMENT**  
**DIVERS' LOUDSPEAKING TELEPHONES**  
**UNDERWATER LAMPS, ETC.**

## SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS RESUSCITATION APPARATUS

*for asphyxia, electric shock, drowning, etc.*

**SMOKE HELMETS** **GAS MASKS AND**  
*of all patterns for Ships, Docks, Oil Tankers, etc.* **RESPIRATORS**  
*of all patterns*

Contractors to Admiralty, War Office,  
Ministry of Supply, etc.

**SIEBE, GORMAN & CO. LTD.**  
LONDON  
**EVERYTHING FOR SAFETY EVERYWHERE**

TOLWORTH, SURREY

## CRITERION BANQUETING

For Wedding Receptions, Luncheon Parties, Dinners and Dances, Masonic Banquets, Business Conferences and similar functions. Please address enquiries to the General Manager, Criterion in Piccadilly Limited, Piccadilly Circus, W.1. Tel. WHI 6611

## A la Broche Restaurant and Cocktail Bar


5 Jermyn Street

For really choice and delightful food under skilful direction and personal attention of M. Alphonse. Luncheon, Dinner and Supper. Open until 11 p.m. Telephone for table reservations, Whitehall 6611.



# MAKE WRITING YOUR OTHER BUSINESS

Enjoy the Security of an **EXTRA** Income



ANTHONY TROLLOPE

**M**OST successful Writers did not begin their working lives as Authors. Thousands of Stories and Articles are by people who write in addition to their regular occupation. They write for the deep pleasure of writing; for the security an additional income provides. Writing gives young people another string to the bow; enables retired folk to capitalise their experiences.

## TROLLOPE'S ADVICE

**T**ROLLOPE, who made a large income for many years by writing, began in this way. He advised all young writers to follow his example and there are many who have succeeded in building up their own separate or private business in this way, but there are not enough.

## GREAT OPPORTUNITIES EVERY DAY

**O**VER 1,300 Daily and Weekly Newspapers, and more than 2,000 magazines and periodicals in Great Britain alone, mean at least 100,000 separate issues per year requiring articles, stories, etc., a large proportion of which has to be free-lance work. Here are immense and permanent markets for capable Writers, with opportunities never greater than now—new publications appearing, the public reading more than ever, and British Editors constantly on the lookout for new Writers. Anyone of average education and ability, willing to learn the technique of preparing written matter in saleable form, has great opportunities of profitable and continuous spare-time employment, which can lead to well-paid full-time occupation.

## PRACTICAL HELP BY EXPERT DIRECTION

**F**LEET STREET SCHOOL gives modern practical instruction which enables the new Writer to produce work in the form wanted by busy Editors (who have no time to teach the novice) and guides the learner to the markets best suited to his personal ability. The continued success of our students is striking proof for the new practical methods of the Advisory Panel of Fleet Street Authors and Editors, whose qualifications as Professional Experts are indicated below.

### THE PANEL OF EXPERTS

1. Author of over 1,000 Short Stories.  
2. Editor of a best-selling Women's Magazine.  
3. A profile Writer of Serials in famous English journals.  
4. The Writer of popular Girls' Stories.  
5. Regular Contributor of all the best-selling Juvenile Periodicals.  
6. Feature Writer to Sunday Newspapers.  
7. Sub-Editor of National Daily.

**YOUR FIRST STEP.**—Write now for Free Copy of "PROSPECTS FOR AUTHORSHIP" and learn how to acquire the Professional touch and essential Marketing knowledge. Remember, the Fleet Street School system is based on earning whilst learning, and special terms are available for those of limited means.

## PRACTICAL RESULTS

*Student 171/102.*—I have sold my story to **EVERY-WOMAN** for 25 guineas. *Student 1106/156.*—The **B.B.C.** accepted the script for the Light Programme—*fee* 3 guineas—after my first lesson! *Student 141/76.*—The article which I wrote for the Second Test Paper appeared in the **SUNDAY MAIL**. Thanks for the recommendation. *Student 2317/185.*—I am pleased to say that my article for Lesson Two has been accepted by the magazine **TRAVEL**. *Student 2003/1610.*—The Course has already borne fruit, for I have sold an article to **PSYCHOLOGY** for 2 guineas. *Student 1834/183.* . . . Together with cheque, which I obtained from the **CHRISTIAN HERALD** for the article which I originally wrote for the Second Test Paper. *Student 761/2812.*—I have just sold my first story to **FAMILY STAR** for 4 guineas, and am I thrilled! *Student 473/28.*—I have had my first short story accepted by the Editor of **HOME REVIEW**. *Student 1457/217.* . . . on your advice I sent my article with a covering letter to the **LIVERPOOL ECHO** and barely three weeks had elapsed before I had the pleasure of seeing it in print. *Student 1328/2110.*—**GLAMOUR** have paid me 7 guineas for a short story and the **B.B.C.** has accepted a fairy story, to be adapted for the Children's Hour. *Student 984/237.*—I also have to report the sale of a further fairy story to the Co-operative Press, for inclusion in their **SUNSHINE ANNUAL**, payment 2 guineas. *Student 1518/69.*—**MODERN WOMAN** have paid 5 guineas on acceptance of my article. *Student 181/282.*—You may be interested to hear that yesterday I had a letter from the Editor of the **ARGOSY**—they have offered me 25 guineas for my story. *Student 3877/3015.*—I have had my story accepted by **BLACKWOODS**, who are paying me £25 for it; also one or two others, at smaller rates, of course, for service magazines. *Student 120/28/8.*—I have established contact with the Editor of **PUNCH**. The item was accepted for Christmas and is a good start. *Student 591/28/7.*—I am sure you will be pleased to know that my article submitted for my Second Lesson was published in the **DAILY MIRROR** and I received 6 guineas for same. *Student 848/129.*—I hope you will be as pleased as I am that my article, submitted for Test Paper Two, has been sold, on your advice, to **MEN ONLY**. *Student 1964/157.*—I have just corrected a proof of my story for **WIDE WORLD**—they have since accepted another and I have sent in a third. *Student 778/2119.*—I thought it might interest you to know that **THE COUNTRYMAN** has accepted a short article of mine on an old country custom. *Student 820/1310.*—I had 7 guineas for my story, which appeared in **WOMAN'S COMPANION**; I also had an article published recently in **FARMER AND STOCKBREEDER**. *Student 4135/7150.*—I have sold an article to the **COVENTRY EVENING TELEGRAPH**—they are sending me a cheque for 5 guineas. *Student 184/315.*—As you suggested, I submitted the article to the **NEW STATESMAN**. One was published on July 17. *Student 1404/6/49.*—I am pleased to tell you that the article which I wrote for Test Paper Two and submitted, on your recommendation, to **CHILDREN'S NEWSPAPER**, was accepted. *Student 984/226.*—The magazine which accepted my story was **RED STAR WEEKLY**—they paid me 4 guineas. *Student 1173/58.*—The article has been accepted by **LONDON OPINION**, having earned 4 guineas. *Student 1813/173.*—My story was published in the June issue of **ARGOSY** and I have just had a letter from the Editor offering me 8 guineas for a second one. *Student 157/43.*—I have sold my first short story prepared for Lesson Eight to **HOME NOTES** for 12 guineas. *Student 281/2411.*—The paper which accepted my article written for Lesson Two, was the **BELFAST TELEGRAPH**. *Student 5921/547.*—Last week I sent to **COURIER** a graphic account of my first elephant shoot in Kenya. They have retained the story and asked for another.



**POST  
COUPON  
TO-DAY  
FOR YOUR  
FREE COPY**

**To THE FLEET STREET SCHOOL LTD (Desk T.10)  
6 Tudor St, Fleet Street, London E.C.4**

Please send without obligation "Prospects for Authorship"

NAME .....

(Please write in BLOCK CAPITALS)

ADDRESS .....

(Stamp for reply appreciated but not essential)

**THE PROSPECTS  
FOR  
AUTHORSHIP**

## H. S. LEES-SMITH & CO.


INSURANCE BROKERS

*For over thirty years, in peace and  
war, we have had the honour of  
dealing with the Insurance  
problems of Officers*

**BUSINESS TRANSACTED BY CORRESPONDENCE  
UNLESS OTHERWISE REQUESTED**

*Write for particulars to :—*

**SERVICES BRANCH  
LLOYDS BANK CHAMBERS  
ALDERSHOT**



**BOSTOCK & KIMPTON LTD**  
WINE MERCHANTS SPECIALISING IN SERVICE  
TO NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR FORCE MESSES

*Proprietors of "G.H.Q." Sherry*

**56 HAYMARKET  
LONDON, S.W.1**

TELEPHONE  
TELEGRAMS

TRAFALGAR 1441-2  
BOSKIMTOCK, LEBQUAKE, LONDON

—BOOKS—

### HUGH REES LTD.

Military, Naval and General Book-  
sellers, Stationers & Publishers

**47, PALL MALL, S.W.1**

**STATIONED AT WHITEHALL?**

*Why not stay at*

### **SUNDRIDGE PARK HOTEL**

*for comfort?*

Golf Course, Hard Tennis Court, free Taxi  
service morning and evening trains.  
Children welcomed. Central heating.  
Telephone every room, Cocktail Bar.  
30 minutes Charing Cross Station.  
Special terms for Services for long visits.  
Tel: Ravensbourne 1172.




### **REMEMBER Two Steeples No.83**

quality when you want a  
good pair of socks.

FROM ALL HOBIERS

## FOR ADAPTABILITY



### *THE ALECTO SELF-PROPELLED GUN MOUNTING*

The Alec was designed by Vickers to meet the need for a light self-propelled gun for the close support of infantry. It is equally efficient as a gun tractor. Rapid acceleration and great manoeuvrability enable this dual purpose vehicle to maintain a high average speed and all-round performance even under very severe physical and climatic conditions, as recent tests have proved.



*ACTING AS GUN TRACTOR . . .*




*. . . UNDER ROUGH CONDITIONS*

**Vickers-Armstrongs**  
  
**Limited**

VICKERS HOUSE, BROADWAY, LONDON, S.W.1.

---

 **F**ROM THE LION ONWARDS all  
Napier aero-engines have been distinguished by

originality of conception wedded to the highest engineering standards. That this Napier trait persists is shown by the introduction of the 3,000 h.p. Nomad, the world's first composite gas turbine piston engine — outcome of several year's research and painstaking development work by Napier engineers.

Napier's experience of aircraft diesels combined with an extensive gas turbine development programme has produced an engine exhibiting a fuel economy not previously encountered in aviation.

# **NAPIER**

---

D. NAPIER AND SON, LIMITED      LONDON      W. 3



# CONTENTS

## FEBRUARY, 1952

	Page
Secretary's Notes ... ..	i
Frontispiece : His Late Majesty King George VI.	
The Land Campaign in Korea ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Major-General B. A. Coad, C.B.E., D.S.O. ...	1
Europe To-day ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Mr. Sebastian Haffner ... ..	16
The Employment of Special Forces ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Colonel J. W. Hackett, D.S.O., M.B.E., M.C. ... ..	26
Toward Atlantic Security ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By the Hon. Charles M. Spofford, C.B.E. ... ..	42
Recent Developments in Assam. By Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Reid, O.B.E., E.D., I.P. (retired)	57
A Private Soldier in the Central India Campaign. By Lieut.-Colonel L. B. Oatts, D.S.O.	69
The Need for Amphibious Forces in the Post-war Situation. By "Seaborne" ... ..	77
Tank Policy. By Lieut.-General Sir Giffard Martel, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. ... ..	82
Air Reconnaissance—Its Purpose and Value. By Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C. ... ..	84
United States Submarines in the Blockade of Japan in the 1939-45 War. By Major C. S. Goldingham, R.M., F.R.Hist.S. ... ..	87
Diary of the War in Korea ... ..	99
The International Situation. By A. K. Chesterton, M.C.	
(i) United Nations ... ..	105
(ii) The Far East ... ..	105
(iii) Egypt ... ..	106
(iv) Federation in Europe ... ..	107
Correspondence ... ..	108
General Service Notes ... ..	112
Navy Notes ... ..	116
Army Notes ... ..	124
Air Notes ... ..	130
Reviews of Books ... ..	136
Additions to the Library ... ..	145

### NOTE


Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective papers.



### **'SINGLE DRAG'**

The design benefits of a single engine formula

---



### **DOUBLE THRUST**

The practical benefits of twin-engine power

---

## **FAIREY GANNET**

**(FAIREY 17)**

*ARMSTRONG SIDDELEY 'DOUBLE MAMBA'*

*TWIN-ENGINE • ANTI-SUBMARINE • CARRIER-OPERATED*

**CHOSEN FOR SERVICE IN THE ROYAL NAVY**

THE FAIREY AVIATION COMPANY LIMITED, HAYES, MIDDLESEX

JOURNAL  
of the  
Royal United Service  
Institution

*Published by Authority of the Council*

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED



Postal Address : Whitehall, London, S.W.1.

Telephone No. : Whitehall 5854.

Telegraphic Address : "Russatus, Parl, London."

Vol. XCVII

FEBRUARY, 1952

No. 585

Advertisement Manager :

A. W. G. BARRETT, 15, CHARTERHOUSE STREET, LONDON, E.C.1.

Telephone : HOLBORN 8655/6.

# THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

FOR

THE PROMOTION AND ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCE AND LITERATURE  
OF THE THREE SERVICES.

## PATRON

## VICE-PATRON

## PRESIDENT

General H.R.H. The DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,  
G.C.V.O.

## VICE-PRESIDENTS

Field-Marshal The Viscount ALANBROOKE, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O.  
Field-Marshal Sir CLAUDE AUCHINLECK, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., LL.D.  
Air Chief Marshal Sir ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.  
Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of CORK AND ORRERY, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir EDWARD ELLINGTON, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.  
General Sir HARRY H. S. KNOX, K.C.B., D.S.O.  
Admiral Sir CHARLES J. C. LITTLE, G.C.B., G.B.E.  
Field-Marshal The Lord WILSON OF LIBYA, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O.

## ELECTED MEMBERS OF COUNCIL

### Royal Navy

Rear-Admiral W. W. DAVIS, C.B., D.S.O.  
Rear-Admiral R. M. J. HUTTON, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.  
Admiral Sir HENRY MOORE, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. (*Chairman of the Council*).  
Admiral Sir ARTHUR J. POWER, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., A.D.C.

### Royal Marines

General Sir LESLIE C. HOLLIS, K.C.B., K.B.E., R.M.

### Royal Naval Reserve

Commodore R. HARRISON, D.S.O., R.D., R.N.R.

### Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve

Captain REX JANSON, V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

### Regular Army

Major-General J. A. GASCOIGNE, C.B., D.S.O.  
Major-General L. O. LYNE, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.  
General Sir OUVRY L. ROBERTS, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.  
General Sir GERALD W. R. TEMPLER, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.  
(*Vice-Chairman of the Council*).  
Major-General G. P. WALSH, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.



### **Territorial Army**

Brigadier Sir GEORGE S. HARVIE-WATT, Bt., T.D., A.D.C., K.C., D.L., M.P.

Major-General IVOR T. P. HUGHES, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L.

Lieut.-Colonel R. D. JUDD, D.S.O., M.C.

Brigadier J. A. LONGMORE, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

### **Royal Air Force**

Air Chief Marshal Sir NORMAN BOTTOMLEY, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force THE LORD NEWALL, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M.

Air Chief Marshal Sir JAMES M. ROBB, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

### **Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve**

Air Commodore F. CRERAR, C.B.E.

### **REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS**

#### **ADMIRALTY**

*Director of Tactical and Staff Duties* : Captain W. K. EDDEN, O.B.E., R.N.

#### **WAR OFFICE**

*Director-General of Military Training* : Lieut.-General Sir RICHARD N. GALE, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

#### **AIR MINISTRY**

*Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Training)* : Air Vice-Marshal T. N. McEvoy, C.B., C.B.E.

### **EX OFFICIO MEMBERS**

*First Sea Lord* : Admiral Sir RHODERICK McGRIGOR, G.C.B., D.S.O.

*Chief of the Imperial General Staff* : Field-Marshal Sir WILLIAM J. SLIM, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

*Chief of the Air Staff* : Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir JOHN SLESSOR, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

*Director, Territorial Army and Cadets* : Major-General E. O. HERBERT, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

*President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich* : Admiral Sir HAROLD KINAHAN, K.B.E., C.B.

*Commandant of the Imperial Defence College* : General Sir FRANK E. W. SIMPSON, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

*Commandant of the Joint Services Staff College* : Air Vice-Marshal L. DARVALL, C.B., M.C.

*Director of the Royal Naval Staff College* : Captain R. A. CURRIE, D.S.C., R.N.

*Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley* : Major-General G. W. LATHBURY, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E.

*Commandant of the R.A.F. Staff College* : Air Vice-Marshal A. D. GILLMORE, C.B.E.

### **HONORARY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL**

Major-General H. C. THACKER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Canada).

Lieut.-General A. J. BOASE, C.B.E. (Australia).

Major-General Sir A. H. RUSSELL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. (New Zealand).

General Sir PIERRE VAN RYNEVELD, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (South Africa).

General K. M. CARIAPPA, O.B.E. (India).

General M. AYUB KHAN (Pakistan).

### **STAFF**

*Secretary, Chief Executive Officer and Curator* : Lieut.-Colonel P. S. M. WILKINSON.

*Librarian* :

*Editor and Museum Registrar* : Major-General R. E. VYVYAN, C.B.E., M.C.

*Assistant Editor* : Lieutenant-Commander P. K. KEMP, R.N.

*Deputy Curator and Assistant Executive Officer* : Captain J. H. LAING.

*Auditors* : Messrs. BARTON, MAYHEW & Co.

Alderman's House, Bishopsgate, E.C.2.

*Bankers* : ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, DRUMMOND'S BRANCH,  
Charing Cross, S.W.1.

## THE INSTITUTION

The Institution is situated opposite the Horse Guards in Whitehall. It provides Members with a comfortable reading room containing the leading papers, periodicals, and principal Service (including foreign) Journals.

There is a Lecture theatre where lectures are given followed by discussions in which officers of every rank are encouraged to take part.

Members can obtain on loan four volumes at a time from the best professional library in the Country. They are provided with a free copy of the JOURNAL.

There is a private entrance to the celebrated R.U.S. Museum in the former Banqueting Hall of old Whitehall Palace.

## MEMBERSHIP

Commissioned officers of all H.M. Services, including those of the Dominions and Colonies, also Midshipmen of the Royal and Dominion Navies, the R.N.R., R.N.V.R., and R.N.V.S.R. are eligible for membership without formality.

Naval, Military, and Air Force Cadets are eligible on the recommendation of their Commanding Officers.

Ladies whose names appear or have appeared in the official lists as serving or having served as officers in any of the three Services are eligible.

Officers' messes are not eligible for membership, but may subscribe to the JOURNAL.

## SUBSCRIPTION

The rates of subscription are :—

	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscription ... ..	1	10	0
Life Subscription ... ..	24	0	0
or four yearly instalments of ... ..	6	6	0 each.
Covenanted Life Subscription—seven yearly instalments of ... ..	3	12	0 „

Full particulars of membership with alternative forms for bankers' orders, and for deeds of covenant enabling the Institution to recover income tax, can be obtained on application to the Secretary, R.U.S.I., Whitehall, S.W.1.

The JOURNAL is published in February, May, August, and November. Copies may be purchased by non-Members, price 10s. od. Annual subscription, £2 post free. Orders should be sent to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

## MUSEUM

The R.U.S. Museum is open daily from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., except on Sundays, Christmas Day, and Good Friday. Members may obtain free passes for their friends on application to the Secretary.

Members of the Services in uniform are admitted free.

---

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

February, 1952

### ANNIVERSARY MEETING

The Anniversary Meeting will be held at 3.0 p.m. on Tuesday, 4th March, 1952. The Council will present their Annual Report and Accounts, and there will be an election to fill the vacancies on the Council. Copies of the Annual Report and Accounts for 1951 can be obtained on application to the Secretary.

### COUNCIL

#### Vice-Chairman of the Council

At the Meeting of the Council in December, 1951, General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., was elected Vice-Chairman on the retirement of General The Lord Ismay, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.

#### Ex Officio Members

General Sir Frank Simpson, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., Major-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., and Air Vice-Marshal L. Darvall, C.B., M.C., have accepted the invitation of the Council to become ex officio Members of the Council on taking up the appointments of Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, and Commandant of the Royal Air Force Staff College, respectively.

### STAFF

Miss E. G. Bickell retired on 31st January, 1952, after 25 years of valuable service as Chief Clerk.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 1st November, 1951, and 24th January, 1952 :—

#### NAVY

Commander H. Pasley-Tyler, R.N.  
Commander G. D. S. Johnson, R.N.  
Lieutenant-Commander J. F. MacL. Anderson, R.N.V.R.  
Commander W. A. R. Cartwright, R.N.  
Commander H. R. E. Janvrin, D.S.C., R.N.  
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander T. F. Richards, R.N.  
Lieutenant T. R. M. Duke, R.N.  
Commander M. C. Morris, R.N.  
Rear-Admiral A. D. Nicholl, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.  
Cadet G. W. Barr, R.N.

#### ARMY

Colonel J. C. Hardy, Royal Signals.  
Captain E. J. Bowen, Royal Army Dental Corps.  
Major D. J. St. M. Tabor, M.C., Royal Horse Guards.  
Brigadier J. F. Bowerman, late Indian Army.  
Major A. J. Wheatcroft, Royal Engineers.  
Captain J. B. B. Pollard, Coldstream Guards.  
Major A. P. Mitchell, late The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.  
Captain W. F. Nesbitt, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.  
2nd Lieutenant A. M. G. Bantock, Royal Artillery.  
Captain A. Begg, Royal Signals.  
Lieutenant J. J. Batten, Royal Army Service Corps.  
Brigadier J. V. P. Braganza, Corps of Engineers (India).  
2nd Lieutenant P. D. R. Carlill, Royal Artillery.  
Captain J. E. Dunning, The Royal Hampshire Regiment.

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

Captain K. B. Frances, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain A. W. Grendon, The Highland Light Infantry.  
 Major D. G. Holmes, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
 Lieutenant E. C. Locke, The Essex Regiment.  
 Major J. C. T. Peddie, The Royal Berkshire Regiment.  
 Major C. T. Rodgers, The Cheshire Regiment.  
 Captain O. J. Waldram, Royal Artillery.  
 Captain P. C. Ormrod, M.C., The King's Royal Irish Hussars.  
 Captain J. S. Agar, Royal Signals.  
 Brigadier Sardar Harnarain Singh, Indian Army.  
 Captain P. R. R. de Burgh, Royal Artillery.  
 Captain H. E. Roper, Royal Signals.  
 Major D. E. L. Gardiner, Royal Signals.  
 Major R. A. Howard, T.D., Royal Army Ordnance Corps.  
 Brigadier K. Horwood, C.B.E., D.S.O., late Royal Artillery.  
 Captain W. D. Cox, Royal Army Service Corps.  
 Captain B. W. Nicholls, Royal Artillery.  
 Captain G. M. Hallowes, The Gordon Highlanders.  
 Captain C. Hartington, Royal Engineers.  
 Major R. A. Norman-Walker, M.B.E., M.C., Royal Artillery.  
 Captain L. J. P. Magee, The Royal Irish Fusiliers.  
 Major A. C. W. Noel, M.C., Welsh Guards.  
 Lieut.-Colonel E. G. Pettengell, Indian Army.  
 Major S. A. Pinto, Corps of Engineers (India).  
 Major T. S. Foster, Royal Signals.  
 Captain A. Morrall, Royal Artillery.  
 Lieutenant J. M. C. Hutton, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

## AIR FORCE

Squadron Leader J. Ashton, R.A.A.F.  
 Wing Commander H. E. C. Boxer, O.B.E., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant I. A. Clarke, R.A.F. Regiment.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. V. Horwood, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant P. M. Mitchell, R.A.F.  
 Flying Officer J. H. Wilkinson, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader P. O. Hildreth, R.A.F.  
 Group Captain J. N. Tomes, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant R. D. Lindley, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant F. E. Runchman, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. P. Hammond, R.A.F.  
 Pilot Officer Wm. C. Milne, R.A.F.

## PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

The following officers have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution on graduation :—

On the recommendation of the President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich :—  
 Sub-Lieutenant J. B. Wallace, R.N.

On the recommendation of the Commandant, Royal Air Force College, Cranwell :—  
 Pilot Officer R. Hollingworth, R.A.F.  
 Pilot Officer C. M. Harcourt, R.A.F.  
 Pilot Officer R. H. Robson, R.A.F.

## COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more Members will support the Scheme for Covenanted Subscriptions, details of which have been circulated to all Members.

This materially assists the Institution because it enables Income Tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription. It is emphasized that a Deed of Covenant entails no additional expense to the Member, but it goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,530 Annual and 775 Life Covenanted Members.

Any Member who has not received his copy of the Scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

### LIAISON OFFICERS

With the object of making the facilities afforded by membership of the Institution better known to the Services, the Council have invited the principal Commands at Home and Overseas to nominate Liaison Officers.

It is hoped that the Liaison Officers will be able to suggest, from time to time, ways in which the Institution can be of greater value to the serving officer.

Liaison Officers are provided with particulars of the Institution and forms to enable them to enrol members without further formality.

The following is a list of officers who have been nominated as Liaison Officers, and the Commands or Establishments they represent :—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters	Squadron Leader E. Mortimer, R.A.F
Combined Operations Centre ...	Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Hewitt, D.S.O.
Joint Services Staff College ...	Major P. E. C. Tuckey.
Office of the High Commissioner for India ... ..	Major B. S. Ahluwalia.
<b>ROYAL NAVY</b>	
Home Fleet ... ..	Captain H. W. Biggs, D.S.O., R.N.
Flag Officer Air (Home) ... ..	Commander R. C. Haskett-Smith, D.S.O., R.N.
Flag Officer, Scotland and Northern Ireland ... ..	Commander J. M. Rowland, D.S.O., R.N.
H.M.S. "Excellent" ... ..	Vacant
H.M.S. "Dryad" ... ..	Commander F. B. P. Brayne Nicholls, D.S.C., R.N.
Flag Officer, Submarines ... ..	Captain B. W. Taylor, D.S.C., R.N.
Reserve Fleet ... ..	Commander (S) G. H. Nicholls, O.B.E., R.N.
R.N. Barracks, Chatham ... ..	Vacant
R.N. Barracks, Devonport ... ..	Commander H. H. Dannreuther, R.N.
R.N. Barracks, Portsmouth ... ..	Lieutenant-Commander D. J. Godden, R.N.
R.N. College, Greenwich ... ..	Commander J. S. Dalglish, R.N.
R.M. Barracks, Eastney ... ..	Major J. L. Carter, R.M.
R.M. Barracks, Plymouth ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel T. P. Honnor, R.M.
<b>ARMY</b>	
Anti-Aircraft Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel W. P. L. Lawson, M.C.
Eastern Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel C. T. W. Hill.
Northern Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel C. M. F. Deakin.
Northern Ireland District ... ..	Major G. D. Dunlop, M.B.E., M.C.
Scottish Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Forteach, D.S.O., M.B.E.
Southern Command ... ..	Major J. M. Howson.
Western Command ... ..	Major A. J. Bayley, M.C.
East Africa Command ... ..	Vacant
British Troops in Austria ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Dickson.
Far East Land Forces ... ..	Major R. L. Barber.
B.A.O.R. ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel S. R. M. Hamblin.
Staff College, Camberley ... ..	Colonel M. St. J. Oswald, D.S.O., M.C.,
Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul	Major Ch. Mohd. Shaukat Riza, R.P.A.



## ROYAL AIR FORCE

Bomber Command ...	...	Wing Commander R. D. Stubbs.
Fighter Command ...	...	Squadron Leader K. Dear, D.F.C.
Coastal Command ...	...	Squadron Leader B. W. Parsons, A.F.C.
Flying Training Command	...	Wing Commander C. D. Milne, O.B.E., D.F.C.
Technical Training Command	...	Group Captain C. W. Dicken, C.B.E.
Transport Command ...	...	Wing Commander C. V. Winn, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C.
Maintenance Command ...	...	Group Captain J. H. S. Richards.
Home Command ...	...	Air Commodore T. B. Prickman, C.B.E.
Far East Air Force ...	...	Wing Commander J. A. Crockett .
Second Tactical Air Force...	...	Wing Commander C. S. W. Harte.

GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION,  
1952

Particulars of this competition will be found in the leaflet in this Journal.

## EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL COMPETITION

The competition for the medal instituted by the late Rear-Admiral Sir Sydney M. Eardley-Wilmot will take place this year.

The medal will be awarded for the best essay contributed by a Member of the Institution on :—

" Changes in Naval Warfare owing to new and modified weapons."

Essays must be typed in triplicate, and each copy must be clearly marked " Eardley-Wilmot Competition " on the outside. Care should be taken to avoid confidential matter. When a reference is made to any work, the title of such work must be quoted.

Essays must be strictly anonymous, and each must have a Motto, which must be written on the outside of each copy. They must be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the Motto written on the outside, and the competitor's name inside.

All essays must be sent by registered post, addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1, and must reach the Institution not later than 15th November, 1952.

## PRIZE

A silver-gilt medal and eighteen guineas will be awarded for the best essay. If this, or any other, merits publication in the JOURNAL, payment will be made at the usual rate. In the case of any essay written by a serving officer, the Editor will seek permission from the appropriate Service Department before publication.

## MUSEUM

## BROADCAST

A broadcast in the Home Service was given by the B.B.C., assisted by the Staff, on Tuesday, 8th January, and judging from the reports this was well received. A successful attempt was made to include not only all aspects of the Museum but also short historical notes on the Institution, the Banqueting Hall and the Rubens Ceiling. The programme will be repeated three times during February in the General Overseas Service.

## ADDITIONS

A case of 54 head dress badges worn by the Corps and Regiments of the Indian Army on 14th August, 1947 (9543). Presented by General K. M. Cariappa, O.B.E., C.-in-C. and All Ranks of the Indian Army.

An inscribed cup, presented to Sergeant-Saddler G. Breeding of The 5th Dragoon Guards, 1841 (9544). Given by Mrs. E. M. Breeding.

#### SECRETARY'S NOTES

v

A coat of arms and sword of the 6th Regiment of the Local Lanarkshire Militia, 1808 (9545). Given by A. K. L. Harvey, Esq.

A bronze statuette of a private of The Gordon Highlanders, 1916 (9547). Given by A. C. Arbuthnot, Esq.

A uniform and sword of a colonel commandant of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, pre-1922 (9548). Given by Mrs. J. B. Finlaison.

A blue tunic of a lieutenant-colonel of the Royal Marines, post-1922 (9549). Given by Major-General A. M. Craig, C.B., O.B.E., R.M.

#### JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the recent war; also contributions of a general Service character, such as Strategic Principles, Command and Leadership, Morale, Staff Work, Naval, Military, and Air Force History, Customs and Traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's Commanding Officer.

#### CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

#### LECTURES

Arrangements have been made for a colour film and commentary on "Marching in Malaya—Anti-Bandit Operations in May, 1951" to be given by Mr. William Courtenay, O.B.E., M.M., on Wednesday, 5th March, 1952, at 3 o'clock.

On Friday, 25th April, 1952, at 2.30 p.m., Lady Levanton (Carola Oman) will give a lecture in the Institution theatre to the Society for Army Historical Research on "Sir John Moore" Members of the Institution are cordially invited to attend.

#### FOR SALE

##### THE STRATEGY OF THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA CAMPAIGN

Owing to the demand for copies of the above-named lecture, given in 1946 by Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, arrangements have been made for a reprint, with the appropriate pull-out map; price 2s. 6d., post free.

---



**HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI.**

**IN MEMORIAM**

---

**HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI.**

**By the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland,  
and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,  
King, Defender of the Faith**

---


**Born 14th December, 1895  
Ascended the Throne 11th December, 1936**

---

**Patron of the Royal United Service Institution  
since 1937**

---

**Died at Sandringham 6th February, 1952**





*Royal United Service Institution,  
Whitehall, London, S.W.*

9th February.....1952

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

The Chairman, Council and Members of the Royal United Service Institution, with humble duty, beg leave to offer their deepest sympathy to Your Majesty, to Her Majesty The Queen Mother, to Her Majesty Queen Mary, and to all Members of the Royal Family, on the death of His Majesty, the late King.

We deplore the loss to the Commonwealth and Empire of one who by His high example and steadfast devotion to duty has been an inspiration to all His people.


We recall with pride that His Majesty was Patron of this Institution since His Accession to the Throne, and we treasure in our Museum a number of His gracious gifts.

We, Members of this Royal Institution, officers holding Your Majesty's Commission, beg to affirm our loyal devotion to Your Throne and Person.

With the profoundest veneration,

I have the Honour to be, Madam,

Your Majesty's most faithful and devoted servant,



Admiral  
Chairman of the Council

TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY

PROCLAMATION OF ACCESSION  
OF  
HER MAJESTY  
QUEEN ELIZABETH II

“**W**HEREAS it hath pleased Almighty God to call to His Mercy our late Sovereign Lord King George the Sixth of Blessed and Glorious Memory by whose Decease the Crown is solely and rightfully come to the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary : We, therefore, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of this Realm, being here assisted with these of His late Majesty’s Privy Council, with representatives of other members of the Commonwealth, with other Principal Gentlemen of Quality, with the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of London, do now hereby with one voice and Consent of Tongue and Heart publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary is now, by the Death of our late Sovereign of Happy Memory, become Queen Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of this Realm and of all Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, to whom Her lieges do acknowledge all Faith and constant Obedience, with hearty and humble Affection ; beseeching God, by whom Kings and Queens do reign, to bless the Royal Princess Elizabeth the Second with long and happy Years to reign over us.

“ Given at St. James’s Palace this Sixth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two.

“GOD SAVE THE QUEEN”

# **THE JOURNAL**

*of the*

## **Royal United Service Institution**

**Vol. XCVII.**

**FEBRUARY, 1952.**

**No. 585.**

### **THE LAND CAMPAIGN IN KOREA<sup>1</sup>**

By MAJOR-GENERAL B. A. COAD, C.B.E., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 29th October, 1951, at 3 p.m.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RICHARD GALE, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : In introducing our Lecturer to you this afternoon, I would like to say how much we welcome here Allied and Dominion listeners.

General Coad needs no introduction by me. Suffice it to say that in addition to his qualities as a fighting soldier he made a great reputation for himself among our Allies and among our Dominions. In fact, I believe that before he left, he was known affectionately as "that grey-haired old ——" That is not language of my own choosing. It is the language of historical fact, so in those terms I will ask General Coad to give us his lecture.

#### **LECTURE**

**M**Y talk this afternoon will be divided into two parts. First of all, I want to give you a description of the country of Korea and a slight background of the 27th Infantry Brigade which I formed, and to say something of how we got into the Korean war; and also—as the first Commander to serve under United Nations Command—to say a few words on that aspect. In the second part, I will give you a brief account of the operations in which we took part.

#### **DESCRIPTION OF KOREA**

When you arrive in Korea, you arrive at the port of Pusan, which is not a very large port. From it there run two roads up to Taegu and also the railway which you can see marked on the map. The roads in Korea are absolutely appalling, and they run—as you can see—largely up the western side of the country into certain very definite bottlenecks at Taegu, Chochwon, and Seoul, and finally on to Pyongyang. The railway system was built by the Japanese and is a strategic railway. It follows, in the main, the road system. Rail and road travel was extremely slow and very uncomfortable.

The main airfields are located at Pusan, Taegu, Seoul, Kimpo, and Pyongyang. There are a large number of subsidiary airfields which the Americans are, of course, using operationally. The country is very barren and mountainous, especially in the central sector, but not so much on the West coast from South of Seoul up to Chongju, which is the nearest I got to the Yalu. The mountains in the central sector run up to 3,000 feet high and they are all completely razor-backed. They produce a lot of

<sup>1</sup> A sketch-map of Korea faces page 14.

problems and difficulties in the fighting. You eventually find yourself forced to go along these razor-backed mountains on a one-man front or at other times you have, for the last hundred feet or so, to scramble up; and the soldiers have to sling their rifles and scramble up with both hands. That is not at all funny when you have a Chinaman sitting at the top, throwing grenades at you!

#### BACKGROUND OF 27TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

A slight background now of the 27th Brigade. It was formed in August, 1948, and we had the rather grandiose title of the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve. Quite soon we were known as the "fire brigade." We were a full brigade group and by and large the supporting arms were either existent or in cadre form, but the infantry battalions were very changeable. In a period of six months we had no fewer than eight different battalions in our order of battle and just before we went to Hong Kong I had one battalion in Ireland, one in England, and one in Gibraltar—which I thought was a pretty widespread command. However, to make up for it, when I was ordered to Hong Kong, I was given three entirely new battalions. We were at ten days' notice to go anywhere from the moment we formed, and that we found somewhat of a strain over a long period. I, personally, am a very keen gardener, and I used to read the morning paper and, judging by the situation, decide whether it was worth putting in the cabbage seed or even, perhaps, the lettuce seed.

Our first test came in May, 1949, when we were ordered to Hong Kong. We managed, with the help of the War Office and the various Commands concerned, to get the first battalion and my brigade headquarters on to the boat in ten days. The training we were to receive in Hong Kong was of tremendous help to us in Korea. We did a lot of scrambling round the hills, and we got very hard there, though at that time we had, of course, no idea even—probably—where Korea was!

#### BACKGROUND OF KOREA

Just a few words here to tell you a little of the background of Korea and how this war started. When Russia entered the war against the Japanese in 1945, the nearest American troops were in Okinawa some thousand miles South-West of Korea, and it was very obvious that, with the Russians sitting on the Korean frontier, there was every likelihood of their occupying the whole of that country, which obviously would not have suited the American book. A very hasty arrangement was therefore made by quite a low-level American staff committee. Agreement was reached that the country should be partitioned, and it was partitioned at the 38th Parallel. A lot of people think that was a politicians' line, but it was not at all.

The Americans trained and equipped the South Korean Army entirely in terms of internal security duties. They gave them no armour, no aeroplanes, and very little artillery, whereas, of course, the North Koreans, being trained and equipped by the Russians, were equipped for a very different purpose, as was proved when the invasion started on the 25th June, 1950. The North Koreans, as you probably know, had armour. They had plenty of self-propelled guns, a few aeroplanes, quite a lot of artillery, and everything necessary for an aggressive war.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, the Americans had three divisions in Japan. They were the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st United States Cavalry Division, which was in fact an infantry division, and the 25th Division. All these divisions were under strength. They only had two regimental combat teams instead of three, and they also had been trained entirely for internal security duties. When

the invasion of South Korea started, we were in Hong Kong, and there was a lot of speculation as to who was to go. It was obvious that someone would have to go and the betting—I can tell you—was pretty heavy on the fire brigade! However, it was given out in Parliament that the 29th British Brigade was being formed up in England, and no reinforcements would be sent to Korea from the Far East. This was not to be, however, because on the 19th August, 1950, I was informed that I was to take two of my battalions to Korea and my brigade headquarters. We were to have no supporting arms and would be maintained entirely by the Americans. We were to leave in five days' time in H.M.S. *Unicorn*, an aircraft carrier, and H.M.S. *Ceylon*, a cruiser, and we were certainly living up to our name of the fire brigade. We suffered the usual vicissitudes of a quick move, and were given no less than four different establishments in five days. The fourth arrived after we got to Korea, so you can guess what we did with that one!

We were told to hand in all our transport, because the Americans would be providing transport. However, the day before we sailed, we were told we had to take it after all, so we had to get it out again. Good did come out of evil over this since, as we had to take our transport, I was given an infantry workshops and an ordnance field park and, possibly as a sop to my anger, a 17-pound anti-tank troop, Royal Artillery. All these were to join us later, but the main thing was that we got off in time and a strong advance party flew into Korea.

Throughout the operations, there were no real difficulties in being maintained and supported by the Americans. I changed the nomenclature of my staff to agree with theirs. My Brigade Major became S.3. I do not think the Americans ever understood how or why my D.A.A. and Q.M.G. carried out the duties of S.1 and S.4. The method of artillery support was very similar to ours. My company commanders were soon able, without difficulty, to control the fire. Whilst we took bearings in degrees the Americans used mils. The American method was to use traces for the issue of all the orders, but traces do become very inaccurate in reproduction. We experienced inaccuracies up to 2,000 yards, and it caused endless trouble to adjust when you were beside another formation.

#### LIFE IN THE NAKTONG BRIDGEHEAD

The 27th Brigade arrived in Pusan on 28th August, and the excitement was colossal. After all, it was a great day for us. We were the first to come in with the Americans in this United Nations force. There was an American negro band playing on the quayside, marching up and down with a very grandiose drum-major in front, twirling his staff. A South Korean girls' choir was singing "God Save the King." They learned the words as the ships were coming in. Various South Korean maidens presented me with bouquets of flowers. And in the middle of all this, H.M.S. *Unicorn* nearly ran aground. It was not her fault or the fault of the Royal Navy. There was not much water in Pusan harbour.

General Walton Walker, the Eighth Army Commander, had agreed with me that until our transport arrived (it was about seven days behind us) we should not be operational. When, on my arrival, I was met by the senior British liaison officer in Japan, he told me that the North Koreans had had such a hammering from the air that they were quite incapable of launching any co-ordinated offensive. That heartened me a lot. However, on 1st September, there was a complete offensive launched right round the bridgehead. I may say that this liaison officer was a Royal Air Force officer!



The situation deteriorated gradually and it became very serious. I was asked by the Americans whether I would go into action, and I felt it my duty to do so in spite of the fact that we had no transport.

Quite soon after that, when we got fairly static, the situation in the bridgehead was always precarious. We were holding a very wide frontage comparative to the number of troops available, and there was very little reserve at any time to plug the many holes which appeared daily. To give you an idea of the situation: with my two comparatively weak battalions, I had to hold 18,000 yards of front, and I had a gap on my left flank between myself and the next American division which started off at 4,000 yards and quite soon increased to 9,000 yards. Into that gap the best part of a North Korean division infiltrated. Life was always interesting, to say the least of it. Some very fine patrolling was carried out by the Middlesex and the Argylls, and we had our visitations in return.

#### THE BREAK-OUT FROM THE NAKTONG BRIDGEHEAD

The position remained like that until 16th September, which was D-Day for the break-out from the Naktong bridgehead, and it was actually the day before the seaborne landing at Inchon, which is the port for Seoul. We in the bridgehead knew nothing officially about this landing, and I never heard it mentioned by any commander, but rumour was rife, and I think most people thought something was going to happen. The plans for our break-out were that it was to be preceded by two hours of carpet bombing by the American heavies in front of the forward defended localities, and a very heavy artillery programme was planned. The 1st United States Cavalry Division, who were in the line at the time, together with the 5th Regimental Combat Team, who were fresh troops, were to advance up the road towards Taejon and Seoul—in other words by the road which they had withdrawn down. This particular division had been fighting very hard for ten days, and they had been gradually and progressively pushed back every single day. They were extremely tired. I never thought much would come of this offensive with this tired division, but they had in reserve by then the 24th Infantry Division which had been made up to strength largely by the integration of South Koreans. Incidentally, our role was to cross the River Naktong and protect the left flank of the American advance. On the evening before D-Day, I went down to see one of the assaulting regimental combat team commanders, and at that moment he had already been pushed a thousand yards back from his starting line for the next day. He had a battalion and two tanks infiltrated in behind him, and I thought myself that it did not look very good for the next day.

On 16th September, it was raining and therefore the American heavies did not come. Although a very big artillery programme had been laid on, from our positions it was surprisingly quiet; in fact, so much so that one of my staff officers (I had sent him to make a reconnaissance for a harbour area for our assault crossing) found to his horror that his jeep was following the leading tank of the break-out. He very hurriedly turned back. The result of the first day's fighting was that the 5th Regimental Combat Team, who were fresh troops, did advance about a thousand yards. Apart from that, little or no progress was made, and it was not really until the 24th Infantry Division was put in that things started moving.

On 21st September, both my battalions crossed the river over a very ropy single-file footbridge, which was under fire from two self-propelled guns, one definitely direct fire, and it was very heartening to see these battalions moving across in single

file. They never faltered, and we had relatively few casualties. I want you to understand that these two battalions were perfectly normal battalions with quite a large number of national service soldiers in them.

Early on the morning of 22nd September, the Middlesex attacked some high ground held by the enemy. It was the first attack the battalion had done, and after very heavy fighting they were secure on their positions by the evening. The Argylls, who were to attack the next day, did a preliminary operation and beat the Koreans to it. It was a most successful day for the brigade.

Very early on 23rd September the Argylls started for Hill 282. They were up on their objective by 0630 hours, having had a stiff fight half-way up the hill. It was a very creditable effort. Then things began to go wrong. The American gunners supporting us were required elsewhere, and we were left with no one whatsoever. Counter-attacks started to form up against the Argylls, and the only thing to do was to try to break them up. An air attack unfortunately came in on the Argylls' position. Major Ken Muir, the Second-in-Command, had arrived earlier on the position with additional stretcher-bearers to assist in the evacuation of the wounded. He assumed command and personally led two rifle companies back in a counter-attack. Under his inspired leadership the objective was held under repeated attacks until he was fatally wounded and the ammunition was exhausted. He was awarded a very well-merited posthumous V.C.

On 1st October, the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment joined my brigade, and I was delighted to have them. It made three instead of two, which makes tactics so much easier. We were by that time engaged in mopping up the many North Koreans who had been by-passed, and destroying weapons and ammunition dumps. The ammunition dumps were all concealed extremely cleverly, and the quantity of stuff in them was staggering, considering that we had complete air superiority. It did look rather as though the war were coming to an end. The landing, you remember, had gone well up at Seoul and the forces were almost joined up or had joined up by then. It really looked as though we had done our job and brought ourselves back to the 38th parallel.

#### THE AIRLIFT TO SEOUL

However, one evening I received a message to say that the whole of my brigade were to be airlifted to Kimpo airfield at Seoul. This was a really magnificent piece of American staff work. The headquarters ordering the move was some 40 miles away, and it was done over an indifferent wireless link. My battalions were very scattered, and the nearest airfield was some 25 miles away. It entailed a relief in the line and a journey over most appalling roads. We had to get into aeroplanes at Taegu. All that happened was that two staff officers—one of mine and one American—supervised the emplaning of some 2,000 men. At the receiving end the deplaning was supervised by one American staff officer, who did the double role after dark of guiding the planes in his jeep into the dispersal areas. The whole of that airlift went most smoothly without any hitch whatsoever and, believe it or not, not one single piece of paper was written by anybody about it.

#### THE BATTLE OF SARIWON

It was decided then that the 38th parallel was to be crossed, and they had flown us up there because they wanted us to join in the crossing. We did a good deal of very unsatisfactory fighting just North of the 38th parallel. I kept on being put out onto an axis which did not exist, and we floundered about in those mountains.

I think we did not do a lot of good, and I was longing for someone to put me out on a decent axis and let us go. They did, eventually. They ordered me to capture a place called Sariwon. We were 34 miles away from it, and it was reputed to be the Aldershot of North Korea. The Argylls led the advance, and after two minor actions reached some high ground East of the town where a most successful action was fought by the leading company under David Wilson. They killed about 40 North Koreans, and they captured a lot more, and that gave us Sariwon. It was a big place, very badly bombed, and the Argylls went in and I slipped the Australians through and told them to go North and cut the road. They advanced about eight miles before dark, then they went firm. The most exciting night ensued, because (though we did not know it until afterwards) the North Koreans had not heard that we were in Sariwon and a whole lot of them were trying to come up from the South and West, making North for their capital, Pyongyang.

Leslie Nielson, the Commanding Officer of the Argylls, was going out to visit one of his companies at the South end of the town, and as he drove down the road he saw coming up towards him on either side a double file of North Koreans. The leading people fired at him, but he kept his head and shouted to his driver, "Put your foot on it!" He drove four miles through these North Koreans who were marching up. Then, when he got clear of them, he took to the hills and spent a most unpleasant night. The mortar officer of the Argylls, Robin Fairey, had been visiting another company and walked round the corner into the middle of a lot of North Koreans. He kept his head, too, and said "Rusky! Rusky!", whereupon some of them patted him on the back. He did not linger but nipped round the next corner and got away.

The Australians North of the town had to turn themselves back to back, put their reserve company facing the other way, and fight both ends of the battalion. The Second-in-Command, coming up with the rations, found he was accompanied by North Koreans which shocked him a lot. Throughout the night very confused fighting went on, and in the morning we had captured over 2,000 North Koreans. We had killed more than 150 and—incredible though it may seem—we had only one chap killed. That was again an extremely satisfactory day for the brigade, which had advanced 42 miles.

#### THE ADVANCE TO THE RIVER YALU

After that, we eventually reached the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, and once again—there was possibly a little holiday spirit in the air—the war looked as though it might be getting towards the end.

We were pretty tired and hoped we should have a chance of doing some maintenance to our vehicles and making up a little lost sleep. But that was not to be, because the morning after we arrived, I received a trace which showed that I was to lead the advance on one road with a South Korean Division on my right. We were to go up to what was then known as the MacArthur line, which was about Chongju, the idea being—I did not know it until afterwards—that we were to stop there and the South Koreans were to go up to the Yalu, as it was thought the Chinese would not mind them so much. Our first job was to link up with some American airborne troops dropped North of Pyongyang with the object of cutting off North Koreans trying to get out. We partially linked up with them on the first day. A good deal of fighting was going on and it looked as though we were going to have a party! The following morning the Australians were leading. What had actually happened was that we had a very large number of North Koreans trapped between

the American airborne troops and ourselves and, due to the fact that we did not know quite where the airborne troops were, we could not use our artillery or mortars. All the fighting had to be done with infantry weapons and nothing else—the Bren gun, the rifle, the bayonet, and the grenade. This was down the Australians' street. Their leading company led off and very soon they were under fire from three sides. The battalion deployed, and, to give you an idea of the type of fighting, the C.O. put a company over a small hill and they killed about 70 North Koreans and went on. The C.O. then moved up with his tactical headquarters and was immediately counter-attacked, and he had a grim battle with his small party. His batman was killed beside him. They accounted for another eight or nine, and they found a lot of dug-outs on this hill. They started setting fire to them and bolted a whole lot more. These North Koreans were not prepared to give up. As the Australians drove them off to the hills, they got down into the paddy and were hiding in the paddy, in the ditches, everywhere sniping and being an infernal nuisance.

I saw a marvellous sight. An Australian platoon lined up in a paddy field and walked through it as though they were driving snipe. The soldiers, when they saw a pile of straw, kicked it and out would bolt a North Korean. Up with a rifle, down with a North Korean, and the Australians thoroughly enjoyed it! They did that the whole day, and they really were absolutely in their element.

The advance to Chongju, the nearest I got to the Yalu River, took us about ten days, and the North Koreans were by no means disorganized or anything else. On the last three days of our advance the American Air Force and ourselves knocked out 22 tanks and six self-propelled guns. By this time the orders had been changed, and we were ordered to go on to Yalu. We got into Chongju and, in spite of the goal being so close, I asked the American Divisional Commander under whose command I was at the moment—as my troops were very tired—to pass a regimental combat team through us, because up to then none of them had been deployed at all.

I honestly think we had cracked the nut, as this regimental combat team that went through us, advanced 16 miles that night and met nothing excepting some tanks which were actually on railway flats. They could have gone straight on to the Yalu and I think would have found nothing.

On our first night of rest we were bombed. This was the first time we had had any air against us and, when I say we were bombed, I mean that a Cub plane, a little Auster plane, came over, and I think he had a jerrican full of explosives which the fellow pitched over the side, unfortunately into the Australian battalion, slightly wounding a couple of them. The Australians were furious, and I never saw such a Brock's benefit. Bren guns, rifle fire, and everything else went up. This plane came on and machine-gunned my headquarters at about three o'clock in the morning. The same chap leaned over the side with a Burp gun and let that off. The sequel was that two days later, in the Army Intelligence Report, it was said that the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade Headquarters had been strafed by jet fighters! Our rest was somewhat short-lived, because that very day I was ordered to send a battalion to Taechon, which was some 42 miles away, and they were to go up there and form a block. The next afternoon I was ordered to withdraw the whole of my brigade less this battalion back to Pakchon, North of Anju, and I had no idea why.

#### THE CHINESE INTERVENTION

We had not got transport to lift the chaps. However, we struggled away, and I got the two battalions back. They arrived at eight o'clock in the evening, and I



went off to see the Divisional Commander to find out what the form was. I went into the tent, where there were a lot of very excited people, and I found the Divisional Commander gazing at the map. He turned to me and said: "The Chinese are in. The Third World War has started!" I thought that a good beginning for any evening. I said: "What do you want me to do?" He said: "Take the rest of your brigade to that place—Taecheon." I pointed out that Taecheon was some 25 miles away from anybody, in a very isolated position, so he said he would put a regimental combat team behind me—which he did. They were only there for two hours when they were removed because they were required elsewhere. Eventually I arrived at Taecheon with the Middlesex and the Argylls and my headquarters. It was the first time we had seen the Chinese. There were quite a lot of dead Chinamen lying about. The only way we could distinguish them was that they wore rather attractive fur boots, and those soldiers whose feet were small enough took full benefit.

We had only been there 24 hours when two or three Chinamen came down the road from the North to turn themselves in with grins on all their faces. They said there were another two or three thousand up the road.

We stayed in this isolated position for two days, not really knowing what was happening. Then we got orders to withdraw, and we withdrew on our feet. We were closely followed by the Chinese who were trying to squeeze us out. I think they very nearly succeeded. We were under small arms fire as we came back, and it was all most exciting.

What had actually happened was that when we led out of Pyongyang we had a South Korean Division on our right. This division had bumped the Chinese, and they were quite good. They stopped advancing and stood on the defensive. The Americans then sent up the 1st United States Cavalry Division to help them, and this Division got a pretty bloody nose: they lost the best part of two battalions. There had also been a very big Chinese breakthrough, further to the East, and they were advancing down the central sector. That, of course, we only discovered a little later on. It was then, as I have said, that we were ordered to withdraw, and I was told that I had to hold part of a river bridgehead North of Anju. We had to form this bridgehead with an American regimental combat team and hang on there until someone broke out, though we did not know quite who was going to break out.

My brigade was ordered up into the North-West corner of the bridgehead, and the American regimental combat team was in the South-East corner. There was a gap of some six or seven miles between us. The position obviously invited envelopment. By the afternoon of 4th November, one battalion of this U.S. regimental combat team was cut off and had lost all its transport. At 0630 hours on 5th November, they reported two battalions cut off, and at 0830 hours, as I was expecting, the Argylls reported that the road behind us was cut and that the American artillery supporting us was under small arms and mortar fire. The Argylls were ordered to attack, and they went in. I would like to say how magnificently these American gunners fought. Dead Chinese were lying 30 yards from the gun shields. There was only a battery and they had only twelve rounds left when we got to them. It was a stirring sight; as one man dropped behind a gun another took his place straight away. It was up to the very highest traditions of any artillery regiment.

The Chinese plan was a very good one. They were out to blow up the bridge just behind these gunners. One demolition squad with their explosives was killed



within 20 yards of the bridge. If they had blown it up, I should not have got out a single tank or vehicle. The air then reported that a Chinese division was in behind us, and we had to deploy the whole of the brigade to get out. Every battalion had a fight, and one battalion had two. By the evening we were still on the right side of the river, but holding a much closer bridgehead just by Anju, and we made some sort of contact with some of the Americans on the right, but had a completely open left flank. During the night the Chinese attacked us, and we managed to beat them off. The next day the Chinese broke contact, and went back about 10 miles.

When this bridgehead was re-established, three divisions and my brigade went into it, and we did a slow thousand yard a day advance. That will give you an idea of the size with two brigades trying to hold it.

On 24th November, having got our original bridgehead back again, we resumed the United Nations offensive to the River Yalu. On 25th November, the Chinese launched their second offensive on an even bigger scale than before and it also involved the American X Corps which had been landed at Wonsan. American and British Marines were fighting on the Chosin reservoir, and part of one U.S. division was on the Yalu. One South Korean division was the best part of the way to Siberia. This offensive involved all of us.

A series of withdrawals now took place. One of these was in a 132-mile withdrawal from a position 35 miles North of Pyongyang, for, as far as we could see, no apparent reason other than some ominous red arrows marked on the operational maps, showing that the whole of the United Nations forces were about to be encircled.

We did rearguard back to Pyongyang and we handed our duty over there to the 29th British Brigade, which had just become operational. We felt extremely proud, because we led the United Nations out of Pyongyang and were the last people back.

I would like here to tell you a story of the Indian Field Ambulance which joined me later. They were up at Pyongyang with all their equipment, and they had a six months' supply of everything. As you can gather, the decision to evacuate Pyongyang was a very quick one, and as soon as the Indian Field Ambulance Commander realized that the town was going to be given up, he asked for a railway engine to pull his stores out. He was told that there was not one available, and that he must burn his stores. He said: "That is quite fantastic, because all my doctors will have nothing to do. We have six months' supply of everything." They then found an engine, but as there was no water in it the other ranks formed a chain and filled the engine up with jerricans. Then they looked for coal, but there was no coal, so they went out wooding. They cut wood and lit a fire in the engine and got the water boiling. Two soldiers said they knew how to drive the engine, and they drove that train over the last bridge at Pyongyang at 0400 hours in the morning. At 0500 hours the bridge went up. It was a great piece of initiative and determination.

#### THE 38TH PARALLEL

We had got back now to the 38th parallel, which was the new front line. It was rather amusing when we were going back. You do not know when you are crossing the 38th parallel. There is nothing to tell you. But a large notice-board was put up by the Americans saying: "You are now crossing the 38th parallel by kind permission of the 4th Chinese Army."

My position was just North of Uijongbu. We knew the Chinese would attack either on Christmas Day or on New Year's Day, and a plan had already been made

for a rearguard action from Seoul in which we featured. We had actually reconnoitred this position and had partially dug it. Christmas Day passed in very uneasy tension. The troops' dinners were served in the open in a snowstorm, but the spirit of all ranks was beyond praise. On New Year's Eve, the expected Chinese offensive was launched and by the morning a most unhappy state of affairs existed. One South Korean division had folded up altogether. Two American Divisions had come back about 5,000 yards, and it was most difficult. I was told to do a most peculiar operation. I had to advance and then act as rearguard to a South Korean Division. How we did it, I don't know, but it did work! The Australian battalion was cut off, but we managed to "uncut" them. To be rearguard to a South Korean Division is a most tricky operation, because no one can tell when friends end and foes start. I cannot tell you how closely the Chinese followed up the South Koreans. However, we got away with it and we then got them back through us without any untoward incident.

#### FIGHTING IN ARCTIC CONDITIONS

A word here would not be out of place about fighting in Arctic conditions. Our first taste of the cold was in the middle of November. We were still wearing jungle green and cellular underwear when, without notice, the wind changed to the North-East, and we had 25° of frost. For those who have not experienced these things, I might say that anti-freeze in a solution of one to one freezes. This was nothing, of course, to what we were to experience later, when we had as much as 45° of frost, but by then we had our winter clothing. In these conditions, everything froze in a few minutes. Hot water poured into the radiator of a motor car was ice before it reached the bottom. The men had to dry their socks twice a day to avoid frostbite. Socks could not be removed unless the owner was sitting in front of a fire. Life was extremely difficult. Water took 1½ hours to boil. A tin of meat, to get warm, had to go into boiling water for two hours. Simple mathematics will tell you how long our dinner took to prepare.

As to our weapons, they caused us little trouble. With the medium machine guns, the lock was put in the sentry's pocket. With the Bren guns and rifles, a burst fired now and again kept them in operation. American 105 mm. artillery and New Zealand 25-pounders, when they joined us, were somewhat limited in their range due to the cold conditions. The New Zealand artillery joined me in January: they were all volunteers. Other than their C.O. and battery commanders hardly any of them had ever been gunners before, and they only had three months' training. They concentrated on their gunnery training, and as regards shooting they were first-class.

#### WITHDRAWAL THROUGH SEOUL

I left the operational picture with the bridgehead round Seoul being formed by American troops and the 29th British Brigade. At this time General Ridgway had just come out to take over the Eighth Army, and he said we were going to hold. However, on 3rd January, 1951, the Chinese renewed their attacks and started to penetrate. By about midday things were not looking very good. I was sent for at 1415 hours by the Divisional Commander, and I got the shortest order I ever had in my life. He just said to me, "Coad we are going to pull!" I was ordered to do rearguard to cover two American divisions. Unfortunately, it was not the rearguard position that we had reconnoitred. It was a new one, and I had to be in there by last light. Due entirely to the initiative and experience of my battalion commanders we were in position in the new place by last light. During the night, the American

Divisions withdrew through us, and by 0430 hours we were in contact with the Chinese. Both flanks were entirely open and in spite of many invitations to hold my position until 1400 hours next day, all of which I managed to refute, I was able to extricate my brigade over the river South of Seoul by 1000 hours. It was a most eerie experience in this very large and deserted town and, looking back on it, I think we were very lucky to get out intact. Had we been involved in street fighting, it would have been very dangerous.

#### CONCLUSION

My story is nearly ended now except that, as far as I was concerned, there were three more months of fighting to be done. The Chinese attacked us again, but were held, and we were then involved in a five weeks' advance in the central sector. It was appallingly mountainous, and there was very hard fighting. We managed to capture our objective, and I asked General Ridgway to put us in reserve, as all the commanders and the men were very exhausted. This was agreed to, and all ranks had their second hot shower and took their boots off at night for the second time since they had been in Korea. The only other time was when they flew to Kimp'o and we had to wait for transport. It was a great test of endurance, particularly for ordinary normal soldiers.

I started off with two battalions, the Argylls and the Middlesex, and my brigade headquarters; finally, when I gave up command at the end of March, I had the Australian battalion, I had a Canadian battalion, I still had the Argylls and I still had the Middlesex. I had a New Zealand regiment supporting me with 25-pounders, and I had an Indian field ambulance. It was a very good cross-section of the Commonwealth, and no commander could have been privileged to have a better team than I had there.

#### DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting is now open for discussion. Certainly there will be many questions you will like to ask General Coad, and he will do his best to answer them.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. D. CARDEW: I should like to ask the Lecturer whether the South Korean forces were largely recruited from the ex-Japanese-trained Korean troops?

THE LECTURER: They were not trained men. They were trained under the auspices of the Americans and supervised by the Americans. The training was quite short.

MAJOR-GENERAL E. GILES: Can you tell us what is the usual composition of a combat team?

THE LECTURER: It is exactly the same as a brigade group, consisting of three battalions. They have their own artillery and their own armour.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. G. STONE: Can you tell us something of the quality of the Chinese troops? How good were they? What was the standard of training, and so on?

THE LECTURER: I would say that they are first-class. I, personally, did not fight against the Japs, but all the chaps in my brigade who had done so said they were exactly the same. They have no fear of death. When they are dug in, you have to winkle them out with a bayonet, or get within five yards with a Bren gun and squirt it into their dug-outs. They are very fit and extremely well trained in night attacks, which means they are good soldiers. Their accuracy with their mortars varies, but their machine-guns are handled extremely well. It might be of interest that the 4th Chinese Army came in with Bren guns and Thomson sub-machine-guns, 1942 pattern, which presumably had been sent elsewhere during the war. The other armies that came in had practically 100 per cent. American weapons.

COMMANDER J. KERANS : Can you tell us, something of the organization of the prisoners of war in your Division ?

THE LECTURER : As far as I know, the prisoners we captured were all back-loaded to various islands off the South coast. The organization to get them there I never saw, but I suppose they marched down the road. They did not go in trucks, I promise you !

SQUADRON LEADER W. R. BAIRD : Could the Lecturer tell us something about air support ?

THE LECTURER : The air support is very much the same as in our system. It has certain limitations in that, due to various people being on the same wireless frequencies, you probably cannot get as much air as you really want. It cuts the other way in that the American fighters are sitting on the aerodrome waiting for something to do. One gets a lot of air, and it was extremely useful and more than that. It saved our bacon very often ! The jet fighters were certainly very good for strafing in front of our troops, and the napalm which the Americans use now is one of the things the Chinese dislike most.

BRIGADIER B. B. RACKHAM : Could you say anything about the use of helicopters ?

THE LECTURER : Yes, I could say quite a lot about helicopters. They were used primarily for the evacuation of wounded, and the American idea was to get the really badly wounded chap back right from the front line where he is hit. We had a lot of experience trying to bring this about, but it does not quite work out like that. Obviously, a helicopter pilot is very loath to come down where there are mortar bombs falling. He also dislikes coming down if there are machine-guns firing at him. In most cases he will not come down—quite rightly. If you can get the pilots to come to the right place, it is an ideal way of getting a badly hit chap out who probably would not live if motored over those appalling roads and tracks. But the limitations are getting helicopters up into the company area. We did do it sometimes. At other times the helicopter hovered and went off again. There is a lot in it for the evacuation of wounded.

Just before I left it became fashionable for senior commanders to use helicopters when visiting their troops. The Americans, who always find lovely names for things, called them "egg-beaters." The helicopter is a frightening thing to fly in, I personally think.

A MEMBER : When the Chinese came in were they supported from the air, or did we maintain complete air superiority ?

THE LECTURER : The whole thing about the air is that as long as we can stop the Chinese from preparing the airfields in North Korea and force them to operate from North of the Yalu, the limit of the jet fighter brings them down somewhere North of Pyongyang. They cannot get further because of fuel. That is, I know, of great interest to the American heavy bombers who want to make certain that this limit is maintained.

MAJOR-GENERAL C. M. BARBER : We believe that our system of training has stood up to the test well. Are there any particular aspects of the training of the future which you would wish to underline for this particular type of fighting ?

THE LECTURER : You need the ability and fitness to be able to climb up the hills. The answer we found, which was our bible, was : "He who holds the highest ground will be the victor." It is a technique and a strain to clamber up these hills, and you have to be very fit. We had to try to evolve a technique for getting up the last hundred feet of these great razor-backed mountains, and we did things with artillery and mortars which were probably not very safe, but which did help us. Due to the very sharp razor backs, you could have stuff falling very much closer, with reasonable safety.

CAPTAIN D. GILMOUR, R.N. : One of the difficulties you must have experienced at one point—I have heard a bit about this—is the question of feeding the men and supplies in general, transport in the field, and especially in the centre part. It must be very



difficult to get stuff to your men. Was that done through the Americans or did we have a big say in that ourselves?

THE LECTURER: We were entirely maintained by the Americans who provided us with food, petrol, and everything else. But we had to get it to the troops, and getting it to the men up these mountains is very difficult. What we really could have done with was mules. They would have been ideal. Instead of that, we had about 200 South Korean porters with each battalion and we got jeeps to go as far as they could before dumping their loads. Thence matters were organized by the battalion Seconds-in-Command, who fed the supplies up the mountains with porters. The porters were always escorted to make certain they did not run away and in case they ran into trouble. By and large they did us very well. It is a problem. One has to go short. The first night up a mountain in very cold weather, you have to take something to sleep in, and you have to adjust your ideas as to what you can get up—whether you are to be short of food, or to be cold, and what ammunition you require.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. SCOTT MONCRIEFF: Could the Lecturer tell us the extent to which the North Koreans and Chinese used armour and the effect of this on the weapons employed against them?

THE LECTURER: Personally, I never encountered any Chinese armour or self-propelled guns at all, but there was a lot of North Korean armour. Once we started breaking out they always used their tanks as pill-boxes. They would hide them extremely cleverly and they were very difficult to locate and very bravely manned.

They also handled self-propelled guns extremely well. They were always moving round, and they were quite prepared to go off without infantry and come up round your side, or even back-side, and open fire at you. They were certainly a problem.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: You told us it was not easy to tell the difference between the North and South Koreans. Was there any great enmity between them? Did they fight against each other, and was there a burning desire on the part of one side to defeat the other?

THE LECTURER: They hate the sight of each other, and you have probably heard that Dr. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean Premier, is always inciting everyone to rush up to the Yalu. They always disliked each other. It is extraordinary: a South Korean cannot differentiate between a South and North Korean until he speaks to him, but despite that they are absolutely at daggers drawn and hate each other. Why, I cannot answer.

THE CHAIRMAN.—We shall close the discussion now, and it only remains for me, on your behalf, to thank the Lecturer.

However, there are one or two points which may be worth making. The first is that this lecture is one of a series of three: one we have had on the naval aspect of this campaign; this one on the army side of it; and one we shall have shortly on the air side. Taken together, the three of them will give us a very fair picture of the lessons that can be deduced from the Korean campaign.

Secondly, I think there are lessons that can be deduced from it, and very important lessons. The first one that strikes me is that whenever the Whitehall warriors plan, we so frequently find ourselves fighting under entirely different circumstances. In 1914, we concentrated on an expeditionary force that was prepared and equipped and trained to fight in France with our Allies, the French. In spite of that, we undertook a terrific combined operation in Gallipoli without the success that we might have wished. We were not properly prepared for that type of operation. In 1939, we knew we had to fight again with our French Allies on the continent. Yet, in addition to this, we undertook operations in Norway and once again were completely unprepared for that type of business. In 1949, and the early part of 1950, we all knew that we were preparing for some kind of war, and we all had a pretty good idea of where that war might be fought, but nobody—in his



wildest moments—least of all our American friends—thought there would be a major campaign and a major war in Korea. Yet, by the middle of 1950, we were joined together in a serious battle of a nature we had never foreseen. I should say that this is the first big lesson. It points to the danger of being too much in the hands of the planners, and it points to the necessity for we British and our friends to be prepared to fight anywhere.

The second big lesson that comes out of this is that we can fit in and fight together. When I went out to Korea, I found that Aubrey Coad's brigade consisted of a Highland battalion, a London battalion, an Australian battalion, a Canadian battalion, a New Zealand field regiment, and an Indian field ambulance, and the whole thing was working like clockwork—more than that. His brigade was working in American formations. A brigade is not a formation. It is a bit of a formation. Yet that brigade was able to fit into the American set-up like a hand in a well-fitting glove. As he himself has said, he found no great difficulty.

The next thing we learn, I think, is that we must be prepared to undertake rather stupendous tasks. We must avoid saying we can do "this" under "these circumstances," or we can do "that" under "those circumstances." We have to do what we are called upon to do. General Coad said (I just took down his actual words): "I felt it my duty to hold a front of 18,000 yards with a brigade." He had there four to nine thousand yards of exposed flank. I have been told by some that this is too wide a front and is not possible. Yet General Coad did it!

My next point is the assessment of the ability of troops to fight. That is very important for any people who are concerned with fighting. It is a great art—a great gift—and it is something that all commanders have to try to develop: that assessment of how much fight there is left in soldiers. It was interesting. He said that at a certain stage he thought the 1st Cavalry Division had just about had it, and he was probably right. This ability to assess the amount of kick left in soldiers is a very serious thing, and one we have to study; indeed, we do study it.

Next, I am sure we all think there is a tendency for staffs to use too much paper. It comes along in peace-time; it grows and grows and we try to get rid of it. Coad was able to carry out a big move by air—a complicated move by a means of transport which he had not used before—and the whole thing was done without one shred of paper. All the more power to his elbow, but all the more power to the American elbow that made it possible to do it without the issue of "bumph."

General Coad made a remark that struck me. He said: "I honestly think we had cracked the nut." That, to my mind, is the essence of generalship. When have you cracked the nut? How often, both in actual operations and in training, one sees a situation in which the onlooker thinks he sees that the nut has been cracked, but the fellow who has the wherewithal to go through and cash in on it does not know it. That is a great lesson. If the commander can tell when the nut is cracked and then chuck everything in, he will turn a doubtful defeat into a definite disaster.

The last thing I have to say is not a lesson but a matter of fact. It is a very interesting matter of fact. When I went over to Korea I saw our two brigades—his and the 29th. General Coad's brigade consisted of a proportion of regular soldiers filled up with National Service men. We know how well they did. The 29th Brigade consisted of a small proportion of Regular soldiers backed by up Z Reservists. I can assure you that in Korea there was nothing between the two. I do not know what we learn from that except that apparently we can still fight, whether we are National Service men or Z men.

I would like to ask you to join me in thanking General Coad for his spirited and soldierly description of what was a great campaign. (*Applause.*)

---



## EUROPE TO-DAY

By MR. SEBASTIAN HAFFNER

On Wednesday, 31st October, 1951, at 3 p.m.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. O. LYNE, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : To many of us Mr. Sebastian Haffner needs no introduction. He came here last year and gave us a most absorbing talk on the conditions in Western Europe, and I am glad to say that he has been persuaded to come again this afternoon. He tells me that he is not necessarily going to follow through his talk of last year, but obviously it will be very closely connected. He is going to talk to us to-day about the situation in Europe.

### LECTURE

EUROPE has, in the last two years, not been in the centre of the news. Last year it was the Far East ; to-day it is the Middle East. But all this time events in Europe have not stood still, and we have by easy stages arrived at a very crucial situation where two fateful interconnected decisions have to be taken. One of these concerns the next step in Germany and the other, connected with it, concerns the method and degree of political integration in Western Europe.

To these two topics I intend to devote the main part of my lecture, but before I launch out into them I should like to pin-point the questions and put them in their context in two ways, first by seeing how the present European situation has developed historically, and, secondly, by trying to make out the position of Europe in the present world situation as a whole.

### EUROPEAN POST-WAR HISTORY : FOUR PERIODS

The post-war history of Europe falls into four periods, each comprising roughly two years. The first period lasted from 1945 to 1947. During that time the Western policy was still based on the war-time alliance with Russia and the belief that it could be sustained beyond the cessation of hostilities, that a settlement in Europe could be worked out in agreement with Russia, and that Europe could be run by continued " Big Three " co-operation.

This conception was never shared by Russia, as we learned in those two years. The Russian conception was that with the breakdown of Hitler's Europe and of the Nazi " New Order," the European soil was generally prepared for the absorption of Europe in the Russian power sphere, that America would fairly soon turn her back on Europe, and that Britain alone was not strong enough to hold this completely disrupted continent against the military power of Russia and the ideological power of the crusading Communist doctrine.

As a consequence, " Big-Three " co-operation in Europe and quadripartite rule in Germany never worked at all. Where Russia was in military occupation, the Communists were helped to power, and all Western influence was rigorously excluded. Eastern Europe, and soon also Eastern Germany, disappeared behind the " Iron Curtain." At the same time there was by no means any comparable process going on in Western Europe. In Western Europe the local Communist parties, sitting in the Governments, were given complete freedom and a great deal of power ; and it looked not improbable that Western Europe, too, would sooner or later be absorbed into the expanding Russian Empire.

This situation came to a head in the Spring of 1947, when it became clear that a peace settlement was not within reach, that the quadripartite administration of Germany was not going to succeed any longer, and that the battle was on for the possession of Europe as a whole. This led to a completely new turn in American policy towards Europe, with which British policy aligned itself; and Western policy now came to be based on the idea that Western Europe had in any case to be held by the West, whatever in the meantime happened to Eastern Europe.

So we come to the second post-war period in Europe, 1947 to 1949. It was the period when what is now called the "Cold War" began and when, through the Marshall Plan and later through the North Atlantic Treaty, Western Europe was consolidated against the Communist political offensive. The Russian answer, after some weak attempts to forestall this consolidation process in Western Europe by political strikes in France and Italy, was counter-consolidation in Eastern Europe; the last vestiges of "People's Democracy," as it was called, were removed and Eastern Europe was put on a basis of assimilation into the Russian system, and very largely of direct control by Russian emissaries.

These two consolidation processes were both largely successful. The Western one was an unqualified success. The Russian one was not quite an unqualified success because it lost the Russians Yugoslavia. But, apart from that, the Russians did succeed in transforming that part of Europe which they had under military occupation into a fairly solidified empire. Just so did the West succeed in stopping the economic rot, and thereby the political rot, in Western Europe and in laying the foundations on which some effective power could again be built in Western Europe.

This period of partition and consolidation closed in 1949 with the end of the Berlin blockade and with the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, in which a kind of stalemate was generally and tacitly recognized. The Russians had to resign themselves for the time being to the failure of their grand design of the early post-war period when they had hoped that they could absorb the whole of Europe. At the same time the West resigned itself for the time being to the fact that there was no political means, within the prevailing balance of power, of pushing the Russians back. The result was a rather precarious *modus vivendi* which has prevailed up to this year. The period of stalemate—1949-51—is the third period of European post-war history.

This stalemate and *modus vivendi* never amounted to a settlement. There was no peace treaty with Germany or Austria. As a consequence, all the things which hang on the conclusion of these treaties, namely, the evacuation of Russian troops from Eastern Europe, could not come about; but at the same time there is no settlement which maintains or justifies this occupation for ever. At some time a settlement will have to be approached. When that time will be, and how the approach can be made, depends on the development of the balance of power.

In this respect the last year, 1951, has brought an important change which, I think, marks the beginning of the fourth and probably most decisive period in Europe when the final shape of the continent will have to be negotiated and settled. The great development which this year has seen is, of course, the fairly rapid strengthening of the Western military power and the consequent shift in the balance of power between the Western coalition and Russia.

Up to this year the military position in Europe was all the time such that, if war had broken out, the Russians would, within the first few weeks of the war, have marched to the Channel with nobody being able to stop them. In a world-wide view,



this local military superiority of Russian power in Europe was to some extent balanced by other factors. But locally it was nevertheless a very potent political factor. The consciousness of all Europeans that they were all the time living at Russia's mercy made it impossible to make Western Europe an active contributory factor in building up Western strength. As long as the Western Europeans felt that, in the event of war, they could not be defended, but only at best liberated, their morale was too low for them to make the full contribution to Western strength which might physically be in their power.

Equally in Eastern Europe, consciousness of Russian local superiority stopped all hopes of an early change. It was clear to the Eastern Europeans, whatever their inclinations and ultimate hopes, that for the time being they had to accommodate themselves to their present situation as best they could and that war could only make it worse.

All this begins to change from the moment when the local military situation in Europe holds out some hope that in case of a war (which need not happen but might happen) it would *not* be a foregone conclusion that Western Europe would fall to early Russian conquest, but that it could be effectively defended; and the change in morale would be even greater once there were prospects that the local balance of power would definitely tilt over and give the Western Powers in Europe the possibility of taking the offensive in case of war.

Between last Autumn and this Autumn the balance of power has begun to shift. It is true that at this moment there is no full military security yet, but it is now in process of fairly rapid development, and it is possible that we may already have passed the worst part of the danger period which this shift always implies. If the Russians wanted to prevent the building up of strength in Western Europe by a preventive war they may already have missed the best time for doing so. By next Summer or Autumn their superiority will already be so reduced that the defence has a chance; and by 1953, if Western rearmament proceeds according to plan, Western Europe should be safe against invasion.

If this fact begins to sink in—and it is bound to sink in—during the next year or two, we can expect a profound change of morale and political feeling in both Western and Eastern Europe. Indeed, one can sense the beginnings of this change in morale even now. From the moment that people in Western Europe begin to feel reasonably physically safe again, they will begin to think more in terms of aspirations and wishes than of preoccupations and fears. A corresponding psychological change can be expected to take place in Eastern Europe, where the people will begin to speculate again on the possibilities of a change for the better, whereas so far they have just speculated on how best to lie low and continue to exist. On this somewhat optimistic note I end my first, historical, part.

I shall now attempt to put the European position into its world context and to ask the question: What should and what must be the Western aim in Europe? Sooner or later and, if possible, without war, we must achieve a European settlement with Russia. What kind of settlement? In order to give a rational answer to that question we must look at what is happening in the world to-day in broad historical terms.

#### THE WORLD HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE TREND TOWARDS WORLD UNITY

We must forget for the moment the diplomatic situation of the last few years and look at the history of the last 50 or 100 years and the outlook for the next 50 or



100 years. If we take this perspective, one overwhelming aspect of world affairs begins to impress itself upon us, and that is the enormous pull towards world unity. This may sound a little surprising in view of the many wars, conflicts, and crises with which we have been plagued these last 30 or 40 years, but I suggest to you that these very wars, upheavals, and conflicts are part of this enormous historic development towards a united world civilization and a united political world organization.

To speak of civilization first, we have been taught by Spengler or Toynbee to think in terms of many co-existing civilizations in various parts of the world; and this certainly has been the general lay-out of history for the last 2,000 or 3,000 years. But if one considers the development of Western civilization in the last 200 or 300 years, one cannot fail to be struck by something which is really without precedent in known history, namely, the increasing tendency of one civilization to transcend and absorb all others and become universal. This one civilization is, I suggest, the scientific, technical, and industrial civilization which we have, for want of a better name, come to call Western.

It is no longer purely a "Western" civilization. Such Eastern countries as Japan have become—if only, perhaps, at second hand—complete members of this civilization. Another Eastern country, Turkey, became a voluntary adherent to the civilization after the 1914-18 War. Countries like India and Pakistan try to acquire at least the fruits of it although we do not yet know whether they can grow its roots. Generally, if you look over the Islamic world, the world of Buddhism and Eastern Asia, and even the more primitive worlds of Africa, you always encounter the enormous capacity of this new scientific, industrial, and technical approach to life first to overlay and then to absorb the traditional, mostly religious, civilizations of those areas. That is one way in which this modern civilization, which we call Western, tends to become universal and spread over the whole world.

There is another way in which it works towards the same end. By its own achievements, by its technical successes, it has, as you all know, shrunk the globe. The nations, even the continents, which yesterday formed units of civilization, find themselves increasingly powerless to preserve this coherent, firm, exclusive unity. In the face of modern machine power, they find themselves powerless to do the first duty of a State in time of war—to keep their territory inviolate. Only Russia and America have now a chance to plan and wage a war as units and to survive it as units. All other nations are forced into combinations which tend to become more permanent and more political; for, once nations are definitely bound up in defence and have to merge their defence forces and to plan for wars waged jointly and in common, they cannot avoid taking the second step and merging Governments, because it is Governments that control armed forces, plan for war, and wage war.

So we have an irresistible general trend towards bigger integrations, and the only question is: Will there be, as it were, intermediate stages—perhaps continent-wide integrations—or shall we, together with the general spread of a universal civilization, arrive at a universal and world-wide political integration?

Here we are reminded of the League of Nations and the United Nations, which have not been unqualified successes. At the same time, if their failures, or relative failures, are recognized, there still seems to be a tendency for systems which were at first conceived on a purely regional basis to grow so much in extension that they tend almost to become competing universal systems. I might remind you of the North Atlantic Treaty which started as a purely Atlantic Alliance. It has now taken in Greece and Turkey; it is about to absorb Western Germany; it may soon spread

to the Middle East ; and it may grow together with the American Pacific system, with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand ; after which it may absorb the Commonwealth and end up by being something like a second United Nations.

But let that pass. My point is that the theme of history in our time is this struggle of one civilization, the scientific, technical, and industrial " Western " civilization, to become the universal civilization of mankind and to find an adequate political form, which can only be found by trial and error.

Inside this technical civilization which I have, with tongue in cheek, called the " Western " civilization, we have at the moment something like a civil war going on, and I suggest that this civil war is our old acquaintance, the Cold War. For one cannot say that Soviet Russia is not, from a certain point of view, part of that civilization. In fact, Russia has made her own scientific, technical, and industrial revolution under the Communist regime. This, I think, gives Communism its hold on Russia, which must not be under-rated. There is much in Communist doctrine which is obsolete, false, and probably rather anti-pathetic even to large masses of Russians. Still, the Communist regime in Russia has succeeded in making Russia a modern State and giving the Russians technique, industrialism, literacy—all attributes of the civilization of which I am talking. This Russian Communist sector of Western civilization has set itself against the parent sector of the civilization, the Anglo-Saxon and West European world, and tries to compete with it in the world-wide proselytizing and organizing process.

So the Cold War may, for a long time yet, be fought very largely as a competition in expansion. The West will try to manage and supervise the spread of Western civilization in its own way. For instance, the British Commonwealth, the American Point Four programme, the United Nations technical aid programmes, colonial aid—all these are measures by which the Western Powers try to spread Western civilization in a way which makes it possible for the new members of this civilized community to become part of what is now the West and to become democracies, to think in our way and to sympathize with us politically.

At the same time, the Russians do the same thing, or try to do the same thing, over the same part of the world by their own means. They have had their greatest success so far in China ; but they similarly have their Communist nuclei of the industrial revolution in practically all other under-developed countries, and we may still see one or other of these countries fall to them. This competition for whether the world is to go modern the Communist way or the Western way will go on, I think one can safely predict, for several decades at least in Asia, Africa, and even in South America. In all these areas a kind of cold war, a kind of competition, for the internal development and for the direction which this internal development takes politically is, I think, inevitable for a long time to come.

But there is one part of the world where the picture is quite different, and that is Europe. Europe is the only present object of the Cold War between Russia and the West which is already a fully developed member of the Western scientific, technical, and industrial civilization, which is not a Power of to-morrow but a Power of to-day, and which will immediately and decisively reinforce that side to which it is finally attached. Therefore, I believe that in the long historical process of the XXth Century, the only political decision which can really be final and which will also very largely prejudice the outcome of the battle for the rest of the world can fall in Europe and must fall in Europe ; " must fall in Europe " because it seems

almost impossible that the stalemate we have had for the last two years can be prolonged indefinitely. Even if both the Russians and the British and Americans were willing to maintain the stalemate in Europe for longer, sooner or later the Europeans themselves would take a hand to end it.

One can see that already, now that the balance of power has sufficiently been readjusted to give them a little elbow room again. In the present important political questions in Europe, which are the question of German re-armament and German unity on the one hand and the question of Western European political integration on the other, the initiative does no longer fully lie with us here, or with the Russians either. The initiative is already very largely shared with the French and the Germans themselves, and we have to adjust ourselves to this.

This brings me to the decisions which have to be taken in the next three to six months about these two crucial questions. I need not, I think, before this audience, go into a long argument about the need for the re-armament of Germany, or a dissertation why this is the decisive question for the political future of the European continent. Three or four years ago I used to argue the case at length, but now I think it has become a commonplace that whoever dominates Germany dominates Europe and that the decision about Germany—which way Germany finally turns—will to a very large extent be the decision about Europe as a whole.

#### WHAT NEXT IN GERMANY?

This gives such enormous importance to the question which has now become topical, namely: What is to happen in Germany as the next step? You know that about a year ago the decision was taken at the Washington meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Powers to bring Western Germany into the Western community and let her make a contribution to Western European defence. This decision is necessary from the purely defensive point of view and would be necessary even if the fate of Germany were not so crucial for the fate of Europe itself. It is quite well known that the French Army alone, even if reinforced by that part of the British Army which can be spared for Europe and by some American divisions, will never make a full military balance to the Red Army. Something has to be added, if Western Europe is to achieve security, and there are not many sources from which the additions can come. Germany is the obvious source.

But if Western Germany is re-armed, not only is something done for the general balance of power in Europe but a very decisive step is also being taken for the future of Germany herself. It is obviously the chief aim of every German and of every German politician to bring about the re-unification of his country. This re-unification can come about in one of two ways, either by agreement with Russia or in despite of Russia. So far, Russia has withheld her agreement—at least on any terms except those which would make the whole of Germany a Russian satellite. The re-armament of Western Germany would mean that neither we nor the West Germans wait any longer for Russian agreement, but that they and we take the decisive step on the alternative road. What if Russia were now suddenly to change her tune and offer German unity by agreement to forestall West German re-armament?

It may be that in the next few months we shall have to make a very difficult decision on the question. It seems that the change in the world balance of power, plus the impending addition of Western Germany to the Western Power, has produced a certain uneasiness in Russian policy. Russian policy during the last few months has been quite extraordinarily self-contradictory and difficult to translate into a

simple formula. But it may emerge that the Russians seek some kind of new negotiations and are prepared for a tactical retreat.

They have put forward various feelers, which are so far hard to appreciate, for general German elections. They have gradually lowered their price, and it begins to look—one cannot say more than that—as if general German elections, under international supervision, might be obtainable at a price. The price would be to renounce the re-armament of Western Germany. The question might then arise: Should we rather re-arm Western Germany now and postpone the unification of Germany till we can negotiate a general European settlement with Russia from superior strength, or should we accept a deal by which Russia allowed her Communist State in Eastern Germany to collapse through free elections while we renounced Western German re-armament?

This is a very difficult question. Provided that the Russian offer of general elections in both Germanies under international supervision solidifies, the temptation to accept it will obviously be very great. If elections in both Germanies were genuinely free and were fairly carried through, there is no doubt that the Communists in Eastern Germany would be routed and that both Germanies would be united under a democratic Government which might sooner or later, in a general political sense, become a member of the Western community.

This looks fair enough, and it must look wonderful to the Germans, whose chief interest is in their own national unity.

But let us look a little closer. If general German elections were held and there resulted a united Germany and a united German government on the Austrian model, the logical next step would be to negotiate a peace settlement with that German government and to withdraw the occupation forces of the Four Powers. It would be very hard to get round that, and the demand for it in Germany itself would be overwhelming. Once that peace settlement and withdrawal were carried out we would have a situation when the frontier of the Atlantic community would definitely be on the Rhine and the frontier of the Russian Empire would definitely be on the Oder-Neisse line.

Look at this for a moment and think what it means. First, it would mean that Eastern Europe becomes unquestionably and for ever a Russian Empire. Secondly, it would mean that the Western—the British and American—foothold in Europe would become very small indeed. It would be restricted to France and Benelux, strategically a very small area—hardly more than a bridgehead. Thirdly, it would mean that Germany would again become an independent Power between the two blocs. Probably her independence would, to begin with, be limited by disarmament clauses or something like that, but it would be obviously utopian to believe that a Power like Germany, peopled by some 65 millions, with the greatest industrial potential between Britain and Russia, could for any long time be kept to these clauses. Once she is unoccupied, unattached, and on her own, it will be only a question of time—and of a short time—before she emerges again as an important military Power.

Once this stage was reached, it would be for her to choose her foreign political orientation, and however much she may detest Communism, there is no guarantee at all that she might not for strictly national reasons make a strictly pragmatical military and political alliance with Russia. All German history points very strongly towards this possibility once Germany makes purely national policy for what she



regards as her purely national interest. It would be very dangerous to rely on mere ideological sympathies in favour of Western Europe to rule out such a policy once Germany is in a position to make her policy independently. I believe this is one of the reasons why we should avoid a position in which Germany is again given the choice between Russia and the West and is entirely on her own and making her policy on entirely national German terms.

The alternative is to postpone the unification of Germany now, even if it were possible, and to integrate Western Germany into the West first and re-arm her first. This need not necessarily be unpopular in Germany, where traditional nationalism is now balanced by a new "Europeanism," but two things might be said against it. The first is that it might provoke Russia into a preventive war now. I believe that this is a phoney argument. If Russia wanted to make preventive war her best time was last Winter or this Spring; the time is now rapidly running out. To start aggressive war against the West in its present stage of re-armament is not a decision to be lightly taken by Russia. Nor is it in style with Russian policy, which has throughout been cool and calculating, to act in emotional response to "provocation."

There is a second argument against the course of re-arming Western Germany. It might be said that it would commit us to tactics of ultimatum and war at the next stage. If, after we have re-armed Western Germany, the Russians simply refuse any further negotiation, how could we press on towards reuniting first Germany and then Europe except by making war ourselves? I think there are answers to this argument, too.

I think it is a fact that the whole of Europe, if it could choose, would prefer to be part of the Western community and not of the Russian Empire, for very obvious cultural and historical reasons. Bolshevism may have its attractions for poor, primitive, down-trodden countries, for which it may be, if not the only way, at least the quickest way of becoming industrialized, modern, and progressive. It has no attraction at all for fully developed modern countries for which it does not signify industrial progress but merely uncompensated loss of freedom. For this reason, I believe that in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, the present Communist regimes are not maintained by any real and strong local forces; they are maintained simply by the present effects of the balance of power, by the fact that Russia is in military occupation, that she is still locally stronger than the West and that there is no prospect of dislodging her. Once the power balance changes, once the outward prospect becomes reversed, I think the local political forces are bound to reassert themselves.

Once the whole of Western Europe, including Western Germany, is fully re-armed and once the American re-armament programme has come to its full fruition, I do not think that we shall have to step forward and put an ultimatum to Russia and say: "Now you go back or we make war." I think that once we have reached this stage, things in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe will begin to move on their own. There will be plots and resistance movements of a serious nature, and it will then be a question for Russia whether to start using force from a position of political and military inferiority, and running the risk of fatal international complications. On past form, the Russians have on the whole shown themselves to be good and efficient calculators who will not risk the danger of national suicide and political extinction for local issues, but, when the tide runs strongly against them, will retreat and wait for the next turn in their favour.



## BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN UNITY

I now want to talk for a few minutes about the inter-related question of a European Army. If it is our aim—as I think it must be our aim—to re-arm Western Germany now, this can probably only be done in the framework of a European Army. It is the French price for allowing German re-armament. It is agreed now by America and, somewhat more reluctantly, by Britain too.

But by saying “a European Army” we have really said very little. It is very easy to establish or mobilize French, Italian, German, and Belgian divisions, put them under some kind of overall command and call them “European Army,” but that is not what the French have in mind. What they have in mind is a European Army which is controlled by a common political authority.

The great French objection to German re-armament is that a German Army which is under the exclusive orders of a German government is an unpredictable factor; it may for the time being stand with France and Britain against Russia but it may very soon stand on a quite different front again. The French want to be reassured that this cannot happen. Therefore, they want a joint European political authority which has real control over the German forces and—they are ready, though reluctantly, to concede—over the French forces too, or at least over the French forces in Europe. This seems to be the price to be paid for it. This may come about. What is the British decision in this?

I am convinced that this is a question which we shall be unable to avoid for very long. If a European Army—the real thing—comes about with Britain standing out, it will almost inevitably after five or ten years be dominated by its German contingent.

There are only two ways in which this can be avoided. The first would be to make the European Army, and the political Federation which controls this Army, from the beginning not European but Atlantic. From the British point of view this would be the ideal solution. And from a wider perspective Atlantic Federation would, I think, be more in tune with the future than the small West European Federation which can never hope to stand on its own feet without British and American support.

But if we cannot have this at the moment—and it does not look as if we can—then the only way in which the German preponderance in the European Army can be balanced would be by Britain chancing her arm and going into this European Army too. I know this would be psychologically very difficult a step for Britain to take, and I know that there are a number of stock arguments against it, such as the Commonwealth and the need to keep large British forces outside Europe, the danger that the Americans might become disinterested if Western Europe stands too much on its own feet, and so on.

I have become doubtful about those arguments. We cannot, of course, commit all our forces to a European Army because we need forces in the Middle East and other places outside Europe. That goes without saying. It is also accepted by the French, as they themselves want to keep some part of their armed forces outside the European Army for overseas commitments. What is in question is to commit a definite, precise part of one's armed forces to this supra-national force for defence and—this is the rub—to commit oneself to having this part of one's armed forces controlled politically by a supra-national authority. That is a big step, but it does not mean that we have to contract out of the Commonwealth or give up our freedom of action overseas. It is a large but limited investment, and it carries a large share

in joint control of European policy which we may not be able to acquire otherwise and which we can ill afford to forgo.

Secondly, America. The danger may have been at one time that America would relapse into isolationism once Europe became again capable of looking after itself, but I can say from fairly recent experience in America that this stage has now passed and that the Americans are sufficiently committed to the defence of Europe to stay here, even if Europe itself becomes more powerful and able to take an active and major part in its own defence.

The danger is now rather that the Americans might become impatient with a Europe which relies too much on American soldiers, airmen, and money. Especially if General Eisenhower's influence should, during the next American administration, become even greater than it now is, we should have even stronger American pressure both for European Union and for Britain joining that European Union. We might be able to strike a bargain with America by which America in turn joins us in defence of the Middle East and other places, where for a long time we have unsuccessfully tried to get her support.

It looks to me as if at this very moment a political-historic constellation begins to appear on the horizon in which a far-reaching bargain might be struck, a bargain by which Britain joins European Union while America underwrites British commitments in the Middle East and Far East. If a very imaginative British statesman seizes this opportunity, he may, perhaps, change history in the next few months. And, after all, there is a very imaginative British statesman in control at this moment.

#### THE CHAIRMAN

I am sure you would wish me to tell Mr. Haffner what a very interesting hour's talk he has given us and what great food for thought there was in it. I was particularly interested that he put the European problem against the background of the world to-day, because I think that one is so apt to look at small corners, however important those corners are by themselves. What Mr. Haffner said was obviously so true, that despite the increased population of the world and despite the drift into larger groupings, there is, through the advent of air transport and the advent of the spoken word round the world by wireless and other things, obviously a necessity for the peoples of the world to come together, either by working for that first, or, as he said, some form of world Government. It is against that background that successive Governments in this Country, and all political parties, have pinned their faith to the United Nations Organization, which, despite many difficulties and despite some perhaps rather shaky moments, is not doing, I should have thought, too badly.

But, to come on to Germany, it is, again, quite obvious to all of us that, however important the rest of the world is, Europe is and will remain the crucial point, because, after all is said and done, Europe is the cradle of the Western civilization; Europe is where it was born and where it could die. The fact that Europe could decay from within or could be overrun by Communism from without has undoubtedly largely contributed to the very wobbly morale of Europe since the war, and I think it is heartening to hear Mr. Haffner saying that, in his opinion, the re-arming of Europe, far from imposing great additional strains, as many people thought, has probably done more in restoring morale and making them look to the future than anything else.

It is, again, obvious that the crucial point in Europe is Germany, and I think that Mr. Haffner has very clearly described what are the alternatives before the German people and before us and has given us food for a good deal of thought. I should like on your behalf to thank Mr. Haffner very much indeed for coming here this afternoon. (*Applause*).

## THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES

By COLONEL J. W. HACKETT, D.S.O., M.B.E., M.C.

On Wednesday, 14th November, 1951, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR LESLIE C. HOLLIS, K.C.B., K.B.E., R.M., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : This afternoon we are going to hear from Colonel Hackett the story of special operations. Colonel Hackett is very well qualified to talk to us on this subject. He has had a very distinguished and colourful career into which I will not go in any detail, because I know that you would like him to get on with the business. He did, to use his own expression, a bit of bush-whacking with the Arabs before the war. Then he was in operations in Palestine and the Western Desert, where he was first mixed up with special operations. He fought in Italy and in France and in Germany, mixing himself up with special operations much of the time. He was wounded in Arnhem, by which time he had been awarded two D.S.O.'s, and he finally escaped from the Germans and worked with the Dutch underground, from whom he eventually made his way home. Here he is this afternoon to talk to us, as he is very well qualified to do, about special operations.

### LECTURE

THAT lively concern which must attend any undistinguished officer who is bidden to address a gathering in this Institution has not, in my own case, been mitigated by the sight of one or two of the characters who were lurking about the premises as I came in. I know some of them are apt to be men of rather forcible self-expression, and there may be occasions later on in less well conducted gatherings when I might not be able to plead the protection of the Chair. At the same time, their presence here removes the last shred of pretence that on this occasion the speaker knows his subject better than the audience !

However, my assignment is to talk about special operations, and I would like to ask you, in the first place, to allow me to narrow this widely comprehensive term down into more manageable proportions. Let us, therefore, give it some rather arbitrary qualifications.

We are talking, first of all, of forces operating in depth, whose members fight in uniform and who expect to be treated by the enemy in accordance with the laws and usages of war. We therefore exclude clandestine organizations from our survey. We also exclude, at the other extreme, such conventional formations as are given special training and equipment for a special task, or for a transient phase in a bigger operation, such as a division equipped and trained for amphibious assault : and also those special organizations which—although designed for an unusual purpose—retain so much of the structure and general appearance of the normal formation that they are more properly described as divisions, or the like.

Thus, General Wingate's force in Burma is outside our range. Similarly, when commandos begin to be used in place of normal infantry battalions and brigades, though they were often doing jobs which only their specialized qualifications and technique made possible, they too move out of our reach.

### FIRST PRINCIPLES

There are one or two principles governing the operation of all these special forces. First of all, according to our terms, the troops employed are not clandestine saboteurs. They are soldiers operating in uniform, engaged in legitimate military tasks. Secondly, they are not expendable. Whatever the task on which they are employed, and

however dangerous it is, they deserve and must be given a fair chance of withdrawal. Thirdly—and this is most important—they never fight on the defensive. They are intended to do what they have to do by speed, stealth, and unobtrusiveness. The destructive resources they carry are intended for the target and not as a means of getting to the target or of defending themselves on withdrawal, except to a small degree.

It has been said that they reverse some of the normal principles—that they aim at dispersal of effort, for example, and not concentration. This, like a great many other things that are said about them, is not so. Their offensive action is only effective when it concentrates the effort at the critical time and place. But it is all reserved for the target, and this must be such that it does not require heavy equipment, or a great many people, or a long time on the job. There is no middle way about this. Either you plan to fight your way along, if you must, and so gather round you those weapons, and all the rest of it, that you require; or else you aim to avoid fighting at almost any cost, and cut down the party to a minimum.

The first path leads to the development of forces like General Wingate's,—admirable for their purpose and for the type of country, the nature and disposition of the enemy, and the air situation in which they are operating. The second is the type of force we are talking about here. It hopes to engage its target only, and if it has to fight its way towards it, except in the very last stages of the approach, it is likely to fail. If it is pinned and forced to fight a prolonged defensive battle, it faces disaster.

You may agree with me that this sort of force does not fit easily into the divisional framework in any of the three normal types of division, although the operations of one type—the airborne—have such similarities, by reason of their depth and technical methods, that the operations of these special forces can be very closely related to them. You may also agree that the forces we are interested in now are such that, if you could establish a continued requirement for operations of their own particular type, their continued existence in war would be justified and their continued retention in peace would be advisable. That rules out of our survey the small parties put together for one task only, and dispersed on its completion.

#### FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS

In the last war, special forces were thrown up in considerable profusion, and it is expedient to ask why. There are three factors, one more or less of a constant and the other two of greater importance in more recent times.

To begin with, there is the national temperament. The history of these islanders, and the people overseas who are descended from them, is a maritime one. It has also shown a high degree of what someone has called "adventurous individualism." The national tendency has been to find an open flank wherever there is blue water, and a tendency to exploit the open flank is probably one result of some centuries of maritime ascendancy.

Secondly, and of more recent importance, there have been developments in means of movement and communication which vastly extend the possibilities of forces like these. It is only in this generation that the internal combustion engine has restored to the battlefield the mobile fire power which probably went out with the mounted archer. It is only recently that we have had the submarine and a new addition to our means of penetration, and that the aeroplane has opened up the entirely new field of vertical envelopment. At the same time, wireless has filled the remaining requirement of a safe and swift means of communication over long distances.



Finally, and here I want to stick my neck out a little, we have emerged from the era in which professional armies, representing a small fraction of the nation's manpower and using only a small part of its material resources, fought each other on land in a more or less agreed manner of which the line was the basis. We have now been flung into the era of total war, and total war is war in total depth. The line is no longer a basic conception. Swift developments in firearms and mechanism, the advent of instruments of psychological warfare, like broadcasting, and, above all, the impact of air power, have caused such an extension of the conception of depth that the tendency is now to regard the enemy's position as extending over the whole of his territory and embracing the whole of his war effort.

If there were war with Russia and someone were to ask what is the depth of the Russian position, you would be quite right, perhaps, in answering that it is from the Elbe to Vladivostock, from the Caucasus to the Polar Cap. It is all depth. Now, as it is becoming rather old-fashioned to talk of lines, so is it becoming equally old-fashioned to describe some operations as taking place behind the lines. That expression is going out and good riddance to it! Its use obscures the nature of these special operations, and sets up a false and harmful antithesis. We are not dealing with one war in front of the lines, wherever that may mean, and another war behind them. The difference here is not one of kind but only one of degree. All operations are conducted in depth, and some are conducted in greater depth than others.

#### THE AIM OF SPECIAL FORCES

The aim, I suppose, in using these special forces is to hinder the most effective application of the enemy's resources in war and to secure advantages in the employment of our own. Most of their offensive action, though not all, is very much akin to that described as interdiction when it is practised by the air forces. But there is also a very important function to be discharged in the collection of intelligence, and the further category—in part derivative from these two but with special characteristics of its own—of work in conjunction with resistance to the enemy in territory that he occupies.

I want to come back to a more detailed analysis of these types of operation later, but we ought now to look briefly at one or two examples of special forces raised in the last war and their use, in order to give us something further to go on.

Soon after Dunkirk, as everyone knows, Dudley Clarke's notion of recovering some degree of initiative by the offensive use of small raiding parties was put into effect, and the old Boer name of Commandos given to the parties that were formed. In 1940, England was a beleaguered island, and national feeling was hurt by the disaster in Continental Europe. It was important to fight back, and the only way to get back into the fight was by crossing the sea. Commando operations, therefore, were from the first amphibious. Some very useful intelligence work was done, but they were also primarily offensive. Their story is well known, from the first experiment at Le Touquet in June, 1940, through the months of disappointment that followed, when opportunity scarcely matched enthusiasm, until the successful raid at Lofoten in March, 1941, was followed up in December of that year by the even more successful raid at Vaagso. But even at Lofoten there were as many as 350 officers and men engaged, and the Vaagso operation already foreshadowed the larger amphibious operations which were to take place later in the war.

The smaller operations continued, however, and as the need for them was recognized, special forces were developed under Combined Operations Headquarters



to carry them out. There was the Special Boat Section formed in No. 2 Commando, the old 101 Troop, operating in canoes with mines to be attached to ships' hulls by magnets. There was the Small Scale Raiding Force under March-Phillips and Appleyard, and small special reconnaissance parties like "Hiltforce" and "Northforce," and others specially developed for the preliminaries to the great amphibious operation of "Overlord." But commandos themselves began to grow more and more like normal battalions and brigades. They were given the heavy weapons and transport which had not been necessary in their original role and they tended to be used more and more for other purposes.

#### ST. NAZAIRE AND DIEPPE

I should like to mention two commando operations in particular, not because the type of action is like that which we are considering, but because the type of target is of importance to us. The first is the attack on St. Nazaire in March, 1941, which has been described as the greatest raid of all. Its chief job was to render unserviceable the only dock on the Atlantic coast capable of taking in the *Tirpitz*, and so prevent her intended use as a surface raider. It was completely successful. The other was the action of No. 4 Commando during the Dieppe raid, with its task of preventing the intervention of a battery of coastal artillery in the main action. It also was completely successful. Both these operations involved far more fighting than our forces could contemplate; but the nature of the two targets—one in the strategical and the other in the tactical field—was such that these raids can be described as the purest types of interdiction.

A good example of a special operation in the intelligence role is the raid on Bruneval on the coast of France in February, 1942, carried out by a company of 2 Para. Battalion under John Frost. Its object was to dismantle a radar station, bring parts of it away, and photograph the remainder. The force was put in by parachute and withdrawn by sea and the operation was a complete success. Again, there was more fighting in reaching the target than we contemplate. But this, too, is a model type of special forces target, not in the interdiction, but in the intelligence role.

#### THE LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, a very attractive open land flank was receiving the sort of attention it deserved. During the thirties, a group of officers, led by Bagnold of the Royal Corps of Signals, used to go out in motor cars on their leaves, exploring largely virgin desert. When Italy entered the war in 1940, Bagnold was allowed to do what he had been urging for some time, and set up a long range desert unit. From the first two patrols, composed largely of New Zealanders, the unit grew later into ten, drawn in addition from the Brigade of Guards, the Rhodesians, and Yeomanry and other units. They consisted of one officer and fifteen to eighteen men in 30 cwt. trucks, specially equipped for long range desert travel and armed with a variety of automatics. Their original job was to keep an eye on the Italians down in the inner desert, and they continued to do reconnaissance and liaison or intelligence work generally until the Axis was driven out of Africa. But L.R.D.G. was also used, though sparingly, for offensive action, and with great success. Wilder's attack on Barce airfield in September, 1942, was usually considered by L.R.D.G. to have been their best beat-up, when for the loss of six wounded, ten prisoners, and 14 vehicles, some 30 Axis aircraft were destroyed.

There were other raids, but offensive action was not the L.R.D.G.'s principal object. Its patrols could move self-contained over almost fantastic distances and its

wireless communications were first-class. Morale and discipline were very high, and the unit was ideal for reconnaissance and liaison.

Let us look at one or two of their operations. To attack Murzuk in the Fezzan, two patrols motored out from Cairo across Africa and picked up a force of Free French at Fort Lamy in Chad. Then they brought them back to operate against a target a thousand odd miles from Cairo as the crow flies and about the same from Fort Lamy, and 500 miles on from the advanced French base at Faya. These two patrols then guided the French in a further operation to turn the Italian garrison out of Kufra, 500 miles South of Benghazi, and when they got back to Cairo by way of Kharga and Owenat they had travelled 4,300 miles in 45 days.

By April, when the British positions were at Sollum and the enemy's siege of Tobruk had begun, the L.R.D.G. was established at Kufra, and from there or from the bases at Jalo or Siwa, or later—when the Eighth Army's advance from El Alamein had developed—from Hon, they carried out the task of deep reconnaissance and the maintenance of contact with friendly elements in the enemy's country with occasional offensive raids.

#### THE ROAD WATCH

There is a book on L.R.D.G. by Bill Kennedy Shaw, peace-time archaeologist and foundation member of the unit, and I commend it to you. Here I can go little further in talking about them. But there is one thing one cannot omit, and that is the Road Watch, which probably represents the highest level in deep reconnaissance on land yet reached. There was one coastal road along the Mediterranean shore, which was used by the Axis armies in the Western Desert, for almost their entire supply. It may be pictured how much it was in use, and what value there would be for G.H.Q. in a census of the traffic that went up and down it. That is precisely what L.R.D.G. provided. For four and a half months from April, 1942, and for seven vital weeks in the Autumn during the Alamein offensive, L.R.D.G. kept watch upon it. Week after week, 24 hours a day, there was a two-man post on the road all the time, a few hundred yards from it by day and a few hundred feet away at night. One man would spot, the other would write to his dictation: so many new vehicles, carrying an estimated so many unburnt troops with clean uniforms and field cookers. That was just the confirmation G.H.Q. wanted that the Littorio Division, recently embarked in Italy, was turning up in the forward areas. So many German Mark III tanks, so many Mark IV's: these were the replacements Rommel was waiting for to take the offensive. An estimated 42,500 troops and a certain large number of vehicles moving West between November 8th and 14th, 1942: here was the indication that this time the El Agheila position was not going to be defended by the Axis. The value of this information to the higher command, coming in day after day, can be conjectured.

The enemy could have done the same thing. The Italians had had a lot of experience in deep desert penetration in connection with their operations for the "pacification" of Libya, and the Germans had one or two people who knew a good deal about it. But they did practically nothing. A captured German officer's remark to an officer of L.R.D.G. is quoted: "You know, we Germans could not do this sort of thing: out 500 miles from base for weeks on end. We like to go about in a crowd." There was a Hungarian some of us had known in Cairo before the war by the name of Count Almasy. He was a desert traveller almost in the same class as Bagnold and Prendergast, and it was supposed that he might turn up sometime.

He did, in fact, raise a long range desert unit, called the "Sonderkommando Almasy." It did one very creditable job, out from Jalo (which was then in German hands) when it dropped a couple of German agents at Asyut and got back to its base after a trip of about 1,000 miles, mainly through the enemy's country. But the Count and his Sonderkommando seem to have faded out after that. The L.R.D.G., meanwhile, was doing a brisk trade in the very business which was responsible for Almasy's single journey. The carriage of agents and special parties of one sort or another—Grand-guillot, Melot, Peniakoff, for example—and their safe and timely delivery at the back door anywhere in Africa was one of its principal tasks.

#### THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE

One of its most interesting clients was the S.A.S., the Special Air Service. But we ought to look back a little here. In 1941, Laycock took a group of commandos out from England to the Middle East. They undertook a number of operations like the abortive raid on Bardia, a very successful raid out of Tobruk, the unfortunate attempt to cross the Litani River in Syria, and some others. About the same time, Keyes, in an operation with six officers and 53 other ranks, landed on the Libyan coast to attack Rommel's Headquarters and dispose of the Afrika Corps Commander. Unfortunately, the attack failed most gallantly. Keyes lost his life and was awarded a posthumous V.C. But this operation is significant for us here, because it provides another excellent model of an important type of raiding target.

Commandos in the Middle East were not a success. They were unfortunate, and Laycock was persuaded that raids by very small unobtrusive parties were likely to be more successful in this theatre than the normal commando type of operation. On his prompting, therefore, a small party of No. 8 (Guards) Commando was thrown off as a detachment under Lewis and Stirling and set up for this purpose. Although it was called the Special Air Service, the name had little or nothing to do with any chosen method of approach. Their first operation was, in fact, carried out by parachute. But it was a principle then, as it has been ever since (and I hope will continue to be) that special forces of this sort must be prepared to approach their target by any means that offers. Their first operation, which was an attack on a group of airfields in the Gazala-Tmimi area to assist the 1941 offensive for the relief of Tobruk, was a failure. They were dropped wide and the weather was disastrous. But they were soon at it again and, with the L.R.D.G. doing taxi service from Jalo, they made a number of raids with phenomenal success.

In December, 1941, the transit airfields at Sirté and Tamet were attacked and more than 30 dispersed aircraft were destroyed by sticky bombs and fire. This was repeated as a Christmas present and 24 more aircraft were accounted for. Meanwhile, another S.A.S. party had been taken to Agedaba by L.R.D.G. on Christmas Eve and there blew up another 37.

A few days later the same L.R.D.G. patrol took out two more parties under Fraser and Lewis from Jalo to attack Marble Arch and Nofilia landing grounds. The S.A.S. attacks this time were only partly successful and one result was to stir up so much air activity that the L.R.D.G. patrol was heavily attacked from the air. Once a party of this kind is located in these open spaces, the aircraft have it all their own way. Casualties can only be avoided by avoiding discovery in the first place. Lewis was killed and Fraser, who had destroyed thirty-odd aircraft in his own attack, could not be picked up owing to the destruction of the vehicles, and had to bring his party back in an eight-day tramp across the desert on foot.

In March, a raid on Berka airfield destroyed 15 more aircraft, and later Jellicoe raided Heraklion in Crete, put in and brought out by submarine, and accounted for another 20. There were a good many other raids, but these can be read about elsewhere. It is enough to say here that in the ensuing months odd parties of S.A.S. could often be found pottering about in unusual places, "looking round," as one of them put it, "for good things to put bombs on."

In the summer of 1942 they acquired jeeps of their own, equipped them with twin Vickers-K guns fore and aft, and with their own signals and transport became independently mobile. A problem arose here. It is possible that intelligence operations will not attract the enemy's attention, but it is absolutely certain that offensive raids will. The L.R.D.G. used to complain that Stirling's force disturbed places that were being kept specially quiet, whereupon a justly incensed enemy would come out to look for them and find L.R.D.G. instead. In the end, an arbitrary line was drawn on the map: L.R.D.G. was given all the desert to the West for the deeper operations, while the S.A.S. did the shorter range work to the East, operating from Kufra.

It was from here that Mayne made a series of attacks on the Tobruk-Daba railway and targets near the coast during the Eighth Army offensive, with conspicuous success. Those in Cairo whose business it would be to provide for Eighth Army when it moved further on began to be worried over the destruction he was doing to railway lines, signal communications, railway stations, and the like. A signal was sent: "Leave the railway alone. We may need it." It was rare to get a reply, but this time it came quickly: "Very sorry. Railway blown up at X and Y and Z. Couldn't resist it!"

I should mention that it was about this time, too, that a man who was one of the best performers and certainly one of the most remarkable people in the whole raiding circus was set up in business on his own, and Popski's Private Army came into being.

By the Spring of 1943, the campaign in Africa was over. Stirling had been captured. Jellicoe had taken out the Special Boat Squadron as a separate unit to train in Palestine for use in the Greek Islands and Adriatic. Mayne was moving over with his squadron to see what openings there were in Sicily. Fitzroy McLean had gone off to establish a squadron of S.A.S. in Persia and would soon be with Tito.

The Long Range Desert Group, deprived at last of desert, was soon to be learning boating, parachuting, and skiing and, after a disastrous episode in Leros which caused heavy casualties, was to turn up early in the following year in the Adriatic.

#### TYPES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

We shall follow these forces no further in detail. Let us try now to set out some systematic arrangement of special operations by types with such further examples as may be needed.

We spoke of three kinds of operation: offensive action, intelligence operations, and action with internal resistance.

There is first of all offensive action against personnel. You can kill them off; you can delay their arrival where they are wanted; and you can sometimes remove them. A good example of this last was the abduction of General Kreipe in Crete by Leigh-Fermor and Moss in 1944. The greater the depth and the better the timing, the greater the confusion. The more important the victim, the greater the impact on the battle. If Keyes had been successful, it would have had important



results. As I have heard offensive action against personnel rather baldly summarized, you can bump, or bag, or delay.

The same considerations apply to material. Consider the loss to the enemy of the 250-odd aircraft destroyed by Stirling and his friends—a big number. In fact, so favourably did it compare in the Middle East with the total destroyed by the R.A.F. that serious consideration was given to awarding these operators the D.F.C. instead of the D.S.O. and the M.C. But some technicality—I think it was that the aircraft had not been destroyed from other aeroplanes—was allowed to stand in the way.

These operations demonstrated admirably the carrying out of the interdiction task by destruction of the actual material to be used in the battle. An example of interdiction by the imposition of delay is the raid on the heavy water factory in Norway in November, 1942, which slowed up the German development of the atomic weapon.

#### THE SHIP WATCH

Now for intelligence operations as distinct from raids, pure and simple. We have spoken of the road watch, the observation of the movements of vehicles. When the Allies had run out of desert, the L.R.D.G. turned its attention, with that versatility which so distinguished these men, to a ship watch. This was carried out with a view to calling up air attack as soon as the ships were marked down, and highly successful it was.

Other useful reconnaissance tasks are the finding and marking of landing grounds, ground reconnaissance of the effects of air bombing, deep reconnaissance of the enemy with a view to offensive action, and so on. You can find examples in the action of special forces in France and the Low Countries, in the desert, in Yugoslavia and Albania.

I should also mention operations in connection with the liberation of prisoners of war and the extrication of evaders. There are always people to be got home urgently, such as air crews knocked down over enemy-occupied territory. When the enemy's hold on territory is failing, bold action by special forces can be very successful, as in France in August, 1944, in Germany in May, 1945, in the Far East in August, 1945, and elsewhere.

I remember being concerned in the laying of it on once in the heel of Italy when—in September, 1943—a special S.A.S. train, conducted by Roy Farran somewhere along the railway line a good way ahead of our advanced troops, brought back all the prisoners of war in a certain camp, and the camp commandant's gold watch as well. There is also the possibility of a special raid for the recovery of an important personage, of whom particular care is being taken. The best example I know is that in September, 1943, when Mussolini was pulled out by a party of parachutists under Skorzeny.

Finally, there is action in connection with internal resistance. Before it develops, you may have to put people in to start it going. Once it gets under way you will want to get in parties from outside to assist in its organization, equipment, and training, and, at least in the first instance, to handle its signals. There are many examples to be found, in France and the Balkans for instance. There was a particularly good one in the action of the Special Boat Squadron under Jellicoe and the forces associated with it in Greece. This is a subject which I can only touch on, because there is no time for more, and I do not know much about it in any case. It is only mentioned here as the third of the three categories of operation for which



special forces can be used—offensive action, intelligence operations, and action, lastly, in connection with resistance.

#### CONTROL OF SPECIAL FORCES

The control of these forces in war is an important matter. It has been found to be best for them to be controlled at a high level. They tend to be G.H.Q. troops in theatres, though if their use is particularly likely to affect one formation rather than others, they may be operating in the interests of the commander of that formation and should be under his command.

If a principle is asked for as a basis, I should say that these forces should be commanded at a level proportionate to the depth at which they are operating; that is, at whatever level is equivalent on our side to the enemy's zone in which their target lies. If they are attacking a target in an enemy's army area, for example, they should be operating under the army commander most interested on our side. If they are operating deeper behind the enemy's army area, they would operate under our own army group, and perhaps under higher authority still as the depth increases. I know of no rule, but that is the beginning of one. In any case, it is only in very exceptional circumstances that you will find them operating under corps, and in even more exceptional circumstances under divisional, control.

But wherever command lies, the special force commander must be brought in early, if the plan involves the use of special forces. And there must, I think—it sounds a truism to say so—be a commander, particularly where the conception of an operation grows from small beginnings into something much larger and you tack other forces on, as in the raid on Tobruk in August, 1942. The Tobruk raid grew from the contemplation of a classic type of raiding target in the interdiction role. That is to say, if you could interfere with the harbour installations in Tobruk sufficiently, you would drive the enemy to use the port of Tripoli, about 1,000 miles further West.

But what was originally conceived as a small raid developed into something very much larger. Other ideas were incorporated, so that in the end a very complicated party with a variety of diversionary operations involved considerable naval forces, a battalion of Royal Marines, S.A.S., L.R.D.G. and the Sudan Defence Force. The operation, I regret to say, was a failure. Security was bad. Signals communications went wrong and the command organization was far from ideal. At a time when warships were worth their weight in gold in the Mediterranean two Tribal destroyers, the *Sikh* and *Zulu*, were lost, and the whole thing showed little profit on the credit side except for the L.R.D.G. raid on the airfield at Barce of which earlier mention was made.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF SIGNALS

Signals are of the very highest importance. I would like to mention again the L.R.D.G. and not only its strict wireless discipline but also its use of commercial maritime procedure, which was interesting. An enemy intercept operator on land with a lot of traffic to work on would tend to disregard signals coming from what were clearly maritime sources, and thus would not follow them up, with the consequent danger of Direction Finding location. I know of no case when it can be claimed that the L.R.D.G. was fixed by D.F.

You can use other means of communication—pigeons, for example. We once procured some highly thought-of birds from the chief pigeon fancier in Middle East,

and gave them to a party of S.A.S. operating in the German forward areas before Alamein. But none of them ever came back to the Eighth Army loft. It is my personal opinion that, with the mixture of sentiment and ruthlessness which distinguishes strong arm men, the S.A.S. patrol fed some of them so well that they were unable to fly and the rest they ate.

#### THE BASE

I should like to say a word about the base. Continuous operations in depth demand a deep base to which operational parties can return to replenish with food, fuel, and ammunition, to replace and repair equipment, and to rest. It must be possible to get men and materials in and casualties out. By definition, you cannot fight to defend it. Where you have an open land flank as in North Africa, or in Arabia, where Lawrence operated, it is easy. The problem arises in its acutest form where maintenance must be entirely by air, since the air situation in depth will rarely be favourable. But even if it is on the whole unfavourable, air maintenance need not be excluded. The intruder is probably the most difficult of all piloted aircraft to keep out and you may have to use his tactics for maintenance operations. You can route bomber formations so that as they go about their business they provide cover for these maintenance operations, and the establishment of a limited period of air superiority over the base may not be impossible, if refuelling facilities can be provided.

The security of the base must lie chiefly in the depth of the warning belt surrounding it, depth not so much in space as in time. It is likely to be located in country where it is difficult of access to everything save its own highly mobile operating parties, using jeeps or camels or horses or skis, or moving lightly equipped and fast on foot. It depends on its own reconnaissance for warning, and the goodwill of local inhabitants. From this it follows that you have the best chance in a sparsely populated area. But it must be mobile. Much progress has been made in this connection. But we have not yet reached the stage of continuous deep operations on an extended scale, in which considerable number of parties are operating from moving bases which are entirely air-lifted and air-maintained.

There are other problems, such as the handling of casualties. This has been eased by new drugs and forward surgery, the increased use of plasma, the freer issue of morphia and other things. There are difficulties in connection with personnel. These are soldiers; they are not wild men. They have problems of pay, allowances, promotion, and so on, which need sympathetic consideration and even some degree of latitude in the interpretation of regulations. This was particularly the case in the last war when the people who went in for these operations were not always entirely orthodox in their outlook. I remember getting a signal from Stirling from Kufra, for example, saying: "Sergeant So-and-So has been doing extremely well. Have promoted him Second Lieutenant." I wonder what you would do about that!

#### DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRIVATE ARMY

If these forces are to give value, there must be no private armies. The private army has certain big disadvantages. Its leader tends to become irreplaceable. One of the most successful that I can think of had to go into liquidation when its commander got himself captured. It tends to become an object of suspicion to the public army, and it sometimes tends to get so specialized in its organization, its training, and its equipment that it becomes rather inflexible and almost incapable of application to the public war. The tendency is to arrive at a norm, and to keep

in being in peace a type of unit organization and a technique in its employment that will satisfy the need which gives rise to the emergence of private armies in war. The great advantage of so doing is less in the interests of the unit itself than in the interests of the commands and staff who may have to handle units like it. If you keep it going in peace so that its handling, and particularly its maintenance, have progressed beyond the empirical stage, such forces are likely to be used in war with less frustration at the sharp end, and less frenzy at the blunt.

What we have now is the 21st S.A.S. (Artists) which has been kept in being as a territorial battalion. It is not without interest that this is one of the very few territorial battalions in the Kingdom which is not only up to strength, all volunteers, but has a waiting list.

There have been many special forces, and I have mentioned only a few. What I have tried to give you is no more than a general picture in order to raise some of the more important points.

If anyone asks where such forces are likely to be employed, the only answer is "Help yourselves!" The Middle East, in the widest sense of the term, will always be what it always has been—the small raiders' paradise. But wherever there is difficult country, wherever cover is offered by jungle, or desert, or tundra (we have not done very much about the Arctic yet), or marsh, or mountain, or forest, near something worth watching, or taking, or blowing up, or near people we have to help, there, I suggest, you are likely to find these special forces employed.

#### CONCLUSION

If there is value in war, and not simply good fun, to be had out of operations like these, the more closely they are subjected to the sort of analytical approach we have been trying to give them to-day, the sooner will their principles be woven into the general fabric of our warlike practice.

The conviction is strong in many of us that, if you leave aside the atomic weapon, the most important development in war in our time is the extension of operations in depth. There are no new basic principles and no old ones are invalidated. But the transformation of our technical resources has enormously extended the application of the principles we have. In these circumstances, operations of the sort we are considering give a commander a most valuable means of developing offensive action forward in depth, and they can produce a handsome profit in proportion to their cost.

Some people will go further. They will suggest—and I wonder whether they are wrong—that total war in total depth is likely to see a projection of this pattern on an ever-increasing scale, and might even argue that the ultimate essence of the matter lies here. No one but a lunatic would claim that if we were to go to war within the next few years the matter would best be conducted by hordes of S.A.S. poking about in little packets all over the place. So far we have never had the heavy equipment without which deep penetration on a decisive scale is impossible. But when we can pick up and put down 60-ton loads in one piece by air in constricted landing space, with all that that implies, such as the achievement of temporary local air supremacy at great distances, then we may find that our approach to operations of war on land is not unlike that reflected on a tiny scale in the embryonic operations of what we have spoken of to-day as special forces.

## DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFORD MARTEL: We have had an extraordinarily interesting lecture to-day, and I should like to expand it a little further by saying something of how the part which the Lecturer said at the end fits into what is being done in the army machine as a whole.

We all know that progress in the Army comes in stages. There was the stage between the two world wars when we reintroduced the tremendous power of mobile armies with light tanks instead of cavalry. We could not do much: we did not have many tanks. But the Germans had those splendid Panzer forces, and they developed them and very nearly won the war as a result. You will see the point of what I am saying in a moment.

Some people may say that those very mobile Panzer forces only succeeded because there were no anti-tank weapons against the light tanks, and they were really only following up a defeated enemy. It was a pursuit. This may be partly true on the French side, but it is in no way true of the Russians. I saw the Russians a little later. They were first-class and were fine fighting forces. They were confident that they could stand up to the tank, but when these Panzer formations came along in comparatively small strength, they completely liquidated the Russian forces. They took them in every direction by surprise, and the latter could do practically nothing.

The next stage to-day in this vital mobile warfare is to use the cruiser tank instead of a light tank and the same process can be carried out again. I am not quite sure whether the Lecturer had in mind using these special troops, the S.A.S. and so on, in greater depth in combination, so to speak, with these very mobile armoured forces, and the cruisers pushing forward in their support, and the two working together. Or was he thinking that his forces would do the whole thing? That is a point I should like to ask him to say a word or two about. I am sure you will agree with me that, whatever we decide upon, it is vital that we should spend a long time in studying the technique. This applies just as much to these special forces as to anyone else. It is a tremendous task to study the technique of mobile operations. The Germans spent two years on it between the two world wars, and after two years' study in which everything was worked out to the last detail, every officer and N.C.O. and man knew what he had to do and they had these tremendous successes, particularly against the Russians. We are not studying that to-day as regards mobile armoured forces. I took a motor car into France the other day to tour round and had a long talk with General Eisenhower and at General Juin's headquarters, and I saw no sign of any preparation to study the technique which we shall need when we go in for that form of warfare.

I think it is fair for me to remind this audience that it took several years after the war before we dropped the idea of a great manpower army to meet the Russians, which was our first idea. Now it is accepted that we must go in for mobile forces working in co-operation with infantry forces holding firm bases, and so on. But we have not begun to make a real study of the technique on the mobile side. One or two people say that it is hardly worth bothering until we have the forces in Europe. But if we do not do this now we shall not be ready when we have the forces.

I should like to know whether the Lecturer agrees with me on that point.

THE LECTURER: General Martel's development of this thesis goes rather further than my terms of reference. It is extraordinarily interesting. I am sure any of us who are concerned in the development of deep warfare can only hope that a study of the technique will, in fact, become a matter of lively interest.

But I ought, perhaps, to restrict what I say in reply to what I have been bidden to talk about. Insofar as special forces of the sort we have been considering are concerned, what General Martel says is of primary importance, because although we may know—or think we know—where we are going, we must be keenly conscious of the stage along the road to which we have got. However interested we may be in the use of small parties



operating deep, we know this is going to be considerably restricted until certain developments in technique are made. A study of what is required, and an attempt to accelerate progress towards getting it, is highly desirable.

I should be the first to agree with anybody who believes that there is profit to be derived out of the pursuit of this information.

LIEUT.-COLONEL CALVERT: First of all, what about military discipline with these special forces operating a long way from their lines over a long period? Do you think that King's Regulations and the punishments laid down cover the problem?

I do not pretend that people should not be perfect, but they are likely, when there is no water or no food, to give way, and discipline is immediately necessary. Do you think there should be some amendments to K.R.?

THE LECTURER: That has put me on a spot. To be invited to say in public that I warmly advocate amendments to King's Regulations might involve me in difficulties, and I could hardly do it.

It is certainly true that deep operations involve—I must phrase this carefully—a modification of the outlook which governs, by and large, the structure and behaviour of the Army. I might, perhaps, have expected a question of this kind from that quarter, because I know that in the deep operations with which the questioner was particularly concerned the question of discipline was handled on original and highly successful lines. But insofar as the practice of these operations allows us to put into operation one of the most widely held but most rarely acknowledged principles of war—that is to say, always serve as far away from the next higher headquarters as you can—this is a question which might tend to answer itself without at the moment any far-reaching amendment to K.R.

LIEUT.-COLONEL CALVERT: When the question came up at the end of the war, when I was commanding the S.A.S., as to the survival of this type of unit or idea, the Army had to think about manpower ceilings and such problems. A very senior R.A.F. officer advocated that these forces should come under the R.A.F., as part of the R.A.F. Regiment, as they did very much the same sort of work as the R.A.F. in the air. They do interdiction, strategic bombing, diversionary raids, and all the rest. Would not that make control over those enemy areas very much more easy? His suggestion was that instead of being the Cinderella of the Army, such forces might be the most sought after ground forces of the R.A.F. and possibly get better attention.

THE LECTURER: That is a very interesting proposal. Speaking as a soldier who enjoyed several years of service under R.A.F. command with ground troops, I should see in it a means of getting rather more favourable treatment than one sometimes gets from one's own Service. There may be less superficial reasons to recommend it, but it is very attractive in basic principle, and I suppose when you get into the realms we have dimly and rather dangerously approached to-day, there is this to be said.

When we have developed a better technique of deep maintenance, when we get to the operation of strong forces in depth—in such depth that they are in fact operating where the Royal Air Force hitherto has been almost solely engaged—I mean as far as the armed Services are concerned—then we may arrive at a common structure in which the interest of the Air Force in deep strategical operations might well be reflected in a much greater share for the R.A.F. in their control.

Whether that suggests a permanent integration within the framework of the R.A.F. of the units retained in peace to be expanded in war, I do not know. The suggestion has not been put to me before, and I have not given any thought to it. But one thing is quite certain, and that is that there is a great similarity between the two types of operation. It would not be surprising if that were reflected in certain changes in structure, so that the forces operating in one sense became more closely affiliated to the forces operating in the other. I have nothing more definite to say about that. I follow the suggestion and am grateful for the chance of thinking about it.



LIEUT.-COLONEL CALVERT : What is your definition of a private army ? I was once asked to form a force but was told not to make it a private army, and I failed to ask what was the definition of one. But I decided myself, after thought, that you must do things through the right channels. A private army does things through the wrong channels. It short-circuits command. Would that cover it ? Whatever one does, such a force is always called a private army in any case.

THE LECTURER : That is a very interesting definition, and I cannot give a better one. I speak at a disadvantage here through being associated with the formation of something which not only was a private army but was officially described as one. It was in a moment of vexation when we were setting up an independent commander with a little group of ruffians whom we called, rather pompously and for the sake of Establishments, No. 1 Long Range Demolition Squadron. This was too much of a mouthful and Major Peniakoff wanted something shorter. But he took a long time thinking what it should be. I said : " Popski, if you cannot find something quickly, we will call you Popski's Private Army," whereupon he left the room and came back a few hours later with some newly made up brass shoulder badges bearing the initials " P.P.A.," thereby demonstrating the flexibility of industrial resource which makes Egypt such a valuable base for us.

One danger of the private army is certainly that it gets into the habit of using wrong channels. If you want to use the inventiveness and audacity of the people who are best adapted for the job of work we have been considering, you must give a good deal of latitude lower down in how they operate. But it must be kept at the lowest level ; and from the time that the army, be it private or a small element in the larger army, begins to come into serious contact with those providing for them, it has to get into the regular channels.

I suppose the objection is not so much to the private army, when it is small, as to the larger private army, the "private army group". What is perfectly legitimate is a more or less private subdivision, provided it can be welded into the larger framework. The work of a staff officer handling these interesting folk from a high level headquarters can be usefully looked at in this connection. It comprises two main elements. One is making what the operators in the field want comprehensible to the general staff, and the other is thereafter making it palatable. A real private army is something whose operations can by no stretch of imagination be made either comprehensible or palatable.

MAJOR R. O. H. CARVER : Do we know whether the Russians show any ability in organizing these operations which you have been describing ?

THE LECTURER : I have no evidence. There is a lot they could teach us if they only would, particularly about the use of deep bases in certain areas in which we have not had much practice—in very extensive marshland, for example—where they had quite a lot of experience in Poland, and in the tundra. I commend the tundra to people who are interested in these things. It forms an enormous area of the earth's surface and in one of our own Dominions there are colossal stretches of it. Perhaps the Canadians with their special development of techniques for operating in tundra and in the completely frozen North may have something at least as good as the Russians have. Whether the Russians are developing anything now, I do not know. They certainly did a lot with partisans, particularly in Central Europe, and they may be contemplating doing more.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFORD MARTEL : I saw no signs of the Russians doing anything of that sort during the last war.

MR. P. M. M. KEMP : In Poland the Russians did drop a number of officers quite frequently at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 to work with their sympathizers underground. They broke what the Lecturer describes as one of the prime rules for such forces in that these officers were expendable and, as far as I know, they were expended. They were dropped with very little money, nearly always blind, and the Polish civilians were often hostile. On one occasion after we ourselves dropped in, we were approached by an unfortunate Russian lieutenant who was starving and absolutely broke. We had to

supply him with money and give him what help we could. There were a number of cases of that sort that I could enumerate.

THE LECTURER: Thank you very much.

MAJOR L. E. O. T. HART: Could I ask a question about control and organization, which I believe covers one or two of the questions asked by other speakers?

If it is accepted, as I believe it is, that the Theatre Commander directly controls the operations of such forces and they do not operate except with his permission, and as fitting into his plans, there can be no question of a "Private Army." And if it is accepted that the Theatre Commander's Headquarters is always a joint headquarters including an Air Headquarters, the tendency of the special forces' targets to link up with the R.A.F. would be well covered, as the two headquarters should plan the operations together. On the question of training and equipment, there is far more point in special forces being part of the Army than of the R.A.F.

The other aspect is in the third type of operation to which you referred—operations with resistance movements—and some of the second type—intelligence operations. In the last war these operations were carried out by special forces of the type you mention, but also by other uniformed officers and signallers operating in uniform, but not directly controlled by the Theatre Commander. Will all these operations in future be controlled by the Theatre Commander? If so, in the case of a large enemy territory, encircled by several Allied Theatre Commanders, how would you visualize the various types of special operations deep inside that territory being co-ordinated and controlled? Would there be political control or would there be some over-all strategical command?

THE LECTURER: On the question of multiplicity, which emerges from the first part of your observations, I should like to say that one of the most dangerous things in the use of these forces is that they should tend to be operating in the same areas under different masters. Speaking of the area which I personally knew best in occupied Holland in the Winter of 1944 and 1945, I knew of six and suspected a further two organizations working, as it appeared, in parallel with apparently no co-ordination at the top. That turned out to be the case. They were operating not only not knowing what each was doing on the ground, but even at the top their masters, insofar as we could run them to earth, were not aware of what the masters of other packs of hounds were doing.

I believe things are on a much better footing now, but it is absolutely essential that this multiplicity should be avoided. There should be single control of special forces of the sort we are considering, which are operating in any one area, and that ought to be the rule.

As to whether you should have a single over-all top control over all such operations—the question opened up in the latter half of your observations—I believe that by pursuing the sort of principles I have set before you, we can probably arrive at something approaching the right answers. Where these forces are operating in what can be described as the interests of a particular command, its commander should be in control of them. That is to say, the army commander should be given control over the forces operating in an area in which the results of their work would have some impact on his battle. The deeper you go, probably, the higher the control will be. Take the Eighth Army in the Western Desert. There was some discussion at the end of 1942 as to whether the Eighth Army or G.H.Q. should have the control of the series of small forces operating in North Africa, and G.H.Q. stuck out for the principle that so far as they were operating in what could be described as a strategic role (that is to say, in greater depth than was the immediate concern of the field commander fighting the battle) they should remain under G.H.Q. control. Thereafter, when there was a possibility of their profitable use in such a way as to give the army command an advantage in the battle that it was conducting, they should come under its control. Extending it further, possibly if you arrive at the point where your special forces are operating at such depth that their targets are purely strategic and are of no immediate importance to any field commander commanding an army or army group, the argument

is very strong for the retention of their control at a level above that of the theatre commander. These are the lines on which you would perhaps agree.

MAJOR HART: Thank you, I do.

THE CHAIRMAN: We could no doubt go on asking questions on this subject almost indefinitely and receiving very excellent answers from the Lecturer. But I am afraid the time has come for me to wind up. Before doing so, I should like to give you one or two brief observations on this very interesting subject, which has been so well presented by Colonel Hackett.

In the first place, he has dispelled any misconceptions—not that they would be held by very many people in this room—about these special formations being a lot of resolute but irresponsible cut-throats, who roam around the campaign area, spreading confusion amongst their own troops and consternation amongst those of the enemy.

He also, I think, confirmed that these special operations, in spite of set-backs at times—and he did not claim that they were always successful—did make a really valuable contribution to the operations that were carried out in the various theatres as a whole.

He made a very interesting reference to the British characteristic—the characteristic of the British Service man—to get into some kind of special formation, and that is clearly brought out by the keen desire of soldiers to do sailors' or airmen's work, and vice-versa. For instance, we had soldiers in the Maritime Regiment of Artillery manning guns on merchant ships, which you would imagine would be the job of the sailors or marines. Then you had marines protecting airfields of the Royal Air Force and sailors getting on a horse whenever they could!

Reference has been made during the discussion and also by the Lecturer to the fact that we are not dealing with clandestine organizations. When we reflect on special organizations, we cannot forget that there were a very large number of other parties, all of which had a certain impact upon the more regular ones that have been described. So the question comes up of control. Although it has been explained to us that there is a satisfactory method of control, and he has described the method of control of the L.R.D.G., the S.A.S., and other formations, nevertheless we must not forget that all these other parties were joining in as well. I remember Admiral McGrigor, First Sea Lord, telling me only recently that when he had a command in the Mediterranean he found there were no less than five private navies in the Adriatic, and these navies used to enjoy the most lively battles at night between themselves, which—of course—was not very good for the campaign. He had to put a stop to their operations and to introduce proper control.

Before I sit down, you will expect me to say something about my own people, the Marines. They, of course, have a very big interest in the kind of work which the Lecturer has been describing, and we have been charged since the war with maintaining commandos. Every marine is now given a training as a commando soldier, and most of them are operating in Malaya at the present time. But we hope that very soon they are going to resume a certain amount of amphibious work. We have a commando in Korea operating with some success. We have also a special boat section which we are keeping up with the technique of frogmen, and so on, and a small section with special boat jobs. I have just returned from a visit to the United States Marine Corps. They are a large Corps. They have developed amphibious warfare to a very high degree. There is one particular development which they have gone in for in a big way which I do not think the Lecturer mentioned—the use of the helicopter. They are rather taken with helicopter development, and are making great progress with it. They are contemplating making use of very large craft which will carry a considerable number of men. They feel, as is generally felt here, that there is a very big future for the helicopter in war which would have a particular impact on special formations.

It only remains for me to propose—as I am sure you would wish—a vote of thanks to the Lecturer. (*Applause.*)

## TOWARD ATLANTIC SECURITY

By THE HON. CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, C.B.E.,  
UNITED STATES DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

On Wednesday, 21st November, 1951, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR GERALD TEMPLER, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It is only right and proper that one of the most distinguished of our soldiers, Field Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya, should have been asked to take the Chair at this very important lecture this afternoon. He has not been well, and this morning his doctors forbade him, unfortunately, to leave his room, which accounts for my extremely inadequate appearance in the Chair.

Mr. Charles Spofford stands high in international affairs and occupies to-day the important position of Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies. We are indeed fortunate that he has accepted the invitation of your Council to talk to us this afternoon. It is still more fortunate that his multifarious journeys between the United States and this Country have not interrupted his visit, still more so since he only got out of an aeroplane from Paris an hour ago. It is not invariably the case by any means that persons high in international affairs in fact have a truly international background, but Mr. Spofford certainly fulfils this qualification.

He comes himself from the State of Missouri, was educated in America, France, and Switzerland, and he graduated from Northwestern University and the University of Grenoble. He was later teacher in European history at Yale. Having received his law degree from Harvard University in 1928, Mr. Spofford began to practise law in Chicago. He subsequently moved to New York and maintained his law practice there from 1930, except for his absence during the war years, until July, 1950, when he was appointed to his present post.

The war drew him inevitably to the Allied Headquarters in Algiers, where he truly fitted into the Civil Affairs Section and advised on economic and supply matters connected with French North Africa and French West Africa. When the Italy campaign opened, he became chief of the planning staff for Allied Military Government in Sicily and in Italy, later assuming the appointment of Chief of Staff of the Military Government of those territories. In May, 1944, he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G.5, responsible for matters affecting the civil populations of the Mediterranean theatre, and that experience led, in July, 1945, to his appointment as Military Adviser to the State Department in connection with the proposed Peace Treaty with Italy.

With all the work that those many appointments implied, he still found the time and energy to be a director of a hospital, of a theological seminary, and of the New York Chapter of the American Red Cross and President of the Metropolitan Opera Association. These posts, among many others, he had to resign in 1950 on becoming Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies, where he now holds the rank of ambassador.

With that brief and very inadequate survey, I have great pleasure in introducing to you His Excellency Mr. Charles Spofford.

### LECTURE

**I** VERY much appreciate the opportunity of being with you this afternoon to discuss certain phases of the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Let me first say how much I regret that Lord Wilson, my old chief in the Mediterranean, where I served on the Staff for a matter of some few months, is ill and



unable to be here. Had he been here, I should have reminded him of the days of 1943 when the issues with which we were faced—political and military issues—in the Mediterranean were the Italian bread ration and whether it should be raised from 200 to 300 grammes, thinking up ways and means of opening up access to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece preparatory to U.N.R.R.A., which was then in its formative stages, and the big questions arising out of the fact that our Russian Allies were approaching the Balkans from the East.

Since that time, we have had occasion to modify a great many of the assumptions on which our plans for the conclusion of the war and for the post-war period were based. We have had occasion to review a great many of our hopes in that direction, too, but there is one facet of that 1943-44 work in the Mediterranean, however, which I think we have had no occasion to reconsider. That is the experience we all had in Allied co-operation in the military field, an experience to which Lord Wilson made a very great contribution and in which he gained the affection of all those whose privilege it was to serve with him. I hope that you will convey my very heartiest good wishes to him for a speedy recovery.

I should like to open my remarks this afternoon by reminding you briefly of the reasons which prompted our 12 North Atlantic nations to sign a Treaty and set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think we can say that the entire project is proof that we can and do learn from past mistakes. It is only 15 years ago that the free nations of the world, through the League of Nations, first attempted collective security, but the League crumbled when it failed to develop the necessary strength, collectively or individually, to bar the path to aggression. The errors of omission of those days undoubtedly influenced Hitler in his decision to launch the 1939-45 War.

With this knowledge fresh in mind, the statesmen of 1945 placed their hope in the development of a fully effective system of collective security under the United Nations as the best means of preserving the peace of the world. Unfortunately, it became clear in the first two years of the life of the U.N. that the conflict between the points of view of the Western Powers and of Soviet Russia and its Eastern European associates went so deep as to make it improbable that there could be achieved at an early date, on a world-wide basis, the major purposes which the Charter of the U.N. was designed to achieve.

#### PRE-KOREAN FEAR

I need only recall the series of episodes which are all too recent in our memory and with which we are all too familiar: the Soviet use of the veto on the Security Council; the imposition of the Communist regimes in the satellite countries in Eastern Europe; the Soviet violation of the Potsdam Agreement, culminating in the blockade of Berlin; the campaign against the Greeks; the war of nerves against the Turks; the ceaseless propaganda campaign; the subversive actions against the economic structure of the Western European countries, particularly France and Italy; and obstruction of the German and Austrian Peace Treaties. All these were bound to make Russia's western neighbours fear her intentions in the pre-Korea days of the post-1939-45 War era.

I think that the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty goes back to 1947 when, at the break-up of the Council of Foreign Ministers held here in London at that time, General Marshall, who was then serving as the Secretary of State of the United States, and Mr. Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, finally reached regretfully the conclusion that the Soviet Government had no



intention of maintaining normal relations with the western world and real co-operation in the U.N.

The consolidation of Soviet and satellite resources made it essential for the West likewise to seek a degree of unification. This led to the Brussels Treaty, as a first step, which was signed between the Benelux Powers, France, and the United Kingdom in March, 1948. On the same day, President Truman, in addressing both Houses of Congress, referred to the Brussels Treaty as a constructive step, and expressed the conviction that the determination of the Brussels Treaty Powers to defend themselves would be matched by the determination of the United States to help them do so.

These were preliminary steps which, a year later, culminated in the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by the Brussels Pact Powers and seven other countries, the United States, Canada, Iceland, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and Italy.

For most of these countries, this step was, of course, a landmark in terms of national policy. This was especially true in the case of the United States, for although the United States had accepted membership of the United Nations, its opposition to military alliances, particularly with the countries of Europe, running back for 150 years, had been one of the strongest traditions and tenets of its foreign policy.

This is a very sketchy and inadequate treatment of what might be said to be the heredity and the environment which brought the North Atlantic Treaty into being; heredity: European post-war economic and political weaknesses and disunity, American isolationism, common experience on both sides of the Atlantic of two world wars; environment: the threat of Russian expansion and the consequent strong and rapidly-growing desire—overriding in the case of the United States its traditional isolationist policy—for collective security.

#### THE TREATY'S ESSENCE

Let us have a look at the Treaty itself. It first obliges, as you well know, all its members to be ready for action in the case of aggression against any one of them and to fulfil the pledges in the U.N. Charter and not to use the threat of force in international relations. It promises the co-operation of all parties in strengthening their free institutions and seeks to promote conditions of stability, well-being, and economic collaboration. That is Article 2, of which we shall hear increasingly in the coming weeks and months.

It calls on members, in Article 3, by means of effective self-help and mutual aid, to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist aggression and, finally, in Articles 5 and 6—the operative clauses of the Treaty—it makes an armed attack against one or more of the member-nations an attack against them all in the area encompassed by the Treaty. It also sets up a Council, on which the members are represented, to implement the Treaty provisions. I would emphasize that the framers of the Treaty insisted on keeping it within the letter and the spirit of the U.N. Charter, taking as the basis for their act Article 51, which affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. Article 5 also makes it clear what should be done in the event of an armed attack against members and says that all measures taken as a result should immediately be reported to the Security Council.

I think it is important to bear in mind that there are three stages, or phases, in the development of collective strength for self-defence. First, there is the agreement on the principle itself; secondly, the planning of the military forces to give effect to the concept; and, thirdly, their actual creation. I think it is a fact that there

have been many alliances in the past in which the principle has been agreed upon—agreement has been reached to go to the aid of others if attacked ; there have been some alliances in the past in which advance staff plans have been made—Western Union was an example ; but I think there has been no previous alliance in which the forces of the various parties have been forged into combined armies, navies, and air forces in peace-time. In this respect the concepts of the North Atlantic Treaty are unique and unprecedented, and this is the measure of the problem which faces this very young organization, this newcomer in the international field.

#### CHANGE IN STRUCTURE

In developing international machinery to accomplish its task, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization faced first the problem of the organization itself, for there were no precedents to serve as guide-lines for the development of a structure to give effect to this new concept, and the organization had to be created as the problems were thought out and as the requirements developed. Of course, invaluable experience was gained in the conduct of Allied operations in the last war, without which I doubt whether anyone would have had the courage or the vision to establish the integrated N.A.T.O. commands which have been set up in recent months. But I want to point out that that experience was in war-time, and there were usually only two parties ; national political considerations played a very minor role, and formal agreements were few and were generally after the fact. The thing was to act quickly and ask questions afterwards. The problem of N.A.T.O. to-day—with its 12 partners, soon to be 14, and with Parliaments and public opinion constantly and rightly watching the situation—the problem of N.A.T.O. to-day is of a very different order and complexity.

I shall not go into past organization here, except to say that events in Korea speedily necessitated a shift from the early original committee structure of N.A.T.O.'s organization to the creation of actual defensive forces, with a requisite change in the N.A.T.O. machinery from what had originally been the committee structure, suitable only for planning, to something resembling or approaching an operating or command structure.

A word now about the present organization with which, I assume, you are generally familiar, but the main outlines of which I ought perhaps to sketch briefly. At the top is the North Atlantic Council, a body which now consists of the Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers, and Finance Ministers of each of the partners. Since mid-1950, three permanent civilian agencies have been set up : the Council Deputies, who met for the first time in late July, 1950, the body with which I have the honour to be associated ; the Defence Production Board, which was created in January, 1951, and the Finance and Economic Board, which was organized late in the Spring of 1951 and meets in Paris. All these agencies are now, or have been for the past few months, supported by the international secretariat created during the past year.

On the military side of the organization there is, first, the Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the 12 nations, which meets periodically as events require. Under that committee, operating on a day-to-day permanent basis, as we, the deputies, do on the civilian side, are the Standing Group, made up of representatives of the French, British, and United States Chiefs of Staff, and beside that Group, the Military Representatives Committee with which the Standing Group consults when the Military Committee is not in session. The Military Representation Committee consists of the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the non-Standing Group Powers.

Finally, on the military side, there are the actual commands. S.H.A.P.E., under General Eisenhower, has been functioning for about eight months and has set up a series of subordinate commands in the area of its responsibility. Other supreme commands will be established in the future as arrangements for these are completed.

Parenthetically, I should like to point out that the delegation of command over national forces assigned to an international commander in peace-time, which is the fact in S.H.A.P.E., is another unique feature of N.A.T.O. It marks the giving up of a limited degree of sovereignty in the delegation of power to dispose of national forces. It is a very limited degree, since the power of command of General Eisenhower is hedged about with certain constitutional and legal restrictions, but he has the power of command, and to the extent to which it is effective there is a delegation to him.

#### CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM

But I want to emphasize that it is only in this limited field that international executive authority in N.A.T.O. can be found. I therefore venture to underline a fact which seems not to be clear, which is that N.A.T.O. has none of the hall-marks of a supra-national State. These Boards which I have just described, the Boards of the Treaty Organization right up to the North Atlantic Council itself, have no delegated powers and can act only by agreement of the Governments of the 12 members. There is no voting machinery or procedure; we operate by a process of agreement, persuasion, and the effect of consensus of opinion.

You may say that these are not ideal methods for carrying on vital operations in a hurry, but until the day when the participating nations agree to surrender some further degree of national authority, these are the realities that we must face in order to operate as we do. It is a democratic coalition, with all its virtues and all its defects.

Since there is no delegation, except in the military command area, the function of N.A.T.O. is to state policy, to formulate plans, to obtain agreement on the plans, and to ensure that action is taken to follow the agreed plans. Providing basic resources in terms of men, material, and money is and remains a national responsibility. No soldier marches under General Eisenhower's orders who is not recruited, equipped, and paid by his own country, and no guns come off an assembly line unless funds are provided by some national Parliament. Thus N.A.T.O. is, I think, best described as the central nervous system which directs and controls the body; the bone and muscle come from national individual efforts. From this, you will see that the entire defence effort under N.A.T.O. is a complex inter-relationship of national and international action, a fact which often confuses casual and even careful observers of N.A.T.O. performance.

To illustrate what I mean, let us examine, from this point of view, the task of the N.A.T.O. military agencies. The development of the military plans for the defence of the West has been a N.A.T.O. function, that is, one performed on the international plane by the Standing Group in broad strategic terms down to the operational plans of S.H.A.P.E. We have there an example, in the planning field, of international action. The raising and training of troops, however, is a national responsibility, but even here the international agencies have entered the field. One example is the utilization of training procedures which have been developed by the Standing Group through a set of principles to which all member-countries are supposed to conform. Inspections are carried out on the international plane by S.H.A.P.E. to ensure

conformity with these principles by the national units assigned to N.A.T.O. Military students are being exchanged between the Treaty partners, and a N.A.T.O. Defence College has this week been established in Paris. In fact, I met with them just this morning.

#### COUNCIL DEPUTIES

Agreement has been reached in certain limited fields—again on the international plane—on the standardization of equipment and of procedures. You all know, moreover, that a series of joint manoeuvres has been held recently between the forces of the Treaty Powers under N.A.T.O.

Obviously all these matters require careful correlation of national and international action. They also lead to the observation that the line where national responsibility ends and international action begins is not fixed. This same interplay of national and international action is to be found in problems with which the N.A.T.O. civilian agencies are dealing. I shall not go into this in detail, but will merely say a few words which can serve to explain how the civilian machinery of the Treaty, as at present constituted, now works.

The Council Deputies are located here in London. They constitute the top permanent body of the Treaty and they represent the Council in day-to-day operations. There is one Deputy for each Treaty-member, and he speaks for all the Ministers in his Government who are concerned with N.A.T.O. matters, primarily those of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Finance. The Deputies deal with a general assortment of matters which are concerned with the Treaty operations. Political responsibilities assumed by the Council Deputies essentially consist of evolving common policy for N.A.T.O. after consideration of various national viewpoints. An example was the recent decision to admit Greece and Turkey as new members. Behind this lay a period of frank discussion over several weeks by the Council Deputies, in which each Government expressed its views on the subject and had the opportunity to analyse the views of others. As a result of this preliminary exchange, there was a large measure of agreement and the Council took its decision at the Ottawa meeting in September.

A similar example was the discussions almost a year ago in which the Deputies, after long debate, reached agreement in principle on the participation of Germany in the defence of the West, participation which has not yet been achieved. This represents one of the major outstanding problems of the Treaty Organization.

#### INFRA-STRUCTURE

In addition to resolving political problems which call for actual decision, the Deputies also exchange views on topics of political interest to the various Governments, so that each Government may benefit from the views of the others and may tend to evolve their foreign policies in common. It is a process of consultation in advance of crisis, which should serve our Governments well.

Further, the Treaty Organization in its present form has raised for consideration by the Deputies a very great variety of topics in the non-political field, of which the following are broadly representative. In organizational matters, besides giving the Treaty structure something of an overhauling last year, agreement was reached on such housekeeping details as common budgets, sharing the cost of the structure of the civil and military sides of the organization. As military men, you have all undoubtedly heard the term "infra-structure," which is a newcomer in the military



lexicon. It is a French word which has been introduced to cover the capital outlay for building airfields, telecommunications, and certain other military facilities designed for common use. The dividing up of these costs between each country in relation to the country in which the airfield is situated, the users of the airfield, and the general beneficiaries by its existence, was a complex problem and still is. It was settled at Ottawa after a long period of debate.

Other legal and technical questions arise with the development and creation of the organization, such as the signature recently of a Treaty setting out the status of N.A.T.O. military personnel serving in various Treaty countries. This problem of status, or to use the legal term "immunities," is often overlooked. In fact, however, it touches on a number of aspects of national sovereignty because it involves the rights and obligations of military personnel outside their national boundaries. The problem has been dealt with bilaterally in the past, such as in the case of the United Kingdom and the United States, through a so-called gentlemen's agreement governing the relationships of their military personnel. In this recent protocol there has been established uniform multilateral procedures, which will be applicable to the French trainee in Oklahoma, to the British soldier in Belgium, and to the American soldier in Iceland. The need for this is brought about by the fact that under N.A.T.O. for the first time large forces from one country are being deployed in another in peacetime. These agreements represent considerable development in International Law relating to the international status of military personnel. So much for the Council Deputies, the political arm of the Treaty Organization.

#### TWO KINDS OF PROBLEMS

I should now like to say a few words about the problems of production and finance which are being dealt with by our sister-organizations, the Defence Production Board and the Finance and Economic Board.

The Defence Production Board, together with its international staff under its chief executive, or "co-ordinator," was set up in London following the Brussels meeting of the Council in December, 1950, and took as its major task the analysis and co-ordination of steps to provide military equipment to meet the requirements of the armed forces through programmes of production over and above those already planned by individual nations. In other words, the D.P.B. aims at developing joint methods for overcoming military equipment deficiencies. It assembled a highly competent international staff for this purpose and, to illustrate its method of operation, organized a series of teams of technical experts, known as "end-item task forces," who were sent into the field to assess the manufacturing capacity for equipment based on lists which the D.P.B. had compiled in important categories of military equipment. Major items were aircraft, ammunition, artillery and small arms, electronics and engineering equipment, shipbuilding, small ships, minesweepers and escort vessels, and vehicles, combat and transport.

These task forces submitted their reports on alternative assumptions; first, capacity available in each country without dislocating civilian economies and, secondly, capacity which could be made available if civilian facilities were converted to military use. The D.P.B., on the basis of these reports from the task forces, made recommendations based on military and production considerations to increase production in these important fields where capacity exists in Continental European countries. However, despite the effective planning and programming action on the international plane by the Defence Production Board, it is a fact that armaments



production in Europe, particularly on the Continent, is not yet adequate to meet the requirements. A number of reasons for this are disclosed by the D.P.B. reports. National desires to "buy at home" have impeded the production of defence equipment in one country for the use of another. Other factors which tend to slow down international production plans are such things as shortages of raw materials and machine-tools, some tariff barriers, and questions of military acceptability in one Treaty country of equipment devised and produced by another. These factors are probably capable of solution.

#### FORMS OF AID

The basic impediment to increased production has been the financial limitation imposed by the defence budgets of the various countries. In order to relieve this in part, there has been recently developed by the United States a programme of "off-shore" procurement, which means that the United States will pay in Europe in dollars for armaments which would otherwise have to come from United States production. In addition to being a source of dollars for the European economy, this method of procedure will provide in certain cases for the utilization of idle European plants in the fields where idle capacity exists in Europe and where U.S. capacity is fully engaged. This is a feature of the United States military aid programme which is in support of the supply programme developed internationally through N.A.T.O., and which it is hoped will make a substantial contribution to the re-arming of the Western Powers, particularly the smaller countries with less developed armament industries and armament programmes of their own.

I want to remind you that the Canadian Government has also tackled the important problem of military aid and has transferred equipment overseas for three divisions and has offered, and is in fact, I believe, supplying, the production of certain other items in the military field to its Treaty partners.

One fact in connection with the production problem and the problem of equipping the forces of the N.A.T.O. Powers deserves attention. The weapon requirements of modern armies have not only become very great in quantity but they have also become extraordinarily intricate in quality. The development since the last war in the complexity of modern armaments has been extraordinary indeed. This has meant an added drain upon the civilian side of the economies of our countries, and it has also brought about a corresponding increase in the cost of armaments, derived particularly from the remarkable developments in electronics. One can almost say that a fractional horse-power electric motor is now as essential as cartridge cases, and that some of the gauges for electronic instruments play as big a role as the rifles themselves. One can almost say that D.D.T., as well as bombs, is essential to win the battle. Aluminium, steel, copper, nylon, sulphur, sugar, penicillin, electric power—almost everything one can name has become part of the production of modern military machines. Military economy to-day is practically synonymous with the economy of the country as a whole. Thus the production effort must be considered in relation to the total economic and financial effort of the alliance as a whole, which leads me to a word on the work of the financial agencies of the Treaty Organization.

#### "BURDEN SHARING"

The Finance and Economic Board is the youngest of the permanent agencies, since it held its first meeting in May, 1951. The Board was located in Paris so that it could have the advantage of drawing on the personnel and the experience of the representatives of the Treaty countries on the O.E.E.C., that is, the Organization for

European Economic Co-operation, a larger economic body which was set up in connection with the administration of Marshall Plan Aid. It includes non-N.A.T.O. countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland. The O.E.E.C. became familiar with the problem of examining, in broad terms, financial problems and analysing economic impacts in connection with Marshall Aid.

The F.E.B. was given as its major task at the time of its organization the analysis of the economic problems arising from the defence effort, the task of measuring, more specifically, the impact of each country's effort and assessing each country's capacity to devote its economic resources to the total defence effort. These studies were set up in order to provide a basis for a judgment as to how the distribution of the economic burden of the collective defence effort might be arranged between the partners; to determine whether it was bearing more heavily upon one than another. The F.E.B. was instructed to make proposals for adjustments, if necessary. This process, known in N.A.T.O. as the "burden-sharing" exercise, also embraces such matters as advice on the division of military aid in relation to the effort of each country. I think it is clear that what constitutes equality in the sharing of defence burdens, when one considers the very diverse standards, resources, potentials, and political realities affecting the various Treaty partners, has an element of peculiar complexity and is one which in the final analysis may, perhaps, be a political one. The F.E.B. has gone deeply into this task, and an interim report based on the examination of the countries' first submissions was presented at the Ottawa meeting of the Council.

#### THE GAP

The carrying forward of their tasks, which I have sketched very generally and briefly, by the civilian agencies of N.A.T.O. has underlined several major problems which affect vitally the Treaty plans.

The first was the disclosure, as the military requirements developed and as the analysis of the resources proceeded, that there was a spread between the requirements formulated by the military agencies and the collective resources of N.A.T.O. as a whole. This spread—called "the gap"—raised serious problems in planning the development of the collective forces on an orderly basis. We also suggested that a revised system of priorities in calling for resources in the present emergency might have to be considered. The gap between requirements and resources, of course, is not a feature peculiar to N.A.T.O. It is an issue which is faced every year by national governments in the process of bringing national military requirements and national defence budgets into line.

The Ottawa meeting of the Council recognized that this issue, reaching as it did into the economic life of each country, affected the military security of its members, and might be resolved on a collective basis in the interests of N.A.T.O. as a whole. It is clear that the establishment of requirements is a military function. But steps to meet them must be taken in the light of the economic and political limitations which obtain in each country, and, while the setting of the levels of financial effort of each country *vis-a-vis* the levels of defence budgets is an economic function, it is one which must be taken in the light of the military and political risks involved. In other words, we have here a complex economic-politico-military problem.

The Council decided that to break out of the circle of N.A.T.O. planning which had resulted from this fact, the task of formulating recommendations for the solution

of the problem should be entrusted to a special ministerial committee known as the Temporary Council Committee. This Temporary Council Committee—T.C.C.—with an Executive Bureau consisting of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Harriman, and M. Jean Monnet—is busily engaged in Paris on two parallel lines of action, assessing the economic capabilities of the Treaty countries on the basis of national submissions, those previously put in to the Finance and Economic Board, and called for by questionnaires from the T.C.C., and parallel action screening the military requirements. The report of the T.C.C. will be a milestone in N.A.T.O. planning, and it will mark an advance in the progress in the international field in one or two important respects. Particularly, for the first time there will be international screening of the military requirements established by the permanent agencies of the Treaty. The T.C.C. report will not solve all the problems of N.A.T.O., but it will be a vital piece of work for guiding its future action.

In connection with this important exercise, I want to emphasize one fact to which attention is, I think, too seldom directed. That is that the exchange of information and data itself between the Treaty partners and the disclosure of hitherto confidential information marks a considerable advance in the concept of collective action. National information has customarily been closely held, even among Allies, in the past. That is no longer the case in the economic and production field, for we now share our facts fully. Without this important development of a common trust, it would be virtually impossible to develop the technical planning multilaterally within the N.A.T.O. framework.

#### GERMAN QUESTION

The second major problem which is facing the Treaty agencies, to which I shall have the opportunity only briefly to refer in passing, is that of Germany. It has been recognized for some time that a realistic defence of the West is not possible without a German contribution; yet the ways and means by which Germany shall make this contribution have become a markedly complex problem. In addition to its sensitive political aspects, particularly with the French and other Continental Powers, the questions of manpower, production, and financial contribution which are involved in the substitution of the occupation status of the United States, the United Kingdom, and French forces by the status of N.A.T.O. forces in Germany, all of these pose tremendous difficulties which are not yet adjusted. The Temporary Council Committee is faced with the economic problem of German contribution in certain respects. Meanwhile, discussions are proceeding at Bonn among the occupying Powers, and in Paris the European Army Conference called by the French is meeting to lay out the framework of a European Defence Force into which Western Germany would be integrated. These are attempts to reach agreement in their respective fields to be submitted to N.A.T.O. in the near future.

In this discussion today I may have succeeded in giving some indication of why N.A.T.O. cannot always present an orderly or clear-cut picture to the public eye. I may have explained to you in some measure why at times its machinery works slowly. Events have moved with such rapidity in the defence field that N.A.T.O. has had simultaneously to organize, develop, plan, and operate. In so doing, it has had to adapt an international organization with multilateral techniques in largely uncharted areas in an alliance in which no one can speak with the absolute authority of the partners and which has no funds or resources to dispose of that are not supplied

by national Governments. Under those circumstances, it is inevitable that all important N.A.T.O. decisions are, in the last analysis, political decisions, for the major economic and military commitments of the individual members can only occur if Governments and their Parliaments give their consent. It follows, therefore, that if N.A.T.O. is to succeed, individual political action, which is the last analysis depends on the support of individual public opinion, is essential.

#### INFORMING THE TAXPAYERS

It is this fact which gives rise to a problem which underlies in a very real sense the entire complex organization. I refer to the problem of making increasingly aware to public opinion in our various countries the scope and aims of N.A.T.O. and its task of building collective defence in the West. Each voter and taxpayer in each country must be convinced of the fact that, in accepting increased taxes or in accepting service in the armed forces and the other sacrifices required, he and his family are obtaining protection and security. He should be shown that through his sacrifices he is contributing to the support of the most powerful coalition that has ever been created and one which, collectively armed, can deter aggression or, if necessary, defeat it, and he must develop a sense of confidence and trust in his country's Allies, which can be important beyond the present emergency.

Unfortunately, we are handicapped in the development of this feeling of participation and confidence. I will mention a fact which characterizes N.A.T.O. action since N.A.T.O. operates deeply in the military field, and that is the security requirements and secrecy with which N.A.T.O. plans and operations are surrounded. In a cold war, military security is just as necessary a precaution as it is in the case of a hot war. Yet there is no question that this secrecy and failure to develop public opinion has resulted in misunderstanding in several cases in many of our countries over N.A.T.O. decisions for which public opinion was not adequately prepared. It is possible that this issue might make the difference at a crucial time between strong support for N.A.T.O. or ineffectiveness. It is a problem with which our Governments must increasingly deal. The risks of over-disclosure of plans must be balanced against the insecurity which can stem from lack of public knowledge of the plans and acceptance of the policies underlying them.

#### CHALLENGE

In conclusion, I should merely like to say that, in my judgment, N.A.T.O. has come a long way. It still has a long way to go. I think we are in sight, for the first time, of real collective security. By "real collective security" I mean a situation such that free men will know that they are safe from aggression, from occupation, and from the type of slavery that exists on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Yet we all know that we are not there yet, and the period between now and the achievement of real security may be the most dangerous of all. But I think we also have the prospect before us not only of collective security but of consolidating through the Treaty agencies the collective association of 350 million people with greater resources, greater skills, more profound devotion to free democratic ways of living, and greater opportunities than any grouping the world has ever known.

These are the goals, and this is the challenge. Therefore, the cost of all this toil, tears, and sweat now as the price of avoiding the unthinkable bloodletting of another war, the price of support, is not too high to pay for the future which we can begin to see before us.



## DISCUSSION

COLONEL F. H. SMITH: We have had a most interesting résumé of the position. From the Empire defence point of view, the dispersal of targets and the decentralization of industry require very careful consideration, as England is the manpower centre for the British Empire, and to ensure Atlantic Security for the Americas and Europe, England is the proposed advanced base for defence and attack from the East. (England and Wales have a population of over 700 to the square mile in contrast to only 3 in Australia and 4 to the square mile in Canada.)

Has the Lecturer considered the Geo-Polar position in relation to Aerial Warfare and the proposals of the great British cartographer, Sir Harold Mackinder, now being studied and developed by the Americans in which they find his Principal Hemisphere is centred practically on London and contains 96 per cent. of the world's population with 98 per cent. of the world's industries, and also includes the world's shortest air routes between any points on this half of the world's surface and entirely within this hemisphere, whereas on the other half of the world's surface, covered largely by the Pacific Ocean and the Antarctica, we only have the land areas of Australia, the tip of South America, Chile, and the Argentine, etc., which only contain 6 per cent. of the world's population and 2 per cent. of the world's industries?

Mackinder also suggested in 1902 that the nation who controlled the land mass of Russia and Siberia (Eurasia) could endanger and threaten the sea and air routes of the world on the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Pacific with submarines and aerial attack.

THE LECTURER: I think you have raised several questions. First, as to the geo-political approach to our problems, N.A.T.O. operates under one limitation, which is almost evident by definition, that is, that the North Atlantic Treaty forces and the strategic planning of the N.A.T.O. are directed solely to the North Atlantic areas. It may become increasingly difficult to plan strategically for the North Atlantic without reference to the Middle East, say, or the Pacific. In fact, it may be impossible to do so. I suggest that the answer to your questions from the standpoint of N.A.T.O. is that N.A.T.O. is concerned, in geo-political terms, with a local problem, the problem of the defence of the area from the North Cape to the Turkish frontiers. The adjacent areas in the Middle East and the problems of the Far East are not within N.A.T.O. competence.

Next, the matter of the concentration of industry is one which obviously gives the strategic planners concern. However, the dispersal of key facilities has remained up to now a question for National Governments.

MR. A. CLINTON: N.A.T.O. has some influence in the appointment of the Atlantic Commander. Is it proposed that each nation belonging to N.A.T.O. in turn shall command the Atlantic or that the Command shall continue to be under an American admiral? For example, is there likely to be a French Commander?

THE LECTURER: The present status of the North Atlantic Command is this: there has been agreement that there should be an overall Command of the Atlantic. There has been no action on the appointment of the commander. There was a proposal some months ago that an American admiral should be appointed to the Atlantic Command but that proposal has never been acted upon, so the fact is that the Atlantic Command has not been activated nor any commander appointed. That is the present status. That is a matter under discussion on the military side of the Treaty organization, and I am afraid that I cannot at this time predict what the result of the discussion will be.

LIEUT.-COLONEL CLIVE GARCIA: I should like to put a question about Turkey. She has just been brought into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It seems to me that Turkey has no connection at all with the North Atlantic but belongs to the Middle East; that in the event of war, Turkey will never send troops to the North Atlantic area and North Atlantic troops under General Eisenhower can never be sent to the defence of the Middle East. This would not mean, of course, that British troops or American troops could not be sent, but troops allocated to the defence of Western Europe, because



this is the vital theatre, presumably could not be sent out of it without the risk of final defeat. Therefore, I wonder why Turkey has been brought into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I do not know whether that is a subject on which the Lecturer can say anything.

THE LECTURER: First, on the status of Turkey as a North Atlantic Power. I think there is some misconception about what derives from the name "North Atlantic." There is some misconception of the requirements of the Treaty. The Treaty was not intended to be confined to those Powers whose shores touch the North Atlantic. There is the case of Italy which is not, geographically speaking, a North Atlantic Power.

The Treaty makes clear that there might be admitted into N.A.T.O. those Powers who meet the test of the preamble, that is to say, whose democratic institutions qualified them for admission, and, secondly, who might be in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Those are the tests and Turkey meets them. The Treaty is not based on a strictly limited geographical concept.

You have raised the question of the disposition of Turkish forces in the event of an attack. Turkey is, of course, a bridge in a sense between Europe and the Middle East. It is a strategic position undoubtedly, a powerful anchor for the right flank of all the forces in Europe. In that sense it should be integrated in the defence of Europe. The same can be said of its position *vis-a-vis* the Middle East. Whether Turkish troops would ever be sent into action in Europe or not is, of course, impossible to say. It would depend upon the areas of action and upon the forces available. Turkish troops are already in Korea, which is a lot further away than any part of Western Europe.

In the event of emergency or hostilities, I see no reason why the forces should not be shifted back and forth, and I should imagine that the military command would probably wish to do so. Turkey has extensive frontiers and might very probably be engaged in defending them, but I think that there is nothing in the Treaty which prevents forces being sent from one area of N.A.T.O. territory into another. In the last analysis the problem is probably one of where the forces are required and what are available over-all.

CAPTAIN I. G. ROBERTSON, R.N.: Would you explain further the process of financing multilateral projects in the "infra-structure," which I understood you to say was derived from a French word? If there is a multilateral project which everyone agrees is a good thing, such as the headquarters in France, where does the money actually come from and how long does it take for the money to be provided after a project has been agreed to?

THE LECTURER: The infra-structure projects—I can treat the headquarters in the same way, and all the facilities for the common use of the integrated forces—are financed by budgets which are put up by the military forces and the cost of which is met by the individual countries in various proportions. As to the budget for the headquarters of S.H.A.P.E. and its subordinate commands, the process is this: General Eisenhower submits the estimated cost of operating his headquarters and that of the tactical air forces and the northern and southern commands and various subordinate commands. These budgets go to an International Budgets Committee, which examines them. The costs are then met through a fund to which, in the case of the headquarters, each nation contributes in various percentages. There is a scale of percentages covering the contributions to the cost of the headquarters. There is a different set of percentages which apply to operating costs from the set which applies to capital and construction costs, and it is a very complicated bit of negotiation; but these percentages are agreed. Sooner or later, at some subsequent budget period, the question may be reopened fully. The process will then recur without change. S.H.A.P.E. will estimate the cost, the Budget Committee will review the estimate, and the participating nations will pay the costs in specified percentages.

So far, "infra-structure" has covered tactical airfields and telecommunications, but it may cover port facilities, or line of communication facilities, or more complicated matters. In the first place, in regard to any tactical airfield problems that we have had,

only five of the 12 nations are contributing tactical air forces, and the question came up as to whether others of the participating nations should contribute to the cost of the airfields used by the five. In the case of telecommunications, you have the very difficult problem of the benefit to the civil economy. Hooking up the airfields of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg is largely a matter of expanding and strengthening and adding to the civil telephone network, which is for the most part of great benefit to the civilian economy. What is the extent of the benefit to those countries who are getting that, and how does one measure the benefit to its civil account? What group of the member-nations should pay for those telecommunications; those who use them, or all of them, or those whose air wings happen to be stationed on the airfields which are interconnected? We get around it by having an arbitrary set of percentages arrived at by negotiation.

As to the infra-structure facilities covered in what we call the "second slice," the group to be completed within 1952, the amounts will be put by the participating countries in accordance with a specified scale of percentages.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. T. WILSON: I should like to put a point to the Lecturer about his reference to secrecy and security. There comes a time when secrecy and security can be overdone, and I should like to ask whether it would not be a good thing if N.A.T.O. let the world know more of what it is doing in the way of re-armament. At present, re-armament is a vague phrase for something which is going to cost an awful lot of money. The man in the street has not a clue as to what it is for; nor has the majority of officers in the Army.

We hear every day alarming tales about how many divisions Russia has, how many thousands of aircraft, how many hundreds of submarines. All we see on the ground on the Continent are possibly 10 or 12 divisions, and we have no idea what is intended. The whole thing is very vague. Do you think that is a good thing? Is it because of secrecy and security, or is it because nothing has been decided?

THE LECTURER: First, I would agree with your first comment that the veil of secrecy and security should be lifted so far as possible. I feel so because not only is the bill for what N.A.T.O. requires high, and, as you say, the man in the street has very little concept of what his taxes are going for, but also because we are increasingly going into territory which is new to public opinion, which is not fully understood and which has sometimes provoked rather sharp reaction. For example, there was the so-called "great debate" in the United States Congress centred on the programme of sending United States divisions to Europe in peace-time, which was part of the N.A.T.O. military plan. The public opinion was not conditioned, was not brought along in support of that, and that provoked a violent political debate in the United States.

The problems in which we are breaking new ground have to be bulwarked by public opinion, or the plans will not, in the last analysis, be carried through, for the Governments will be unable to take the political decisions necessary to do so.

The other point of your question, that is, making available some statement of the forces available to N.A.T.O., involves, of course, both security and the fact that it is still in the development stage. Decisions have been made, but in very basic respects, and they may have to be revised. I described the review which is going on in Paris now under the Temporary Council Committee.

I think there is a great deal more that could be done to inform public opinion than we have done. The Governments in the Treaty Organization must face up to it. As the plans are developed and the forces appear, it is up to N.A.T.O. to make that apparent and to avoid the risk of insecurity by not having the public know what N.A.T.O. is doing and, therefore, not being prepared to support it.

REAR-ADMIRAL HUTTON: One of the most difficult matters of the lot is the question of German re-armament. I am sure that nobody in this room or in this Country or in the United States ever wanted to re-arm Germany, but it is just one of those things from the military point of view which simply has to be done.

You said that without German re-armament there is no defence of Western Europe. Without German re-armament there is certainly no defence of Europe or Germany itself, and without German re-armament there is no possibility, as military minds at present reason, of combating very large forces raised in East Germany by the Russians.

The question I want to ask is : do you think that the Continent as a whole is beginning to realize the military reasons for the re-armament of Germany and that the short time we have available to do it is overriding the political objections which they have had to it ? Are things moving fast on the Continent the whole time, or is there still very little progress ?

THE LECTURER : It is hard to generalize about the Continent as a whole. When the German question was first raised in N.A.T.O., which was at the New York meeting of the Council in September, 1950, opinion on it was divided. The small countries were generally in support of prompt steps to re-arm Germany, and they included Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and that in spite of the fact that these countries had been occupied by the Germans during the war.

The problem in France is different. It is a most difficult political problem, which led to the first rejection of the proposal by the then French Government. But after a period of negotiation during the four weeks of the Fall and early Winter of 1950, there came acceptance of the principle of German re-armament. At the same time the Council accepted a French plan to convene a conference to discuss details of an integrated European Army in which Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands would contribute their forces, which would be de-nationalized and would make an international force, the European Defence Force. That plan, which was put forward in its general outlines in pretty vague form at the end of 1950, was launched by the French in Paris at the conference in January, 1951, in which the Germans participated. It made extraordinary progress in the first few months. The Germans and the French were able to get together on a number of points of great difficulty, and the whole idea took on considerable momentum, and qualified support of the plan was followed by general approval in July.

I think it is a far-reaching scheme. Here is a scheme for very much closer integration of five or six of the Treaty Powers, with long-range political, financial, and economic features. Obviously that is bound to take time. I think, however, we must recognize that great progress has been made, and I think that in the next few weeks further progress will be made.

THE CHAIRMAN : It would be a presumption on my part to sum up at the end of such a comprehensive and vitally important lecture by so well-known a personality as Mr. Spofford. It is one of those addresses which should conclude with the authoritative voice of the speaker.

I have been out of this trade—I was only in on the edge of it before—for 18 months, but one is apt often to feel disappointed at the slowness of progress. Personally, when I look back on the last 18 months and knowing what I did when I left, it amazes me to see what has been achieved in spite of the enormous national and international difficulties.

We are all delighted to have had Mr. Spofford here this afternoon and are most grateful to him for fitting in this discussion, for he has a very full programme of visits on State business. I am sure also that I represent your views when I thank him for the forthright and most interesting manner in which he has answered the questions. (Applause.)

---

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSAM.<sup>1</sup>

By LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. REID, O.B.E., E.D., I.P. (retired)

**U**NTIL 1942, Assam, the Cinderella Province of India, was virtually an unknown country except to those privileged to live in that fascinating land. Then, for three years or so, Assam was in the limelight as the only Province of India actually invaded by the Japanese. The defence of Kohima and Imphal were temporary highlights in the history of the War, and many thousands of troops from Britain, the U.S.A., Africa, and of course the rest of India, made a personal acquaintance with Assam, though perhaps under conditions which somewhat obscured its attractiveness! With the end of the War, and the withdrawal of the troops, however, Assam reverted to its former condition of obscurity.

Nevertheless, with the trend of world events, Assam is an area of great strategic importance, not only to India, but to the whole of Asia. The advance of Communist influence in China, Manchuria, Korea, Malaya, Indo-China, Burma, Tibet, and the East Indies, shows too clearly that, save India and Pakistan, no country in South-East Asia has the strength to withhold this pressure unaided. Assam, projecting like a bastion from the North-East frontier of India, is the first in the way—and must form a political, and indeed military, outpost to hold back the tide. Consequently, developments in Assam, and since the War there have been many, are of no little importance to Asia and the democratic world.

For a proper comprehension of the problems of this little known corner of India, which differs so completely from the rest of the sub-continent, a general knowledge of its geography and its inhabitants is essential, especially of the latter, as in the conflicting aspirations of the various sections of the population lie some of the greatest difficulties which beset the administration. Many readers will have a personal knowledge of Assam; for the benefit of those who have not, a short description may be useful.

Assam, then, is the North-Easternmost State (termed Province until 1950) of India, and consists of two valleys running roughly East and West. The Northernmost, and larger, is that of the Brahmaputra River, and the Southern, that of the Surma. Between them lies a chain of hills rising to nearly 6,500 feet and forming, as it were, a central "prong" projecting from the Himalayan barrier which forms the northern boundary of Assam, and curving southwards, sends a spur through the Lushai Hills towards Chittagong to form the eastern boundary. To the North of Assam lie Bhutan and Tibet; to the East, Burma (though in the extreme North-East only a very narrow strip separates Assam from China); and on the South and West, the Pakistan Province of East Bengal, save for a very narrow corridor in the extreme North-West, which links Assam with West Bengal and forms the only direct contact with the rest of India. In area, Assam is, now, roughly the same size as England.

### INHABITANTS

The Brahmaputra Valley (commonly called the Assam Valley) is mainly inhabited by Assamese. The vast majority of these are Hindus, though there is a sprinkling of Muslims, the descendants in many cases of settlers who remained after the abortive Mogul invasions centuries ago. There is a considerable Bengali element, mainly Hindu, in the towns; and in Lower and Central Assam, there are large areas almost exclusively inhabited by Muslim immigrants from East Bengal who, during

<sup>1</sup> An outline map of Assam faces page 68.



the past half century, have been pouring into Assam and who, by industry and skill in cultivation, combined with a habit of using force as a persuasive argument, have virtually ousted the former Assamese and tribal inhabitants. These Bengali elements jealously maintain their own language, culture, and social customs, and there exists consequently between the Assamese and the Bengalis in Assam a bitter jealousy, amounting to real enmity.

The Surma Valley which, prior to the Partition of 1947, consisted of the two districts of Cachar and Sylhet, now, so far as Assam is concerned, comprises the Cachar District only, to which, however, the greater part of the Karimganj Sub-division of the Sylhet District was transferred, the remainder of Sylhet falling to Pakistan. The inhabitants are entirely Bengali, and very largely Muslim, but the Hindu population of Cachar, taken as a whole, has a higher standard of education, and is politically more vocal than the Muslim.

In both valleys there is a large tea-garden population, about half a million in all, none of which is indigenous. This labour is mainly recruited from the aboriginal tribes of Bihar, Orissa, and Central India on contracts providing for repatriation. A considerable number, especially in the Surma Valley, have settled permanently in Assam instead of returning to their homes. They are all nominally Hindus, although the Hinduism consists of a very thin veneer over the aboriginal animism; and they have very little intercourse with other sections of the inhabitants.

#### HILL TRIBES

The hills which surround Assam, and form the central prong, are inhabited by peoples of many different tribes. All are Mongoloid, and most belong to the Tibeto-Burman Group. The various tribes differ utterly in language, appearance and customs, and vary in their progress towards civilization from the Nagas, only a generation removed from head-hunting, to the Lushais, with the highest percentage of female literacy in India. The hillmen, except to the extent to which missionary influence has penetrated, are animists, and all have a deep distrust of the plainsman. Owing to their peculiar social organization, and to prevent exploitation, the tribal areas are administered under special rules, the ordinary laws and procedure not being applicable. The avowed policy of the present Government is to open up the hill districts and, by the development of roads, schools and dispensaries, gradually to replace the present system of tribal rule by a democratic administration adapted to local custom and tribal usage.

Finally, in the sub-montane areas of the Assam Valley fringing the hills, there live the "Plains tribals"—Mongolians also, who probably long ago inhabited the hills. They have been, and are being steadily ousted by the pressing stream of immigrants and pushed back towards the foothills. These mostly still retain their old tribal languages, though the majority are bilingual, speaking also Assamese. They retain also many tribal customs, but are rapidly becoming Hinduized. They are subject to the ordinary administration and, while not imbued with the general distrust of the plainsman that is shown by the hill tribes, they nurture a deep resentment against the Muslim immigrants from East Bengal who have been the main factor in driving them from their former lands.

#### PARTITION OF 1947

When, in 1947, the Partition of India was announced, the fact that the Surma Valley was overwhelmingly Muslim and the Assam Valley Hindu presented an



obstacle. There was intense opposition by the Assamese to any suggestion that Assam should form part of East Pakistan, and a referendum was held in the Sylhet District to enable the people of this Muslim area to express their choice. Feelings ran very high, but elaborate security measures were taken, and no serious incident took place. As a result of this referendum, and of the Radcliffe Award, made subsequently to settle the actual areas to be incorporated in each of the new Dominions, approximately seven-eighths of the Sylhet District was transferred to Pakistan; the remaining portion, although in fact very strongly Muslim, being reconstituted into a new subdivision and added to the Cachar District. At the same time, at the western end of the Assam Valley, intense propaganda was carried on by the Muslim League to obtain the incorporation into East Pakistan of those portions of the Goalpara and Kamrup Districts which are mainly inhabited by Muslim settlers from East Bengal. Enormous meetings were held just over the border and threats made of a mass "invasion" to force Assam to adhere to Pakistan. The movement failed owing to the firm attitude adopted by the authorities, and to the fact that the indigenous Assamese Muslims, who had at first supported incorporation with Pakistan, later reversed their attitude on realizing that, were this accomplished, their community would be completely swamped by the Bengali Muslim element. But the result is that on both her south-western and western borders, Assam for a considerable depth is inhabited by a population of whom the great majority have the very closest of ties with Pakistan, and whose sympathies lie generally with Pakistan, and not with India. The problems this raises in the matter of border security from the civil administration and military points of view are obvious.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

An even more serious situation arose immediately as a result of Partition in the matter of communications. From both valleys, all communications, road, rail, river and telegraphic, with the rest of India now passed through Pakistan, and in fact the only corridor linking Assam with India was a narrow strip in the extreme North-West, through which not even a motorable road ran. Fortunately, relations between the two Dominions were not as strained for a few months as they were to become later, and through traffic on the existing routes continued. Even so there was much interference with, and obstruction to, the movement of certain classes of stores, and it became obvious that Pakistan had the power to strangle Assam in a matter of months by stopping through traffic. The construction of new railways, roads, telegraph and telephone lines through the corridor was taken up in desperate haste. These have been completed, a very creditable achievement, and provide a circuitous all-Indian link between Assam and the rest of India. But the narrowness of that corridor, and the vulnerability of those communications are matters of a strategic importance which cannot be overlooked.

Internally, too, the one district left in Assam of the Surma Valley became entirely cut off from the Assam Valley except by the extremely roundabout hill section route on the railway. A road through the hills from Shillong, the capital, *via* Jowai and Haflong to Silchar, headquarters of Cachar, and on to Agartala, the capital of Tripura State, which had acceded to India, was planned, and much work was done; but the cost of construction proved to be so enormous that later, after reaching Jowai, it had to be abandoned, and Cachar still remains isolated save by rail, though easier possible road alignments are still being sought.

## BORDER DISPUTES

As 1947 moved on, feelings between India and Pakistan, never very cordial from the inception, began to deteriorate. The deterioration naturally affected Assam, and immediately resulted in a whole series of disputes as to the new boundary between Cachar (India) and Sylhet (Pakistan). The boundary had, indeed, been defined by the Radcliffe Award, but with reference to certain rivers and police station boundaries, and on examination it was found that these contained discrepancies capable of different interpretations. An official map, for instance, showed a boundary down the midstream of a river, whereas the corresponding gazette notification described it as the left bank; rivers had changed their courses time after time, and even their names. But the most important quarrel concerned a patch of hitherto valueless jungle on an outcrop of hills, in dispute owing to defective wording of an old notification. By the irony of fate, the Burma Oil Company had discovered indications of oil deposits in this very area, and had commenced operations, making it of immense value as a potential oilfield. Both Dominions made irreconcilable claims; and, while no actual armed clash took place, constant friction occurred. Formal protests volleyed to and fro between the Governments; additional police vigilance was demanded here, there and everywhere, and conference after conference was held without the slightest agreement. This quarrel continued, and as time passed spread to other parts of the border also. The Bagge Tribunal, a neutral body called in to adjudicate, gave an award which still left many points to be settled, and eventually the Governments of India and Pakistan agreed on a joint survey and demarcation of the boundary, which is in progress.

## EMERGENCE OF COMMUNISM

There remains one more development to note for 1947. Although there had been a Communist Party in Assam for years, it had been of negligible importance; but, with the increased interest of Communism in India following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow, there began a definite infiltration of Bengali Communist workers into Assam. They made little stir at first; but, by incredible activity and fanatic zeal, they organized the Assam Communists, trained leaders, and set up a very efficient "underground" system of shelters, couriers, hiding places and means of communication. By the early part of 1948 their efforts began to bear fruit. Sporadic labour trouble broke out all over Assam. There were strikes on tea gardens for the most trifling reasons, or for no reason at all. The peasantry of Cachar, who habitually cultivate their land on a crop-sharing basis, demanded a reduction of the landlord's customary half to one-third, and organized themselves to resist coercion. Bands of landless peasants occupied so-called waste land on tea gardens—areas kept for the supply of thatch, fuel, and timber for the gardens—and parcelled it out among themselves. Scores of new trade unions were registered, registration being invariably and immediately followed by the formulation of impossible demands and threats of strikes. It was, however, on the railway that the Communists concentrated their efforts. They gained control of the main railway trade union, and thereafter utter indiscipline reigned until a condition not far removed from chaos prevailed.

## MUSLIM IMMIGRATION

The immigration of landless Muslim cultivators from East Bengal continued in an increasing stream. Many of them "squatted" in the Government grazing

reserves, and strongly resisted eviction ; indeed, great numbers had to be ejected by force, and armed clashes between huge crowds of unruly immigrants and the police were not infrequent. Even when evicted, the newcomers rarely returned to East Bengal, but wandered round the countryside, seeking vainly for land to occupy, and taking shelter in previously established settlements of their countrymen. Assamese feeling was bitterly opposed to allowing these newcomers to settle anywhere, and what was to be done with them became an insoluble problem for Government.

Anti-Bengali feeling grew in intensity in Assamese circles, not only against the Muslim immigrants, but against Bengalis in general. While it never became a serious threat to public order, vituperative speeches and demonstrations on both sides, fanatical outbursts in newspapers, posters and pamphlets, pulling down of sign-boards written in Bengali, stoning of Bengali-occupied houses, and destruction of Bengali newspapers on sale became popular diversions and effectively served to keep feelings high.

#### UNREST IN THE HILLS

In the hills, too, the advent of Independence aroused amongst the comparatively few educated and sophisticated hillmen a feeling of dissatisfaction with the system of tribal government, and a desire for change. In the Lushai Hills, the Mizo Union, an association demanding the grant of autonomy to the Lushais and racially allied tribes, complicated by a subsidiary claim by a small minority for transfer to Burma, led a movement of passive resistance against the local chiefs, through whom the Government had carried out its administration. In the Naga Hills, the Naga National Council, regardless of reality, demanded a "sovereign independent Naga State" and displayed great intransigence in discussions to frame a reasonable basis of self-government.

#### CUSTOMS BARRIERS

Above all this, relations between India and Pakistan, and consequently between Assam and East Bengal, steadily deteriorated. In March, 1948, the free trade agreement between the Dominions terminated ; endless lists were published of goods, the import or export of which was prohibited or restricted, and both countries immediately set up chains of Customs Posts facing each other on every possible route crossing the borders. The immediate effect, of course, was virtually to stop all trade whatever between Assam and East Bengal ; and this led to a state bordering on starvation amongst the Khasis and Garos inhabiting the southern face of the central hills who, from time immemorial, had been entirely dependent for all foodstuffs on imports from Sylhet. The Assam Government made stupendous efforts to maintain supplies from the Assam Valley, but as this involved 80 or more miles of transport up a hill road, followed by anything up to eight days portorage on men's backs, the cost of a bag of rice, by the time it reached a starving village at the foot of the hills—probably only the width of a fordable stream from plenty across the border—can be imagined. And to the non-stop flow of border "incidents" was now added a spate of smuggling, with more demands for border patrols, armed escorts, and the like.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES

These were a few of the problems faced during its first year of Independence by the Assam Government, with its administrative framework gravely weakened by the withdrawal on Partition of practically all British personnel, and the loss of a large

number of Indian officers who had opted for Pakistan. It was weakened further still by the deputation of many of the few remaining experienced officers to the rapidly expanding Central Government, or to man new departments. In return, it is true, Assam had received a number of officials, formerly serving in Sylhet and elsewhere, who had opted for India, but these in the majority of instances had little local knowledge and needed time to settle down, while in many cases they were Bengali-speaking Sylheti Hindus, and hence were received with but lukewarm enthusiasm. Junior officers of two or three years service were called upon to shoulder responsibilities which normally they would not have borne for another 12 or 15 years. Subordinate officers, old in service but with little experience of independent action, were promoted to posts of responsibility needing quick decision, and vacancies were filled with new recruits, sketchily trained at high pressure. Their work was made even more difficult by a spirit of indiscipline and disregard of authority apparent in the flush of enthusiasm after "Independence"; and behind all could be clearly seen, by those who looked, the unmistakeable signs of a coming shortage in rice and cloth. It was a difficult year, but Assam held fast.

#### REBELLION IN BURMA

As the year passed, shadows deepened on the Eastern horizon. After the much-trumpeted achievement by Burma of complete independence, and her withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, conditions in that country had rapidly and alarmingly deteriorated. This is not the place, neither has the writer the local knowledge, to discuss the causes of this sad state of affairs, but the facts were only too clear. Rebellion by the very powerful Karen tribe, defection and open mutiny by a large part of the military forces, the emergence of the Communists in Burma as a well armed and organized party bent on the destruction of the Government by force, and reversion of various political parties to the role under which they had conducted guerilla tactics during the War, created a situation of the utmost danger. Government authority ceased to run except in a few of the larger towns (even Rangoon itself was threatened), communications were paralysed, and the greater part of the country fell under the complete control of the various rebel factions.

This situation was perturbing for Assam. There are strong racial affinities between the hill tribes on the two sides of the border, and in the native states of Manipur and Tripura, Communist contacts had been made, Communist propaganda was spreading, and there was the obvious danger that Communist success in Burma would be followed by large scale infiltration into Assam. In actual fact, infiltration was negligible, although there was a good deal of intercommunication, and the leading Manipuri agitator, Irabat Singh, who had been "underground" for several years, found it convenient to transfer his base of operations across the border. In any case, the Communist successes in Burma had their repercussions in Manipur, where gangs of dacoits, labelling themselves Communists, started depredations on the Burma model.

Another, and somewhat unexpected, result of the chaos in Burma, was the reopening by the Kachins of the Stilwell Road. The Kachins are a tribe of North Burma who had held aloof from the rebellion; but with all communications with the rest of Burma disrupted, they found themselves unable either to dispose of their produce, mainly rice, or to import their necessities. The Stilwell Road had been deliberately abandoned by India, but the Kachins, under stress of necessity, with



few resources, but much ingenuity, brought it into cold weather use, and opened a limited trade with the bazaars of Ledo and Margherita in Assam.

#### BORDER FRICTION, 1949

Meanwhile in Assam, friction with Pakistan led to even more frequent border incidents. The dacoits made hay while the sun shone by raids across the border; the large Muslim population on the Assam side of the border gave no assistance; and, to check these raids, patrolling of the border had to be intensified. The influx of Muslim would-be settlers continued unabated in spite of all discouragement and caused unending Assamese resentment until, towards the end of the year, the Government decided on the most drastic policy of wholesale eviction from Assam of those who had entered since 1938. A bill to enable this to be done was introduced and passed by the Indian Parliament—its results were to become apparent later.

#### COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS, 1949

The most serious development, however, lay in the steady and rapid expansion of Communist activities. The party grip on Trade Unions tightened, and the policy of exploiting industrial and agrarian grievances, real or imaginary, at every opportunity, continued. At the same time, it became evident that the extremer element was not content to follow "constitutional" means, however dubious, of attaining the object, and a series of dacoities took place. It was clear that these were attributable to members of the Communist Party, but not for many long months was it possible to obtain evidence to bring them to trial.

A railway strike, called in March, having proved a fiasco, the next move was to call a "Peace Conference" later in the year, in the Railway Colony in Dibrugarh. The Conference was publicly advertised, and was attended by many delegates, mainly railwaymen, from the Communist Party in Assam and West Bengal. In the course of the Conference, a fight took place between the organizers and some invited visitors, resulting in broken bones and a complaint to the police. When a police party arrived it was surrounded, the members disfigured with vitriol, mercilessly beaten and left for dead, while the sub-inspector in charge, having been clubbed into unconsciousness, had a bottle of vitriol poured down his throat, and was buried in a cess-pit. Police reinforcements restored order after fighting their way in through defended barricades.

This atrocious crime staggered the Province, and opened the eyes of all to the nature of the Communist menace. Investigation showed that the real object of the "Peace Conference" had been to enable the leaders to plan widespread sabotage of communications and murderous attacks on officials. The police, previously hampered in their dealings by the ostensibly constitutional methods used by the Communists, were able to act with vigour, and shortly afterwards the Assam Communist Mobile Headquarters was captured, and with it full details of the secret organization, with the result that a series of swift raids utterly smashed the Party beyond repair.

#### COMMUNAL RIOTING, 1950

On the 26th January, 1950, "Bharat," the Indian Republic, was inaugurated with rejoicing, the symbols of royalty were obliterated, and the advent of the era of universal prosperity that Independence was to bring was awaited. The first development in Assam was a strong intensification of the feeling against the Muslim settlers from East Bengal. The passing of the Act for the Expulsion of Undesirable Immigrants led to a belief, fostered by interested propaganda, that Government had ordered



the sending back of all the "Bhatias," as they are called, to East Bengal, and gangs led by local politicians began to turn immigrants off the trains and force them back. Once started, the movement spread like wildfire, and by February the whole of the immigrant-settled area in Lower Assam was ablaze. Huge crowds of tribal villagers, reinforced by gangs of hooligans and bad characters from the towns and bazaars, swept down on settlement after settlement, driving out the Muslims, looting their cattle and goods, and burning their houses. The refugees, many of them born in Assam or resident for decades, fled in thousands to the railway and the river and crowded on to trains, steamers, and boats back to East Bengal, to be harassed afresh all along the route and robbed of the few wretched possessions they had brought with them. At first there was little violence, but as news came of the corresponding communal rioting which was taking place in East Bengal, frenzy overcame the tribal assailants, and there were many cases of coldblooded butchery—and of retaliation.

The restoration of order proved a difficult business. The District Officers, almost without exception, were young and inexperienced, and many of their subordinates had a sneaking sympathy with the anti-Muslim elements. They were, moreover, much exposed to propaganda and pressure by local politicians who claimed that expulsion of the immigrants was Government policy, and that any officer who interfered with the movement did so at his peril. Government itself was reluctant to resort so soon after the inauguration of the new Constitution to drastic repressive measures; but very shortly, when it became evident that the situation was rapidly getting beyond control, it was made clear that restoration of order, irrespective of community or political party, was to be carried out. District Officers were able to act with vigour and, with the help of detachments of the Assam Rifles and of the Army, the situation was re-established in both valleys.

#### THE DELHI PACT

The course of these events had naturally caused a still further deterioration in the already intensely strained relations between India and Pakistan. Clamour arose in each country that it should go to the forcible assistance of the oppressed minority in the other, until irresponsible talk of war as the only and necessary solution became openly common, even amongst the highly placed. Fortunately, as tension rose to a crisis, commonsense prevailed, and a meeting of the two Prime Ministers produced the Delhi Pact, a temporary agreement by which both countries agreed to cease the policy of mutual annoyance and, among other things, to endeavour to persuade refugees who had sought asylum to return to their homes under promise of full protection.

The effect of the Pact was instantaneous; and although, as always, the minor subordinate officials of all departments, on whom the actual carrying out of Government policy depends, began to evolve ingenious methods whereby the spirit of the Pact could be disregarded while maintaining the letter, a breathing-space was obtained in which tempers to some extent cooled off. Relations, while still the opposite of cordial, have never since reached the same degree of tension.

Implementation of the provisions of the Pact added yet another complication to the problem. The Assam Government had given temporary leases of abandoned land to refugee Hindu families, in the hope of saving at least part of the growing crop, on condition that the land must be relinquished after the harvest. Under the assurances of the Delhi Pact, the Muslim refugees began to return in their thousands, and there

was bitter resentment when they found their lands occupied by Hindu refugees, who indicated that they had no intention of moving. Several riots occurred, and more refugee camps had to be established to accommodate the returning settlers until after the harvest, when their lands were restored, where necessary, with police help.

The Hindu refugees, on the other hand, showed no inclination to accept the Pakistan assurances, and the number returning to East Bengal was negligible. Resettlement of this element remains a most difficult problem.

#### THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY

While the Assam Government was grappling with these troubles, a fresh and sinister menace was developing. Some time before the neutralization of the Assam Communist Party in 1949 the extremer section, dissatisfied with the slow progress achieved by the "constitutional" methods adopted, had split away to form the Revolutionary Communist Party of India. The object of this new, and completely separate, party was the same, but it differed in its methods which advocated terrorism by murder, arson, robbery, and sabotage as the means for creating the necessary breakdown. Its activities in 1949 had placed the party in possession of considerable funds, whereby arms and ammunition had been acquired and an organization of refugees and communications established. Two areas in Assam were then selected for active operations—one in Sibsagar Subdivision, and another in Kamrup. A third, also, directed from Bengal, was amongst the Hajongs in East Pakistan. In each case the area chosen was inhabited by a section of tribal people in poor economic circumstances and with a grievance. The *modus operandi* was simple: the grievances were exploited and a picture painted of the heaven upon earth that a Communist regime would bring. The granaries of landowners were looted and the grain distributed amongst the villagers, thereby assuring their support, and this was followed by skilfully planned and ruthlessly executed dacoities in which firearms were freely used, and the establishment of a reign of terror in which Government officials and their supporters (including any who dared to give information) were murdered in cold blood. Within a matter of weeks these areas were entirely Communist controlled. Eventually, after several prominent persons had been murdered, and ordinary police action proved insufficient, it was decided that as soon as the forces engaged in restoring order in Lower Assam and Cachar could be withdrawn, police operations on a large scale to re-establish authority must be undertaken.

The Hajong area, which had been the first to achieve prominence, differed from the others, as the Revolutionary Communist activities took place in Pakistan, although the bases and training camps were established just over the border, in inaccessible sites in Assam. While in Assam, the members carefully avoided any action likely to embroil themselves with the police. However, complete failure of the local harvest brought a condition bordering on starvation amongst the Hajongs, and the Revolutionary Communists eventually found it impossible to maintain supplies in their training camps. They broke their rule, and raided one or two granaries in the Garo Hills. This antagonized the Garos, and compromised their previous immunity; and as the precarious supplies thus obtained were quite insufficient, the organization in the Hajong area was disbanded.

In the Sibsagar and Lakhimpur Districts the affected area was cordoned by Assam Rifles, while police forces in a quasi military operation systematically combed villages and jungle. When the inhabitants realized that the Government were definitely

resolved to end the Terror, and that reprisals need not be feared, information was forthcoming in greater and greater volume, and results beyond expectation obtained. Practically all the R.C.P.I. leaders known to be in the area, together with many scores of the second rank, were arrested, in many cases after gun-fights, and were prosecuted or detained. Hundreds of their dupes were interrogated and released and great quantities of Sten guns, revolvers, rifles, and ammunition recovered, while the information obtained enabled the revolutionary organization in this area to be completely broken up.

Similar action was taken in the Kamrup area with considerable success, although some of the most-wanted men had already absconded into the safety of Bhutan.

#### THE 1950 EARTHQUAKE

Assam is a land where earthquakes are common and, on this account, houses are lightly built of flimsy materials, which "give" to a mild shock, or do little damage if they do collapse. But in the evening of Independence Day, the 15th August, there occurred the most severe earthquake ever known in Assam, followed in the succeeding weeks by many other shocks but little less in intensity, though shorter in duration. The damage done in Upper Assam was appalling. In the course of a few minutes communications of every kind were completely disrupted, bridges destroyed, roads literally disappeared, huge cracks spouting sand and water developed, and great tracts of land sank bodily many feet. The bed of the Brahmaputra River rose from four to eight feet, effectively stopping steamer navigation, and rivers changed their courses—and continued to change them at intervals as some fresh tilt changed a level here or there. In the Abor and Mishmi Hills nearer the epicentre (which was in Eastern Tibet, not far from the border) the damage was greater still, whole hillsides collapsing in landslides into the ravines and sweeping away villages, tracks, and cultivation. The total casualties will never be known, though many hundreds were definitely confirmed.

Great as was the direct damage due to the earthquake, worse was to come. For a few days all the tributaries of the Brahmaputra on the North Bank (themselves large rivers) from the Dikrong eastwards, ceased to flow, the ravines which form their courses through the hills being blocked by the landslides, forming gigantic dams. When later these burst from the pressure of piled-up water behind, the released floods swept down and over the earthquake-scarred land with a force defying description. Whole villages were swept away, cultivation disappeared, tea gardens were ruined, and even great blocks of Government forest miles deep had every tree uprooted. Many thousands of villagers were rendered homeless, many marooned without food, and casualties among livestock were innumerable. Countless trees were swept down the rivers, and the Brahmaputra presented an extraordinary sight, its surface covered with a continuous carpet of logs (a rich harvest for villages lower down) while the water was so loaded with silt that fish were suffocated by the thousand.

For many days, the only information as to conditions in the earthquake-affected area was that obtained through the police wireless system, which was the sole means of communication still working between Upper Assam and the rest of the World. All possible Government resources were used to effect relief and restore communications. A joint party of tough and resolute adventurers, selected from the Police, Assam Rifles, and the Army, was immediately despatched to penetrate the flooded area by whatever means they could and effect the rescue of the marooned villagers.

This they did, and the story of their work is an epic in itself. The Indian Air Force established a base at Gauhati, later moved to Jorhat, and engaged in dropping food and essential supplies at centres cut off from help. The Army, with the help of tea-garden labour, undertook the temporary repair of some of the main roads. Medical parties were despatched to carry out mass inoculation against cholera and enteric (all wells in the North Lakhimpur Subdivision had been destroyed, and water supply was an acute problem), while the railway and telegraph departments succeeded by herculean efforts in restoring through communications in far less time than had been estimated. The response to the Governor's appeal for a Relief Fund was immediate and generous—contributions in cash and kind flowed in from all over the World. These were utilized to provide clothing and shelter for the destitute, milk for children, and agricultural implements and domestic utensils for those who had lost all.

#### CHINESE INVASION OF EASTERN TIBET

So much for internal affairs. In the autumn of 1950, while Assam was still distracted by the earthquake and the anti-R.C.P.I. operations, there came the news of the entry of a Chinese "Liberation Army" into Eastern Tibet. This was a move evidently fraught with potential political danger to Assam and India as, in the first place, it brought China into actual physical contact with Assam, with the possibility of Communist infiltration from a new front. In view of the physical difficulties of penetrating the mountain barrier, and the damage or destruction of most of the hill tracks in the earthquake, the danger of actual entry of emissaries was perhaps small, but the moral effect on the shattered Communist-remnants in Assam was considerable, and even greater in Burma, where the Communist rebellion, previously weakening, and appearing on the point of collapse under a regained Government initiative, suddenly revived its guerilla activities with renewed vigour.

Another question also arose. The boundary between Tibet and Assam is the Macmahon Line, following the crest of one of the Himalayan ranges. It is undemarcated, and for the most part runs through uninhabitable mountains, pierced here and there by a few trade routes and only passable for a month or two in the year. This line has been accepted for many years by Tibet and India as the international boundary, but has never been recognized by China, which has an old, but never seriously pressed, claim dating from pre-revolution days, and entirely unsupported on historical, political, or economic grounds, that the boundary runs not along the summits, but along the South face of the foothills. This boundary would include in China a goodly part not only of Assam, but of North Burma also; indeed, Chinese maps are not uncommon showing this to be the frontier. There was consequently apprehension in Assam that, having "liberated" Eastern Tibet, the Chinese, under cover of suzerainty of this country might reassert this old claim. In point of fact the Chinese made no attempt to cross the border, and explained the maps as dating from the Imperial regime, the Republic having been too busy with other affairs to correct them. Nevertheless, the situation necessitated the strengthening of the chain of border outposts held by the Assam Rifles, and a general tightening up of frontier security measures.

#### FOOD SHORTAGES, 1951

The year 1950 thus closed with Assam striving against difficulties, internal and external, which strained her resources almost to the limit. But the measure of her tribulations was even yet not full. The wholesale panic abandonment in the Spring of their lands by the Muslim settlers had left many hundreds of thousands of acres



uncultivated and, although something had been done to save part of the crops by temporary settlement of East Bengal refugees, the loss of production of foodstuffs (mainly rice) showed itself towards the end of harvest to be stupendous. To this had to be added the loss, almost equally heavy, due to destruction of crops by the earthquake, the floods and, in Cachar, to interruption of normal cultivation during the communal riots. At the same time, demands had grown. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from East Bengal, and those made destitute by earthquake and flood, had to be fed for many months together. By the end of the year, and indeed before, it became obvious that a food crisis of the first magnitude was impending. Measures of control by Government, in the form of control of prices and rationing in urban areas, had already been in force since their introduction during the War; but with the whispers of a coming shortage, the flow of grain from the cultivators to the markets dried up.


Difficulties immediately arose in the maintenance of regular food supplies, particularly to tea-garden labour, industrial concerns and the towns. A "procurement drive" was instituted by Government to induce the cultivators to disgorge their stocks, first by persuasion and, when this failed, by coercion. The drive had a very limited success. It could, of course, be carried out only in areas unaffected by the disturbances, and everywhere the cultivators, in the hope of getting higher and higher prices, which naturally Government were unwilling to sanction, concealed their grain, or disposed of it surreptitiously in the black market. Eventually the tea industry, to save an already desperate situation, was given permission to import rice by air to feed the labour; but this, at enormous expense, was obviously only an emergency solution, and the problem remains desperate, at least until next harvest.


#### ASSAM AND THE FUTURE

This brings the story of Assam to the present time, with the State beset by difficulties and problems of great perplexity. Assam is facing them all, and all that are within her own power to control have been countered. For others—for instance, developments beyond her borders on the North and East, or relations with Pakistan on the South and West, the actuating forces lie outside, and Assam must wait upon events. What the future will bring forth none can prophesy. The first vital factor is clearly the need for improvement in relations between India and Pakistan, and the next a reduction of the uncertainty of the situation across the northern and eastern frontiers. Meanwhile, there is no alternative to remaining alert and prepared.



by  
at.  
ce,  
an  
on  
or  
nd  
nd  
ed.





T

a solo  
the z  
to th  
ago,  
of his  
the C  
scale

Infan  
in the  
was  
whom  
recom  
in the  
From  
their  
dislik  
they  
days  
as his  
Watt  
spect  
It is  
Priva  
tea!

H.M.  
Regi  
It di  
being

unna  
of pr  
play  
answ  
The  
scrip

moun  
a wh  
bugle

## A PRIVATE SOLDIER IN THE CENTRAL INDIA CAMPAIGN

By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL L. B. OATTS, D.S.O.

**T**HE journal of Private John Watt, which he commenced on the 3rd January, 1858, is an intimate document which was obviously not originally intended for publication. It is a day-to-day record of the thoughts and experiences of a soldier of a British Army during the period when the British Empire was approaching the zenith of its power and influence. It is of interest, firstly because it does justice to the character of that much-maligned individual the British soldier of a century ago, and secondly, because it describes how he was employed and what was expected of him in a situation not dissimilar to that which at present prevails in Malaya; for the Central India Campaign was one of regulars against guerillas, though on a vast scale.

In 1858, Private Watt's "Corps," as he called it, the 71st (Highland) Light Infantry, was stationed in Malta. Luckier than most regiments which had fought in the Crimea, the 71st had lost little more than a hundred men in that campaign and was consequently still a regiment composed of long-service professionals, many of whom had marched with its Colours for thirty years and more. From the regimental records and other contemporary documents, it seems that their average height was in the neighbourhood of six feet, and that over ninety per cent. were Scotsmen. From the journal, it is apparent that they were possessed by a fanatical devotion to their "Corps," with an intense pride in their profession and, surprisingly enough, a dislike of bad language. They marched and fought on rum, of which man's drink they seldom went long without a tot, whatever the climate or conditions. In those days it seems to have been recognized, in fact, that rum was as important to a soldier as his arms and ammunition and consequently, no matter what else ran short, Private Watt and his companions invariably had their regular tot. To what extent their spectacular achievements were due to this fact is purely a matter of speculation. It is perhaps worth considering, however, whether it is altogether fair to expect Private Watt's modern successors to achieve similar results on an occasional cup of tea!

The 71st "received the route for Bombay," on 2nd January and embarked in H.M. Ships *Princess Royal* and *Vulture* two days later. The matter being urgent, the Regiment was ordered to proceed by the "overland route," from Alexandria to Suez. It disembarked on the 18th and travelled out into the desert by train, the troops being much astonished by the "sandy appearance" of the country.

We can now take up the journal. Private Watt had a good hand, but was, not unnaturally, weak in spelling and grammar. The book is filled with precise descriptions of precious stones, notes on instances in military history in which his "Corps" had played a distinguished part, his own and others' poetry, and a series of questions and answers on the art of gunnery in which he seems to have been particularly interested. The journal itself consists of some five thousand words of neat and closely written script, through which we will now glance.

On arrival at the desert station the troops, after the usual tot of rum, were mounted on donkeys. The sight of his Regiment thus mounted put the Colonel into a whimsical frame of mind. He ordered the trot, which was duly sounded by the buglers in true cavalry style and, "the asses began to go faster, then as they



commenced to trot down came donkey and man in the dust which raised a laugh. Some rode to-day that had never ridden before, but such a sight I never saw. No help for it, it was up and away for you must keep along with the rest. Half-way across we got bread, cheese, coffee, and a change of asses, and after this got on very well and arrived at Suez at 6 p.m."

At Suez, the 71st embarked in the steam frigate *Punjaub*, one of the East India Company's fleet, which was so ill-found that "for the first time our spirits was damped." But "at 3 p.m. our spirits rose again when told that our rations would be free but that we would have to pay for our grog." The troops, however, were "huddled together like pigs," with no blankets or bedding and food that was almost uneatable. A mutinous spirit arose, and one man, John Hamilton, was flogged. Then the ship was becalmed and "the engin stopped, being overheated." This did not improve matters and, to try and cheer the men up, the Colonel ordered dancing. "At first it was a failure, the Colonel tried to start it, but it would not dow, till John Hamilton went to face him up, he being got over his punishment, for his hard cheek or divilment, call it what you will, it was all right afterwards, songs were sung." The ship rolled lazily in an oily sea, while a full moon lit up the masts and spars, the idle sails, and the strange scene on deck. In the middle of a crowd of silent men, the Colonel danced the Highland Fling, clapping his hands and calling vainly to them to join in. Then suddenly the biggest rascal of the lot, John Hamilton, tripped forward stripped to the waist with brawny shoulders still lacerated from the lash. The pipers changed to the Fairy Dance and the Reel o' Tulloch, and Colonel and defaulter hooched and swung, each striving to beat the other's high-cutting. In less than no time the deck was filled with dancers and finally, when all were exhausted "songs were sung." "The auld Scots sangs," no doubt. It does not seem a bad way of stopping a mutiny.

The 71st landed at Bombay on 6th February. Red coats were exchanged for loose blouses dyed in curry powder, and towards the end of the month the right wing marched to join the Central India Field Force under General Sir Hugh Rose, while the left wing was posted to the Rajputana Field Force under General Michel. The subsequent experiences of both wings were much the same, but the diarist, Private Watt, was in the right wing and we must accompany it accordingly. "10 p.m., 2nd May, 1858. Came up with the Division after a forced march. On or about the 5th instant as we marched into camping ground that the 1st Brigade had left, we saw a Pandie hanging by the neck to a tree, the first of the rebbls we had seen." It was a sign that the Central India Campaign, as this phase of the Indian Mutiny was afterwards called, was being fought with the gloves off and, indeed, as will presently be seen, the captives of both sides got very short shrift.

The recapture of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow had finished the Indian Mutiny as an organized movement. The rebels, however, still continued operations on a considerable scale in central India, under the leadership of the Ranees of Jhansi and Tantia Topi, friend and companion of the Nana Sahib who had been the principal instigator of the Mutiny. While, therefore, General Sir Colin Campbell gradually restored law and order North of the Jumna, General Sir Hugh Rose was ordered to march through central India to join him, clearing the country of rebels as he went. The Central India Field Force which he commanded, was formed from the East India Company's Bombay Army, the native units of which had remained loyal.

When the Central India Field Force was joined by the right wing of the 71st, it was facing Tantia Topi and a large army in strong position near the village of

Kunch. The story of the subsequent action, fought in heat so intense that ten horses died in one battery alone, while in the 71st twelve men died and thirty lost consciousness, can be left entirely to Private Watt. "On the 7th May marched on Koonch, by the time we got a rest and our grog the sun had risen. Many that saw it rise did not see it set. We had marched all night and still had three or four miles to come up to the place. When within a mile of the town we heard firing on our right and left. On our right was the 1st Brigade playing at long balls. On our left was Major Orr and his Nizam's Cavalry, infantry and artillery. By this time the sun was getting strong and Brigadier Stewart thought to give his Brigade a drink of water. On our left was a well and we went to it. What a rush to get one drop, and oh how Precious was it when gotten. This revived us a little, and after filling our waterbottles we fell in. At 2 p.m. the heat at 118 and a hot wind blowing. Our skirmishers went within range and blazed away. The Nizam's infantry made a dash at a wood and entered, but not being properly supported had to retire. The firing was now at its height, but though bullets dropped among us no-one was hit. Some of our good shots were sent to dislodge the enemy who kept firing at us from a corner of a wood. Our rifles soon sent them out of it. Sir H.R. now ordered up the 14th Cavalry (Light Dragoons). At it they went, their sabres gleaming in the sun. It was a fine sight to see. Their charge was irresistible, the enemy did not wait a moment longer but to the right about they went and our fellows after, cutting and slashing. Now came the order for us to enter, and we entered double quick, but stand they would not; those that had horses to mount got away, but those who had none were cut up. The cavalry and artillery went off in pursuit and the infantry being exhausted was ordered to halt."

After their drink at the well in the morning, the troops had no water until late the following day. During the night a burning wind rose to gale force, blowing down tents and shelters and raising a dust storm in which men and animals were nearly suffocated. The Brigadier collapsed, and when the march was resumed Colonel Campbell of the 71st commanded the Brigade, leaving Major Rich in command of the Regiment. "8th. Remained in camp, buried the men who died yesterday. Two more died during the night. Marched on the morning of the 12th, exposed to the sun. Two more died from its effects." The temperature at midday reached the staggering height of 130 degrees in the shade.

It will be remembered that the 71st had only arrived in India three months before, after a long voyage in conditions of the greatest discomfort. The Regiment had almost immediately been sent off on a march of over two hundred miles along roads which were scarcely better than tracks, frequently intersected by unbridged rivers and nullahs. It had then fought the battle described and was now moving on by forced marches in pursuit. But there was no need for the Colonel to dance another Highland Fling. His men were soldiers and gave no trouble on active service. They did not even grumble.

Some of them, however, did collapse under these conditions from time to time, as the Regiment sweated briskly along the sun-baked jungle tracks. Those that did so were bundled into bullock wagons or litters, and when a village was reached the inhabitants were rounded up and made to pour water over them. If this treatment revived them they took their places again in the ranks. If it did not, they were reckoned to be dead and were buried accordingly. Private Fraser was a lucky man. Laid out for burial with the others, a comrade who was removing his medals from the breast pocket of his blouse thought he felt a heart-beat. The surgeon was called,

and succeeded in reviving him. It was the last time that Fraser fell out during the Central India Campaign.

On 15th May, the rearguard was attacked on the line of march and the baggage was only saved by the prompt intervention of the Cavalry. "Foiled in their attempt to capture the baggage, they made a dash at a village about a mile from camp, but our two companies in support made a charge and drove them out of it at the point of the bayonet." This was the village of Matra, covering a junction on the main road, some six miles from Tantia Topi's stronghold of Kalpi. The following day the rebels attacked it in force, but the 71st had loop-holed the walls and stood two men to each loop-hole, one of whom loaded while his comrade aimed and fired with extreme deliberation. "Their shot fell short, while ours told on them beautiful." As the rebels hastened off the field in disorder, Major Rich called to his bugler to sound the cease-fire, but Sir Hugh Rose rode up at that moment and shouted: "Let them go on Major. I've never seen such firing, I believe they could hit them at a coss!"<sup>1</sup> They were, as a matter of fact, "making killing practice" at a thousand yards.

On 19th and 20th May, the Central India Field Force camped about four miles from Kalpi, waiting for General Maxwell's Brigade to arrive in support from North of the Jumna. Private Watt noted that in a small detachment of Sikhs, who joined the force at this juncture mounted on camels, fourteen were knocked out by the sun. "It is curious to see one struck. In ten minutes he becomes raving mad, taking seven or eight men sometimes to hold him down." On 22nd May, the rebels moved out of Kalpi and advanced to the attack. One enemy division attempted to overrun the camp. "But it would not do, for the 71st and 3rd Europeans was guarding it. Their shot passed into our camp, but did little or no damage, except the wounding of an Elephant." As the enemy fled, "the artillery being double-shotted with grape and canister gave them a parting salute, such as they can Never forget." But the rebels re-formed out of range, whereupon "the cavalry and artillery charged at full gallop at them, but as usual they would not stand but took to their heels as though the Devil had been after them."

On the morning of 23rd May, the troops stood to arms at 3 a.m. and moved off silently for the attack on Kalpi. The 71st were on the left of the 86th (Royal Irish Rifles). "A little to our right a small village appeared, and it was evidently full of the enemy for a pretty sharp fire was kept up from it. The 86th being nearer than us rushed forward with a wild cheer, and part of our fellows along with them and took it. The enemy went to the right about as usual, after giving us a volley. One man of the 86th was shot through the head, and the bugler of one of our companies shot dead. This enraged them, and fire was set to the village, and god noes but if any aged or infirm remained in it, be they rebells or not, they must have been destroyed."

The advance continued until "the enemy appeared in force on our front and a halt was ordered, but so keen was our men to meet them that they could not be halted till the Bugler had sounded three times." Private Watt's section overtook a wounded rebel who turned to fire on them, and was accordingly killed. "An Indian medal was taken off him with a clasp for Burtpure on it. One of ours got it, and another got his gun and bayonet. An 86th man took his coat and I believe got the best prize, for the coat was full of rupees. So much for knowing the sepoy dodge."

After some further hard fighting, Tantia Topi and his rebels evacuated the town and fled. "Coming close up to the town not one was seen of the enemy, but we

<sup>1</sup> Two miles.

knew they could not have gone far, so all the cavalry and artillery were sent off in pursuit at full gallop." The Infantry entered the town, and the 71st took possession of a large building which gave a much-needed protection from the sun. "For we were all pretty nigh used up. Some lay down to sleep, and when they awoke were not able to stand on their feet. A ruse was tried in the shape of calling two or three times Turn Out, but it would not do. At last a Piper started up a reel and all who could lift a leg went at it. This had the desired effect of completely arousing the sleepers, yet some had to be taken to hospital, but mostly all recovered in a few days."

"24th. Queen's Birthday. The artillery fired a salute, and the infantry gave a cheer. The prisoners were taken to a nullah and shot. Our brave General (Sir Hugh Rose) is very sick to-day. Everyone is sorry, for he is well-liked among us, and hope for his recovery is wished by us all." The 71st remained at Kalpi for the remainder of the month, thinking the campaign was over. Sir Hugh Rose thought so too, and issued a farewell order of the day. But, on 2nd June, tents were struck and the force marched on Gwalior. On 16th June, a fierce action was fought at Morar, in which the fighting was nearly all hand-to-hand. "The bayonet was but little use against these desperate men, for when it was drove in to them they seized it and held it there and cut at you with tulwars until shot down by someone. Some severe wounds were received in this way."

At Morar, the 71st received its first Victoria Cross, although Private Watt makes no mention of the fact, for the Regiment was not best pleased about it. It seems strange that this particular decoration should ever have been regarded with contempt, but it certainly was in those days. Such an innovation as a personal award for valour was far from popular in an army of long-service professionals. They were comrades in arms; soldiers with an intense pride in their calling, and the idea that individuals should be selected as being braver than the others seemed to them to be ridiculous and incongruous. Sergeant-Major Blackwood of the 71st wrote, "in the 71st, from the old Peninsular days, everyone had a high feeling of what his duty was, and any theatrical show has always been discouraged." The 71st, like most other regiments, made no recommendations for the Victoria Cross during the Crimean and Central India Campaigns. The award at Morar was due to the intervention of the Brigadier, Sir Robert Napier, after he had watched the recipient, Private Rodgers, performing a "theatrical show," in which he engaged no fewer than seven rebels single-handed and killed the lot.

Gwalior was taken on 22nd June, after a brief engagement in which the redoubtable Ranee of Jhansi was cut down in a cavalry charge. As she was dressed as a man and leading her troops on horseback, this incident could scarcely be helped, but the regiment involved was nonetheless gravely concerned and embarrassed. British soldiers do not like any imputation that they war against women, however militant and dangerous some women are.

Still burning with rage at the tales of Cawnpore and the murder of British women and children in many a far-flung outpost, the troops entering Gwalior passed a scene which added further fuel to their wrath. Three captured troopers of the 8th Hussars had been hung by their heels to a tree and fires lighted under their heads. "God noes how much they must have suffered before death came to their relief." There is a tendency to blame the British forces engaged in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny for the ruthless manner in which they summarily executed all rebels taken in arms, but with such scores as these to pay off, what else could have been expected in those robust days? The Mutiny could not in any case have been suppressed with



kid gloves. "September the 6th this evening at 6 o'clock, there was a parade of all hands. General Stewart and the 14th Cavalry and Artillery came over from Morar. They brought 4 prisoners with them and blew them away from their guns. Their crime was for trying to bribe the 25th Native Infantry."

Execution by blowing from guns sounds a somewhat barbarous proceeding, and one which might scarcely have been expected to have been employed by the troops of a civilized nation. The British troops of those days, however, were realists. They were dealing with Orientals, among whom this particular mode of execution was not only a strong deterrent, but was also an established punishment for certain offences. Furthermore, as far as the victims were concerned, to be executed in this manner was no worse than being shot and a great deal better than being hanged. The executions were carried out with a great deal of ceremony at a parade of all troops and in front of as many civilian spectators as it was possible to assemble. The offences and sentence were read out, and the culprits were blindfolded and placed in front of the guns with their wrists bound to the wheels. The portfires were lighted and brought to the touch holes together on the signal of an officer on horseback. Although the guns were unshotted, the effect was to blow the victims completely to bits.

"Yesterday 2nd at 6 p.m. We had a parade for the Maharaja Scindia. He inspected us and rode up and down the ranks. He was greatly taken up with the Pipes. They played a number of tunes, both quick and slow time. He seemed never to have heard anything of the kind before. We had on our tartan trews and Highland jackets, and mostly every man had a medal on his chest which added to our appearance. The Maharaja is a fine-looking man about the middle size, rather stout with black moustach and side-whiskers." So taken with the 71st was the Maharaja that, on the following day, he gave the Regiment a "treat" in the form of a festival. "All the officers were there and Major Macpherson. Our pipers also played on the platform in front of the car, where never piper played before. I though his people did not like it, for some of them turned up their eyes in an unmistakable manner, but they could do no more, for there sat the Rajah in his chair of state, seemingly enjoying the fun. Some women sat in a sort of pith, singing a song, but heavens what a song, it reminded me of a sow and her litter. After a little some sweetmeats were given to us and some gram or spice, call it what you will. Everything went off very well after this when all went home in fine spirits at the Rajah's treat."

After the capture of Gwalior, the Central India Field Force was split up into small independent columns which scoured the country in every direction, hunting down rebel bands. "Tanti hunting," as the troops called it. It was a somewhat hazardous proceeding, for the rebel bands were seldom less than three or four thousand strong, whereas the British columns were seldom more than three or four hundred. In spite of these odds, however, the rebels when met with were attacked without hesitation.

On 12th December, Sir Robert Napier marched from Morar on a rumour that Prince Feroz Shah with a large force of rebels was moving up the Scinde River. He took with him on this mission two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, one squadron of Mahratta Horse, two companies of the 71st, and two guns. He moved by forced marches of anything up to twenty miles a day. Nor did the fact that at this pace the baggage camels collapsed and left him without supplies induce him to slow down. Quite the contrary, for as he came upon camping sites with the fires still hot, indicating that the enemy were not far off, he mounted half a company of



the 71st on the fresher camels and moved on at a trot, leaving the remainder of the 71st with the guns and baggage to follow as best they could. The mounted force "after a few miles entered a dense jungle, and at 8 p.m. halted at a small village for the night. The 71st party was put to a Great Deal of Inconvenience, owing to no cooks being sent with us, but the 14th kindly cooked our tea, and did all that they could to remedy the deficiency."

Marching at 5 a.m. the following morning—on nothing but "biskets and grog"—the Cavalry soon located the enemy. The jungle being too thick for mounted action, the Cavalry then halted, and the 71st were dismounted and sent to the front, where they extended and "skirmished" on either side of the road. Eventually the force emerged from the jungle close to the village of Ranod where, "as all were pretty nigh done up and the heat very great we halted and pitched camp. A number of prisoners were taken yesterday and to-day. Some were tied with ropes and fixed to the saddles. They are all very tired and their limbs swollen, but I expect this is their last night of suffering."

"17th December, marched at 5 a.m." After a short march, the force halted and dismounted, while the General rode forward to reconnoitre. On his return, "an order came for us to get mounted again and look to our rifles, for the enemy was advancing to attack the village. The cavalry moved more under cover, the 71st in support of them on the camels, Mahratta Horse on either flank. Not a word was spoken, all was silence." The rebels, about three thousand strong, drugged with hashish and led by Feroz Shah and other gaily dressed chieftains, then made their appearance. They covered over half a mile of frontage, and must have looked extremely formidable to the tiny British force of under three hundred men, but, "when within five or six hundred yards the word was given and the 14th charged right at them, cutting them down at a great rate." The 14th then rallied, and "Boldly met them again with a cheer, and although the ground was bad with a small stream and high banks on either side they cleared it in gallant style, forming on the other side." Meanwhile, "the 71st kept up as well as they could, except those that had the misfortune to fall off." In an affray such as this a rifle and bayonet is of little use on top of a camel, and the small party of 71st were soon all dismounted and fighting back to back in the middle of this howling mob of drugged fanatics, while their comrades of the 14th charged again and again. "Some of them (the enemy) fought well. One of them rushed at the General and might have hit him for he did not see the cut, but a trumpeter of the 14th took the blow on his sword which was broke in two. The General then saved the trumpeter."

After about an hour of this unequal struggle, the enemy panicked and fled from the field, leaving the ground covered thick with their dead. "I was sorry to see two women among them, but in the confusion it could not be anyone's fault for they had trows on." The subsequent pursuit lasted three hours, and ended only when the enemy had been completely dispersed and their survivors in twos and threes had taken refuge in the jungle. Nearly six hundred of their dead were counted, which was over double the number of the entire British force. It may be remembered that there were no machine guns in those days. The action had been carried out entirely with sword, rifle, and bayonet, with which weapons the enemy were also armed and had been trained to use. "We had thus marched 140 miles in 4 days, overtaken the enemy and dispersed them with loss, though six times our number. Our party only amounted to 250 men in all, but nothing could withstand them." Private Watt does

not mention the casualties suffered by the 71st, but in fact these amounted to four killed and some half-dozen wounded.

That evening the British column camped near Ranod. "The wounded woman that was brought into camp is doing well, although she wants an arm, besides another wound. During the night she was attacked with the pains of labour and was safely delivered of a still-born child. Two of our sentries were midwives on this occasion. She is still alive, poor woman, and a subscription has been got up for her as it is thought she will live."

Four or five other similar actions are carefully described in Private Watt's diary, and before the cold weather of 1858 had arrived law and order had been restored to India. In November, the Queen assumed the additional title of Empress of India and, although she never visited the country, became a legend among the soldiers and peasantry which survives to this day. The Nana Sahib fled to the hills and was never more heard of, and Tantia Topi was caught and hanged. The 71st was stationed in Gwalior, and soon established that feeling of friendship and regard which British soldiers continued to receive and to deserve from the peoples of India up to the end of British rule. In 1860, the Regiment marched for the North-West Frontier, after a warm send-off from the Maharaja and people of Gwalior who were deeply sorry to see it go.

After fighting with their usual intrepidity in the Ambeyla Campaign, the 71st returned home in 1865, and in due course Private Watt was invalided as "worn out." He had enlisted "for life," which meant that so long as he could stand on his feet without support he soldiered on. He was one of the last of his kind, and one cannot help wondering how he and his comrades would have stood up to modern warfare. What, for instance, would they have made of the situation in Malaya? If Private Watt's journal is any guide, they would have marched over the whole country; they would have immediately attacked any rebel formation met with, without hesitation, whatever its strength; and they would have summarily hanged every rebel they caught. One feels, in fact, that they would not do too badly—so long as there was plenty of rum.

## THE NEED FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE POST-WAR SITUATION

By "SEABORNE"

**A**T the end of the 1939-45 War, the neglect of amphibious warfare was, by general consent, classed as one of those errors which we would never again commit. Six years of peacetime financial stringency have, however, taken their toll of many of the good intentions of 1945, and not the least, of amphibious warfare.

This Country is vitally concerned with the vast problems of air defence, land defence of Western Europe, and defence of our sea communications. Defence preparations to meet these problems are enormously costly and seem to call for every shilling and every man that can be extracted from the Treasury and the Ministry of Labour. Under these conditions can we logically expect any considerable expenditure on amphibious warfare? Yet can we summarily neglect the hard-learned lessons of 1939-45? And is it possible to achieve anything worth while with the limited effort which can be spared?

### THE PAST

Amphibious operations in the last war grew from very small beginnings to gigantic proportions. In 1940 we needed, and lacked, the ability to mount coherent amphibious operations on the scale of one or two brigades. In 1944, we needed, and had developed, the ability to mount Overlord. The very lavishness of our latter day amphibious resources may be a source of post-war weakness. It was clearly impossible to retain in peace material and manpower on the Overlord scale, yet at the end of the war we were accustomed to think and work by Overlord standards. Cut down the material and manpower to what can be afforded in peace and these standards are unworkable. Unless our ideas are radically altered, what remains is a museum of the past, rather than a system for the future.

If the amphibious operations of the past are examined, it will be seen that they fall into two distinct types:—

(a) *Continental Amphibious Operations* such as Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy. These operations have been, in effect, the opening move of a land campaign. Forces have had to be put ashore with complete scales of all necessary equipment, however heavy and expensive in shipping. Usually time has been available, and indeed essential, for planning and for assembling the necessary forces.

(b) *Maritime Amphibious Operations*, such as the landings in Iceland, Norway in 1940, Diego Suarez, and, of course, Guadalcanal and the later Pacific amphibious operations. Raids, such as Zeebrugge and St. Nazaire, also fall within this classification. These operations have been essentially maritime in their conception and their object has been the furtherance and exploitation of sea power.

No one before 1940 could have foreseen the actual course of the war, but the general requirement for maritime operations could, and should, have been foreseen. In 1940, reasonable foresight would have provided in advance a small force, trained, organized, and rapidly available for maritime amphibious operations. Plans for a later build-up of larger forces for continental amphibious operations in case of need might also have been prepared. If this had been done, the maritime amphibious

force would have been available for Norway in 1940, and would perhaps have been brought to instant readiness when the decision to mine the Norwegian Leads was taken. It, or its successors, would have been available for the later maritime-type operations mentioned above. As a by-product, the experience gained from these operations would have been used in the build-up of forces for the continental amphibious operations, the need for which did not become apparent until after Dunkirk. The development of the Fleet Marine Force of the United States Marine Corps between the wars shows what could have been done, though perhaps on a smaller scale, in this Country.

#### THE FUTURE

So much for hindsight. How far are we justified in assuming that similar provision should be made for a future war? Whatever may happen later, continental amphibious operations are not likely to be possible in the main theatre in the early stages. This is not because our land forces are already committed on the continent on a larger scale than in 1940—they might want the assistance of a flanking operation on the Inchon model—but because the provision and maintenance with modern equipment of the amphibious lift, necessary for a force capable of intervening in the main land battle in Europe, is not possible in peacetime. If continental amphibious operations are required they must, as in the last war, wait until the necessary forces can be developed.

On the other hand, maritime amphibious operations can be successfully carried out with comparatively small forces. Naturally the main enemy land forces must be avoided and, except for raids, operations are limited to those areas in which such forces cannot easily be deployed. There are, however, land areas of this sort adjacent to most important sea routes and areas. It seems reasonable to suppose that the struggle to control such routes would be a vital part of the naval campaign and that the seizure and denial of advanced bases by both sides could play an important part in that struggle. Allies, too, isolated from the main land battlefields, may require seaborne assistance. As a secondary requirement, we could exploit sea power against the sea flanks of the main land battle, not only by bombardment, but by seaborne raiding. These operations, avoiding either in time or space the main enemy land forces, would be an important and practicable means of furthering and exploiting sea power, and would be essential to the maintenance of an offensive policy at sea.

The facts of air attack must, of course, be faced. In maritime amphibious operations of the future, adequate carrier-borne, or other, air cover will be necessary for the initial attack and, except in raids, the early development of our own air forces on the airfields ashore will be vital. Indeed, the establishment of such advanced airfields is likely to be the most frequent object for maritime amphibious operations. Guadalcanal, so vividly described in Volumes IV and V of Captain S. E. Morison's *History of the U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*, is the classic prototype of such operations. Henderson airfield was the prize in the long train of sea, land, and air battles which the American landing set off. Midway was an attempt by the Japanese to carry out a similar operation which was frustrated by their defeat at sea before they had reached their objective. Thus the two great sea battles, which marked the turning point of the Pacific War as surely as El Alamein and Stalingrad marked those of their respective land campaigns, were maritime amphibious operations for the establishment of advanced airfields. The existence of the atom bomb may in



future enforce greater dispersion of the base to be secured, while, for our part, we shall be reluctant to use the bomb against enemy forward bases in friendly territory. Otherwise the situation is not likely to be affected. The extension of the range of aircraft has made heavy bombers directed against land targets independent of advanced bases, but not so aircraft required to patrol sea areas and to seize fleeting opportunities to strike enemy ships and submarines, or to give fighter protection to our fleets and convoys.

#### THE LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

We should, therefore, develop the technique and forces necessary for maritime amphibious operations. It is no good, however, planning them as cut-down versions of Overlord. New and appropriate methods must be planned and developed. The assaulting forces must be trained and organized for their special task; to operate in the less accessible areas and to exploit speed and surprise, instead of relying on overwhelming fire support and heavy equipment. Sometimes the main assault may be airborne, but, even when it is not, the characteristics and organization of the seaborne assaulting troops should resemble those of airborne or mountain formations. Commandos are, of course, the obvious source for the assaulting infantry, but after that we come up against our complete lack of amphibious troops of the supporting arms. It is no good deceiving ourselves about this. Commandos will require support—not the heavy support of the main land battle—but, if the advantages of seaborne attack are to be exploited, something rather heavier than that provided for the airborne division. The units providing this support will have to meet and overcome the special problems of their arms in this task. Armoured, light artillery, anti-tank, light anti-aircraft, and engineer units are required which should bear the same relation to continental warfare units of their arm as commandos do to normal infantry. Then the whole must be assembled and work together as a team. The old familiar habit of the component members of an amphibious force meeting each other for the first time when a movement order deposits them in a ship bound for a hostile coast is really not good enough.

Sea and air must take their place in this team. The naval amphibious lift must be accustomed to plan and work with the assault force. The naval aviation components necessary to operate captured airfields at short notice must be part of the same team and organized to follow close behind the assaulting troops. Naval bombardment and close air support will play an important part in the support, and the assault and liaison teams must form a permanent part of the force, ready to control whatever bombardment and air support is allotted for a particular operation.

#### THE COST

But will not this be very expensive in money, manpower, and material? Not if the subject is handled sensibly and economically. A light amphibious force based on one brigade group would by itself be sufficient for some operations, and for those requiring greater strength, could act as the spearhead for normal formations. Suppose it were decided to maintain this force in peace? The present commando brigade would form the basis of the force and supply an infantry component of about 2,000 all ranks for it. The specialized supporting arms would have to be provided as properly found units or sub-units and, together with bombardment and air liaison detachments, might account for another 800 to 1,000 men. Of the amphibious lift, some landing craft flotillas and force headquarters would be required as units in peace. The remaining flotillas might be found from the Volunteer Reserve, while



skeleton provision should be made for the crews which would man L.S.I.s found from trade on mobilization. Five hundred would probably cover provision on this scale for the lift. Finally, the units required to operate airfields could be maintained in peace in skeleton form, except for the planning headquarters, which should be more fully manned. This would require another 200 to 300. Thus for a manpower expenditure of about 4,000, a small light amphibious force could be provided in peace.

Of this 4,000, about 2,000 would come from the existing commando brigade and some of the remainder could be found from other existing amphibious units. Apart from its readiness for operations on the outbreak of war, such a formation, progressively training and developing technique from exercise to exercise and training season to training season, could make a tremendous contribution to amphibious technique. This fact would more than justify the sacrifice of most of the manpower at present engaged in amphibious commitments. To go to extremes, even the School of Amphibious Warfare could be sacrificed and its functions performed by attaching officers to the light amphibious force during the training season and requiring its staff to run courses for them during off periods. This extreme would indeed be undesirable. What an advance it would be if the present school were working hand in glove with a light amphibious force. Retaining the School and sacrificing most of the rest, an appreciable contribution could be made towards finding the additional 2,000 required. By doing this we should be turning non-operational overheads into fighting troops.

#### DEPARTMENTAL INTERESTS

Now we come to the question of whether this force is really wanted by the three Services. The strategic requirement has been shown, but will this carry much weight in the departmental atmosphere of Whitehall? First the Army. The continental commitment in Europe is, in all conscience, sufficient to engage the full attention of the field army, yet there would be reluctance to forego the ability of field army formations to carry out an amphibious assault. Such self-denial is not, however, necessary. Drafting and secondment between the field army and the army and marine units of the light amphibious force would do far more to spread practical knowledge of amphibious operations than the present policy of occasional exercises for formations primarily concerned with their continental role. Add to this the development of practically tested technique and doctrine, and it is clear that, far from the existence of a light amphibious brigade group reducing the ability of field army formations to undertake amphibious operations, the reverse would be the case.

The main burden of finding a light amphibious force would fall on the Navy, which would not only have to find the ships and the men for the amphibious lift and possibly for the airfield component, but is, of course, also responsible for the present commando brigade. Moreover, in war, the support and maintenance of an amphibious operation would make a far greater, if temporary, demand on naval resources. The only justification for such demands can be that operations of the type envisaged are as much part of modern naval warfare as were the great carrier battles of the Pacific and the carrier-borne air strikes of that and other theatres.

In all forms of warfare, there is a strong temptation to remain on the defensive. This temptation is particularly strong for the free nations in the early period of a war, when the aggressors have the advantage of superior numbers and equipment. But we should know by now where passive defence leads us. If the American admirals could have foreseen the naval casualties they would suffer in holding

Guadalcanal, they might have been excused if they had called off the operation. Yet these casualties were balanced by those of the enemy and the pay-off came in the passing of the initiative from the Japanese to the Americans. The question is therefore not so much whether the Navy can spare the effort, but whether it is, in the long term, the most economical way of carrying out the Navy's task. In the final count, it is highly probable that political and strategical factors will force us into maritime amphibious operations, as they did in Norway and elsewhere in 1940 to 1942. Operations by improvised forces will be costly. In Norway a trained amphibious force, capable of seizing and operating an air and sea base, would have more than paid for itself in saving naval casualties alone.

Nevertheless, additional manpower will be required and, in peace especially, it will be difficult to persuade the Minister of Defence, who must balance the claims of the Services, to grant it. However, the need is a real one and the proposal an economical way of meeting it. Compared to the manpower we are prepared to use to support our Allies by continental land operations, the additional manpower required for a light amphibious force is very small, while the advantages to be gained, both in protection of our sea communications and in the sphere of foreign affairs, by exploiting sea power to assist our Allies, are great. Fifty years ago, one of the major factors in our European and world diplomacy was the fact that the Foreign Secretary could send a British battlefleet to a disturbed or threatened area. Some of that power would be regained by a fleet which could call upon seaborne amphibious forces in addition to its carrier-borne air force.

#### CONCLUSION

The answer to the problem of applying the lessons of the amphibious operations of the 1939-45 War to the present situation will be found by distinguishing between the continental and the maritime aspects of the problem. A light amphibious force, designed for maritime operations, would make a real contribution to the pressing defence problems of the day and at the same time develop, by practical experience, modern amphibious technique. This force, maintained at the scale of one or more brigade groups in peace, could in war be expanded, either from reserve units or by converting infantry brigade groups to form additional amphibious forces. The practically established doctrine and experienced officers, made available by the prototype force, would make the rapid achievement of either possible. Without it, the naval forces or military formations converted after mobilization for amphibious warfare will have to start from the beginning, having only the dead doctrine of a past war, preserved indifferently on paper, to guide them.

Finally, let us never fall back on the excuse that we lack the men and material in this Country to continue the development of amphibious warfare. Maritime amphibious operations are a vital part of naval warfare and the day has not dawned, nor ever will, when we can leave our sea responsibilities to others. The smaller our resources, the more important it is to get them organized right, and the right organization for fighting forces is in operational units. Men and material are expensive; the more reason to employ them to the best advantage.

## TANK POLICY

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

**T**HE main criticism that was made on my article, which appeared under the heading of Tank Policy in the August, 1951, JOURNAL, was to the effect that Hitler's great victories in the early stages of the war, by using highly mobile warfare, could not be repeated to-day. The critics argue that these successes were only rendered possible by the fact that the Panzer forces were engaging an enemy who had lost his morale and that the action by those German forces was in reality the pursuit of a defeated foe. This is partly true in the case of the advance against France in 1940, but it is in no way true as regards the German advance into Russia in 1941. The Russian forces were well trained and full of confidence that they would be able to resist the attack of the Panzer forces. The German success was in no way due to lack of morale on the part of the enemy.

By their success in the early stages of the war, the Panzer forces showed us how to revive the great value of highly mobile warfare which had played such a vital part in so many great campaigns in history. This was the first stage in this revival and depended mainly on the use of light tanks. The second stage, which we would use to-day, depends on having equally mobile armoured divisions, but using cruiser tanks instead of light tanks. When used in this way there is not the slightest reason why we should not be able to repeat those great victories, if we had the forces and if the Russians advanced against us. In a recent visit to France I found a large measure of agreement that we should use this form of mobile warfare when the forces became available. The armoured divisions would, of course, have to operate from firm bases in the event of war, and would need full air support. Russians very much fear this form of attack and there would be every chance of bringing a war to a rapid conclusion.

Another important criticism of my article on Tank Policy came in an article by Lieut.-Colonel Carver and appeared under the title of Tanks and Infantry, printed alongside my article in the same issue of the JOURNAL. Lieut.-Colonel Carver agrees in general terms to the two forms of warfare, i.e., mobile and positional, and to the general implications as regards the forces which are required for the two roles. He then points out, quite rightly, that in war there is often a great deal of "semi-mobile" warfare. This officer had very wide and valuable experience in this role. It is, therefore, only natural that his proposals revolve very much round this type of fighting, which varies from almost open mobile operations to what is nearly positional warfare. If we fail to reach conclusions with the enemy in the early stages, then semi-mobile conditions will certainly set in, and for this a heavy tank is what is wanted in most cases. This tank has quite sufficient mobility for anything except highly mobile warfare and what it wants is hard hitting power and good protection. We shall certainly want as many tank regiments as we can get, equipped with heavy tanks, to work with infantry divisions during positional and semi-mobile periods. Armoured divisions, with their cruiser tanks, were repeatedly used in this role during the latter part of the 1939-45 War because we had failed to produce the necessary heavy tanks. They suffered terrible casualties at times and they should never have been used in close fighting except as a last resort. If, however, the semi-mobile approaches open warfare, then the armoured divisions can fill a very valuable role. For this purpose they must, of course, work in close co-operation with infantry. For this type of work, Lieut.-Colonel Carver stresses that the armoured division should be organized in two

brigades, each having two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, instead of the present organization.

If this were the main task of the armoured division, I would agree at once, but it is not. The main task is to carry out the mobile work of penetration. For this purpose the armoured division is much best organized as at present. Most of the semi-mobile warfare should be carried out with heavy tanks. When armoured divisions are used for this purpose, they have no difficulty in grouping themselves as suggested by Lieut.-Colonel Carver for the time being, and this is what I consider that they should do for this secondary role. By retaining their present organization, they will be ready at all times to carry out their highly mobile role or to move out to meet and defeat any similar enemy formations.

We now come to a very important point. When the headquarters of the Armoured Forces were first formed after Dunkirk, the cupboard was almost bare and we had to raise powerful armoured forces as quickly as possible. Our time was almost entirely occupied with this task. We kept strictly to the policy laid down in my previous article. For some time we had to concentrate on the handling of the armoured division and the component parts, and also of the armoured brigade. For almost a year there were very few formations with which we could carry out trials or tests. We realized that there was still a great deal of work to carry out in developing the right technique for mobile armoured warfare. The Germans had worked this out in great detail before the war, over a period of two years and with a number of fully equipped armoured divisions. In our case, we were just beginning to study and develop the full technique at a higher level, and particularly on the administrative side, when I was suddenly sent to Russia on 4th April, 1943, and my headquarters were then abolished as such. The handling of the armoured divisions in mobile warfare was thoroughly taught and understood, and this carried us through to final victory. In the advance to Antwerp, Brussels, and Ghent in September, 1944, our armoured divisions showed great skill, bypassing opposition and maintaining full mobility. The enemy was thoroughly demoralized by these actions and was starting to surrender in large numbers. If our armoured divisions could have retained their mobility, the German front might well have collapsed. Unfortunately, administrative arrangements began to fail. They had not received sufficient study from certain angles at higher levels. This would certainly have been done if the headquarters of the Armoured Forces had continued to exist. As it was, the Germans began to recover their morale when they saw that we had lost our mobility, and the war continued.

Since the war, most of our attention has been paid to positional or semi-mobile warfare. This would be our immediate task, but when our European Army is ready, consisting, we hope, of at least 20 infantry and 20 armoured divisions, then surely it is highly mobile warfare that we will have to study. Little has been done so far. Two years is none too long for this considerable task of a detailed study at every stage of the technique of penetrations with mobile forces. There are those who say that this is a task to be solved by the European Army. I disagree. With all our great experience, it is our Country that should give the lead. If we carried out this work, we would carry the other nations with us and the European Army would have a clear-cut plan, with full preparation on the mobile side, which it may well need in two years' time. We might well have started on this work a few years ago; we must certainly start now.



## AIR RECONNAISSANCE - ITS PURPOSE AND VALUE

By AIR MARSHAL SIR THOMAS ELMHIRST, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C.

**W**HEN a war commences, a curtain even more impenetrable than the Iron Curtain drops between the opposing countries. The Bible says "without vision the people perish," and though a country may not, in fact, perish because of its inability to see where the armed forces of its enemy are and what they are doing, its own armed forces will be very severely handicapped and may well suffer defeat through being brought to action out of position, unbalanced, or before they have been able to concentrate.

Throughout a war, and more especially at its commencement, the high commands of armies, navies, and air forces cry out for information about the enemy's fighting services. Where are they? In what strength are they? How are they organized and armed? What is happening at their bases and have they established a new base? What supply lines are they using? What and where are their reserves? What is their next likely move? Have they any surprise weapons, and where? What effect did our yesterday's offensive operations have? And so on, and our own dispositions, whether offensive or defensive, must be made according to the answers we can obtain to some or all of these questions.

There are various methods in war of obtaining this information, or intelligence, from the other side of the curtain. From prisoners, from captured documents, from agents planted in enemy countries, from listening to the enemy talking on the air, from neutrals, enemy newspapers, etc.,. The best method is, of course, to be able to read the enemy high command's orders to his own forces, but this can seldom be done! At the end of the 1939-45 War, undoubtedly pride of place in methods for obtaining information of our enemy's land, sea, and air forces, of his industry and of his lines of communications, went to reconnaissance carried out by aircraft.

At the commencement of the 1939-45 War, all Britain's armed forces were severely handicapped because the Royal Air Force was not equipped with any aircraft capable of carrying out a satisfactory reconnaissance, either close over the enemy front line, or in depth over his naval bases, industrial centres, airfields, or lines of communications. The only squadrons (other than two or three flying-boat squadrons) trained in the art of air reconnaissance were equipped with aircraft which were neither capable of fighting to obtain the desired information, nor of obtaining it by evasion due to their high speed, rate of climb, or range. These errors in the provisioning of a proper type and a properly equipped aircraft were remedied as quickly as possible but I doubt if, even at the end of the war, all Commanders-in-Chief were satisfied that they had all the air reconnaissance that they thought they had need of.

A few instances of vital information received from aircraft reconnaissances in the last war will, perhaps, show something of the purpose and value of well-trained and well-equipped air reconnaissance units, both in the strategical, or long range, and in the tactical, or short range, spheres.

Of our own air reconnaissance. The plotting, from air photographs in May and June, 1941, of the moves of German Air Force squadrons away from the Channel coast to airfields in East Germany, Austria, and Poland, foretold for certain that the German attack on Russia was about to begin. So again did photographs, in the early Winter of 1944, of G.A.F. units concentrating on airfields in West Germany



behind the Rhine, foretell the coming of the Ardennes offensive. The great and successful Allied bombing offensive on oil factories and rail communications in the Spring of 1944, which preceded the liberation campaign, would have needed double the effort if a daily air photographic survey of Europe had not been available, from which bombing target maps could be made and from which could be seen what objectives had been destroyed and what needed further attention. The battleship *Bismarck*, on her last voyage, was located by air reconnaissance shortly after her arrival at Trondhjem, and was again located by flying boat reconnaissance some hundreds of miles off Brest, after she had been lost to view for many hours. This sighting enabled her to be brought to action and destroyed by British naval forces.

In the tactical sphere, there were some days just prior to the El Alamein battle when the German Air Force was making it almost impossible for our Hurricane tactical reconnaissance aircraft to obtain for General Montgomery the detailed information he required of the enemy dispositions. One squadron had been decimated in attempting to gain this vital knowledge. But the information was obtained by giving a lone, well-trained pilot-observer in his Hurricane an escort of a complete wing of three squadrons of Spitfires to escort him round his route over the enemy positions. As a matter of interest, it was R.A.F. fighter pilots, returning from a sweep over the enemy back areas, who first reported signs of the enemy withdrawal at the conclusion of the battle.

It will, perhaps, be not without value to record that had trained observers and a photographic library been available, the latter from which reference could have been made to previous photographs, early news might have been had of the German move into Norway in the Spring of 1940. A few days before the invasion, and for the first time, an R.A.F. aircraft was available, capable of taking photographs of the German Baltic harbours and returning safely with the photographs. These showed two harbours packed with shipping, both naval and mercantile. As no previous photographs were available to which reference back might be made, no conclusion was drawn from them. But a few days later, further photographs were taken and the harbours were seen to be empty. And again, on the night before the Norway invasion, a R.A.F. night-bomber crew, on return from a sortie over the Hamburg-Bremen area, reported having seen streams of cars with their headlights on going North towards Schleswig. Unfortunately, the report was not considered vital at the bomber's base and came too slowly through the usual channels to the Air Ministry, where the right conclusion might have been drawn.

On the enemy side, two instances readily come to mind, one of the value and one of the complete failure of his air reconnaissance in the last war. First, the long range reconnaissance aircraft that located and reported the *Prince of Wales* and *Renown* off the Malayan coast without an accompanying aircraft carrier. This one report enabled Japanese land-based torpedo aircraft to send those two great ships to their doom and so alter the whole course of the war in South-East Asia. The other was the complete failure of the German air reconnaissance units either to locate the invasion fleets in their English ports in June, 1944, or when at sea in the Channel on the way to Normandy on the day prior to "D day." Surely this failure was one of the most astounding and costly failures of the war. The R.A.F. Fighter Command was undoubtedly making air reconnaissance by the G.A.F. a very dangerous and difficult job, but if ever a reconnaissance was worth fighting for and worth losing many aircraft to obtain, one should have been made over the Channel on that 5th June, 1944.

With these lessons in our minds, and with the R.A.F.'s good reconnaissance schools and all their war experience to draw upon, there is no doubt that we shall be far better prepared for air reconnaissance tasks in the future than we were in 1939. But the last war lessons are still worth remembering. Perhaps they may be summarized as follows:—

(1) None but the latest and best type of aircraft, whether single or twin-engined (suitably modified), is of any real use for air reconnaissance, whether strategical or tactical, in the face of a competent hostile air force.

(2) The best type of cameras both for high and low altitude work must be available. For strategical reconnaissance, photography from great heights is probably the producer of the best results. But there are many days in the year in Europe when clouds make photography from great heights impossible, and it may well be that on one of these days a report must be obtained and can only be obtained by a low altitude flight and by the eye of an experienced pilot-observer, who is familiar with the objects which he has been sent out to report upon. For tactical air reconnaissance, the combination of the trained pilot-observer's eye and the camera is probably the best.

(3) Men expert in the interpretation of photographs of every type of objective that may become the target of a bomber force, or of bombardment by shore or naval guns, must be available, together with a reference library of photographic prints.

The Germans, prior to the 1939-45 War, had target maps of all suitable bombing objectives in Britain which had been taken from the air in 1938! It is not Britain's habit to undertake such flying operations over a possible theatre of war before the outbreak of hostilities, but there are other ways by which target dossiers can be compiled in times of peace.

In conclusion, it is good to read in the daily press a report of the acceptance by the Air Ministry of a new type of combatant aircraft that can be modified for "P.R." (photographic reconnaissance).

---

## UNITED STATES SUBMARINES IN THE BLOCKADE OF JAPAN IN THE 1939-45 WAR

By MAJOR C. S. GOLDINGHAM, R.M., F.R.Hist.S.

### INTRODUCTION

THE defeat of Japan was due to numerous causes which, jointly and cumulatively, reduced the country to a condition in which the life of the nation could no longer go on. The most important single cause was probably the blockade, which drained the life blood from industry and the armed forces. In the blockade, submarines played the major part, as the following table shows :—

#### JAPANESE MERCHANT VESSELS SUNK

<i>Agent</i>		<i>Number of ships</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>
Submarines	... ..	1,215	5,152,000
All other agents	... ..	1,131	3,466,100
Total	... ..	2,346	8,618,100

Broadly speaking, the submarine created the conditions for victory; the aircraft exploited them and determined the timing of Japan's surrender.

The blockade of Japan differed from the classical concept of blocking an enemy's harbour or line of coast, so as to stop ingress and egress and prevent the entrance of supplies or the exit of a fleet or single vessels. It was an extension of this conception designed to effect the ruin of Japan's economy and consequently of her capacity to wage war, and it entailed the destruction of Japanese shipping, whenever and wherever found. The Americans termed it attrition.

The war of attrition had as its object the cutting of the lines of communication between Japan and her overseas military bases, her Empire and such other markets as remained open to her, and the territories she had conquered and from which she designed to draw the raw materials and foodstuffs to enable her to prosecute the war. It was frequently possible for submarines to effect more than one of these objects simultaneously.

The adoption of blockade as one of the principal weapons for the defeat of Japan was inevitable from the moment the decision was taken, at the inter-Allied conference which opened at Washington a few days after the outbreak of war with Japan in December, 1941, to concentrate on the defeat of Germany before Japan, and meanwhile to conduct against the latter a holding war. There was never any intention, however, to conduct a passive defence. From the outset every opportunity was taken to strike the enemy with the only two weapons, aircraft and submarines, which remained at the disposal of the Allies in the Far East and Pacific after the destruction of the U.S. Pacific battle fleet at Pearl Harbour, with which hostilities opened.

#### JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE UPON IMPORTS

Japan was unusually susceptible to blockade, even more so than the other island Empire, Great Britain. The United Kingdom at least possessed coal and iron in some abundance; her economy was based on them. Japan had few raw materials, however, and those for the most part of inferior quality. Even her coal, one of the

few commodities present in quantity in the home islands, was of low grade and unfit for many industrial uses. Surrounded by lands that were rich storehouses of coal and iron, rubber and aluminium, and above all fuel oil, her own cupboard was bare. Without drawing to herself over sea routes the riches of distant Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies, as well as the nearer regions of China, Manchuria, and Korea, she could not wage a modern war. Hence her dependence upon shipping, a dependence aggravated by the paucity of level land for railways in Japan's rugged home islands, which necessitated most of her transportation being carried out by water.

Prior to plunging into war, the Japanese Government made a survey of the nation's military potential as at December, 1941.<sup>1</sup> It is clear from the survey that the Government did not at that time consider it necessary to carry out total mobilization for war of the country's economy. Japan was poor. Even by exploiting the riches of the southern area—the Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies—she could not hope to rival the immense industrial and military potential of the United States and the United Kingdom. She knew herself to be incapable of fighting a long war, and the intention consequently was to harness to the war machine only such production as would suffice to see her through a war in which the period of active offensive operations would be short. Her intention, after seizing the territory she coveted, was to form a defensive perimeter and hold it until her antagonists grew tired of attacking and agreed to a negotiated peace.

In considering Japan's economic position and military potential, it is necessary to distinguish between imports from what are usually termed the Inner Zone and the Outer Zone respectively. The former comprised the home islands, Manchuria, Korea, North China, and Formosa. The sea routes in this zone were short and easier to protect than the long hauls from Indo-China, Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies which comprised the Outer Zone. Thus the large dependence upon coking coal and iron was of minor importance, since these were imported from China. The survey took into consideration only those raw materials which Japan needed to import, it omitted those for which available substitutes could be employed and those of which stockpiling would provide quantities adequate for a short war. The employment, for example, of substitutes largely drawn from the Inner Zone, made up for the shortage of cotton which developed in Japan in 1942; for though the country was, in peace-time, the world's largest exporter of textiles, she depended upon imports of raw cotton, wool, and hides for their manufacture.

The Philippine Islands were barely noticed in the survey since their importance was mainly strategic, in that they protected the route to the southern areas. There was an intention to develop the supplies of copper in the islands, to make good the deficit of 40 per cent. in home production, but for various reasons the project did not materialize. New Guinea found no place in the document: conquest of the island was not part of the original Japanese war plan. The attempts to seize Port Moresby which were made in May and again in July, 1942, with the intention of using the base as a jumping off place for eventual attack on northern Australia, were an extension of the plan; and the occupation of the North-eastern and northern part of the island, which it cost the Allies two years of fighting to recover, was undertaken for the protection of Rabaul, the South Seas base in the Bismarck Archipelago, and the other enemy positions in the Bismarcks and northern Solomon Islands.

<sup>1</sup> *Japan's struggle to end the War*, Appendix A. (H.M.S.O., London)



### STOCKPILING

Stockpiling of commodities in preparation for war was undertaken by Japan to an extent perhaps never before adopted by any country. It was the rapid exhaustion of her stockpiles, after the freezing of her foreign assets in the Summer of 1941 by the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies had stopped her imports of vital raw materials, that rendered war inevitable within a few months, failing the renunciation of all her ambitions.

Some of the stockpiles were very large; those of manganese ore and copper amounted to nearly a year's requirements, and there was a two years' supply of tin in the country. On the other hand, some grave risks were accepted. When war broke out, nickel, for example, was already in short supply, and there was actually less than one week's supply of rubber left in the country and no supplies in sight nearer than Indo-China and Siam. When, at the end of 1943, shipments of iron ore from the Yangtze ports were reduced almost to vanishing point, principally through the operations of the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, Japan lived for nearly a year on her stockpile, and for a time even increased her output of steel during the period.

The only foodstuff which the survey noted as vital was the staple, rice. Reports as to Japan's peace-time position vary from a small surplus to six per cent. dependence, the latter, in terms of quantity, being little more than half a million tons. War conditions multiplied this fourfold, which appears to have surprised the Japanese Government. As a precaution, a system of rice rationing had been imposed in the six largest cities of Japan in April, 1941, in preparation for war; and the war was not many days old before this was extended to the rest of the country. It has been stated that Japan depended upon imports for some four-fifths of her total consumption of sugar and soya. The latter was an essential commodity.

### OIL AND ALUMINIUM

Japan's ability to wage war depended upon adequate imports of oil and aluminium, more than on any other factor. Though other commodities were of equally pervasive importance in her military potential, they were not so immediately necessary to her war machine. The aluminium which built the "Zero" fighter aircraft and the "Kate" torpedo bomber, machines which the Allies were far from being able to match at the outset of the war, and the oil that flew them and moved the great carriers from which they flew, these were the raw materials of Japan's conquests, and it was shortage of them that slowly strangled her.

Imports of bauxite, the raw material of the aluminium industry, amounted to nine-tenths of total requirements. Their source was the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. Since the refineries were all situated in Japan itself, import necessitated a long sea passage. An alternative existed in the alunite and aluminous shales of Manchuria and Korea, but the relative inferiority of these low grade materials, and consequently the greater bulk required, would have counterbalanced the saving on the shorter sea route. Moreover, there were no refineries in Japan capable of treating these shales.

It is no exaggeration to say that oil was the life blood of Japan. The human machine would continue to function when reduced to a starvation diet of rice and fish and deprived, as before the surrender of Japan it was deprived, of necessities such as soya products and meat—for by 1941 meat had come to be classed by economists as a necessity for the Japanese no less than tobacco to the nations of the West. But

the war machine would not function without oil. Japanese production supplied only a fraction of her needs. No adequate synthetic oil industry was developed in peacetime, probably on account of the difficulty of providing the large quantities of high grade steel and the complicated equipment required. Instead, efforts had been made to create a reserve by passing, in March, 1934, the Petroleum Industry Act, which required all foreign oil companies in Japan to construct storage equipment and refineries, and to keep in the country six months' supply of crude oil. Despite this, the refining capacity of Japan when war broke out sufficed to meet no more than half her normal needs.<sup>2</sup> Pre-war imports were almost entirely from the U.S.A. The attitude of the latter towards Japan's penetration of Indo-China rendered these supplies precarious; and, in 1940, when the Dutch were in no condition to resist or Great Britain to support her Ally, the Japanese Government compelled the Netherlands East Indies to enter into an agreement to supply an amount which would reduce Japan's dependence on imports from America to half her total needs. The rapid exhaustion of stocks after the freezing of Japanese assets by the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch in the Summer of 1941, prevented further imports of oil and thus rendered war inevitable, failing a complete reversal of Japan's policy, before the fleet should have become immobilized in harbour and the air forces on their airfields for lack of fuel.

#### SHIPPING


Japan's dependence upon overseas imports rendered the possession of adequate shipping essential, and she had built up in peacetime a large and modern merchant marine, of which the only legitimate criticism that can be made is that the average tonnage of the ships was rather too small for the most economical working. Much of her external trade was carried in foreign vessels, the withdrawal of which on the outbreak of war was compensated by the disappearance of most of that particular trade. Including tankers, Japan, when war broke out in December, 1941, disposed of nearly six million tons of shipping, of which rather more than two million were allocated to the service of the Army, and rather less than two million each to the Navy and civilian use. Some 200,000 tons were under repair. The three fleets were separate and autonomous. The figure allotted to the civilian fleet was quite inadequate for the immediate exploitation of the resources of the conquered territories necessary for the maintenance of the country's capacity to wage war. At least three million tons were needed for the purpose, and the Japanese strategic plan envisaged the return to civilian uses of shipping taken up by the Army and Navy, on completion of the operations against the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. The extension in the Spring and early Summer of 1942 of the war plan to include seizure of islands in the South Seas, Midway Island, and the western Aleutians, followed as these operations were by the Allied counter-offensives in July (New Guinea) and August (the Solomons) of that year, prevented the release of the full amount of merchant shipping required. It was only the loss of those positions, for the supply and reinforcement of which shipping was being employed, that made the release possible.<sup>3</sup> The consequence was that Japanese industry suffered from a shortage of raw materials almost from the very outset of the war.

<sup>2</sup> Hence the importance of the Sumatran refineries and the attacks made on them by the carrier aircraft of the British fleet.

<sup>3</sup> Less than  $\frac{2}{3}$  million tons were returned to civilian use before the Allied attack on Guadalcanal in August, 1942.

The Japanese authorities undoubtedly made some miscalculation, not only of the losses to be expected, but also in the formidable dual problem of supply by sea simultaneously with the immediate exploitation of the resources of conquered lands, separated by long sea hauls from the home islands, which was essential in order to replace the pre-war import trade and sustain the country's economy. It seems open to question whether sufficient allowance was made for the poor port facilities, partly resulting from war damage, at the outer extremities of the long lines of communication. As we shall see, too, failure, not altogether through Japanese remissness, to keep ships in repair played a part in the early decline in tonnage available. Due perhaps to the time taken by the blockade to get into its stride, the trend of losses seems to have escaped notice until a late date. The pre-war estimate was that after three years of war there would still remain to the country  $5\frac{1}{4}$  million tons of shipping. Actually, there remained at the expiration of that period, in December, 1944, less than half that amount. Once the situation became apparent the Government acted with energy and increased its building programme in a remarkable manner. But it was not adequately supported by the belated and ineffective escort and anti-submarine measures taken by the Navy. American submarines came off the stocks in ever increasing numbers, and losses of ships continued at an accelerated rate which the speed of building was unable to overtake.

## JAPANESE SHIPPING LOSSES AND CAUSES



During the war, 88 per cent. of Japan's shipping was sunk. Submarines sank 63 per cent. of this total (see diagram). These figures do not tell the whole tale of the effect of the blockade. They do not show, for example, the waste of cargo-carrying capacity resulting from diversive routing of convoys in consequence of attacks by shore-based aircraft as the Americans pushed forward their airfields, nor the damage to the country's economy through overloading of the railways by the forcing on to them of bulky goods formerly distributed by the coastwise shipping upon which Japan was unusually dependent. They fail to show, too—though this has no bearing on the destruction of Japan's shipping—the extent to which submarines bore the burden of the blockade during the years whilst the Allies were engaged in capturing and establishing bases from which to attack Japan. In November, 1943, the

American Fourteenth Air Force, and in the following month carrier-based aircraft, joined in the counter-shipping operations; yet the share of the submarine as causal agent of Japan's shipping losses still remained very high, and it was not until the late Summer of the following year that it dropped below 70 per cent. from a peak in 1943 of 74 per cent.

#### DEFENCE OF THE MALAY BARRIER

Nearly two years elapsed, however, before the commitments of the United States in the war against Germany, which had priority over the war in the Far East and Pacific, enabled them to concentrate on the blockade of Japan. During the period of Japanese southward expansion which ended with the fall of the Malay Barrier, as the line through Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies to Timor is conveniently termed, the Japanese fleet was in such overwhelming strength that submarines were employed defensively to supplement the meagre surface fleet and air forces with which the Allies attempted to stand on successive positions in the Far East.

The principal submarine force in the area was that of the Asiatic Fleet, based on Manila, which was the largest American submarine force West of the United States. The submarines of the Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbour, numbered 22 boats. When the Asiatic Fleet main base at Manila was evacuated at the end of December, 1941, the survivors of the 29 submarines of the fleet came South and, with three British and nine Dutch submarines, worked from Surabaya, in Java.

On the unification of the Allied commands in the Far East under General Wavell on 3rd January, 1942, Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, continued in command of all the naval forces of the Allies in the A.B.D.A. (American-British-Dutch-Australian) area, until relieved on account of ill health on 14th February by the Dutch Admiral C. L. Helfrich. Difficulty was experienced in keeping the American submarines running efficiently from the Dutch dockyard at Surabaya. They were anything up to 20 years old. Many of their stores and spare parts had been destroyed by bombing at Cavite Naval Yard (Manila) during the heavy air raids with which the war opened. There were differences in the Dutch and American engineering practices; and, as the Japanese advanced their airfields further South towards Java, air raids, to which the few Allied aircraft could make no effective opposition, became of daily occurrence, compelling the submarines either to remain at sea or to submerge in harbour during daylight. Even so, the Dutch submarine *K-7* was destroyed in the port by bombing. Four more of the operational Dutch submarines were lost whilst defending the Malay Barrier.

The approaches to the Malay Barrier, strewn with shoals and navigational hazards and inadequately surveyed, constituted a difficult area for submarine operations. There was much shallow water near the shores of the islands in which submarines were unable to operate, and the Japanese took full advantage of this by employing in their expeditions invasion transports of moderate size and small draft. Reporting of the enemy was difficult. The Allies were fighting a rearguard action, resulting in the necessity for continual reorganization of communications and, as there were few aircraft available for reconnaissance, the submarines were usually sent up too late and arrived after the invasion fleets had entered shoal water or landed their troops and withdrawn.

The great invasion fleet of 80 ships that carried out the main Japanese landing in the Philippines, at Lingayen Gulf on the West side of Luzon, escaped in this manner. All round the Gulf there were depths of four to five fathoms for a distance



of three miles from shore. Since the submarine cannot operate in depths of less than ten fathoms, and indeed prefers 50 or more, the Japanese invasion ships were safe here from attack. Five submarines were sent up to do their best, for the prize was a great one. Only one, S-38, managed to cross the reef and enter the Gulf. She sank one of the largest Japanese transports, but stirred up such a hornet's nest that she only escaped by desperate courage, efficient damage control, and a large measure of luck.

At this date torpedoes were in short supply. Many had been destroyed in the Japanese air attacks on Cavite at the beginning of the war, or abandoned when the base was evacuated on Christmas Day, 1941; and U.S. production had not yet caught up. Submarines were sent out on patrol with less than a full allowance of torpedoes and "spreads" had to be cut down, only one or two torpedoes being fired where tactics demanded a full salvo. The old "S" boats, which constituted a large proportion of the Asiatic Fleet submarines, operated under the further handicap of being too slow on the surface to attack warships. Moreover, many were without air conditioning, and living conditions on tropical patrols were intolerable and soon wore out the crews.

#### THE BLOCKADE BEGINS

The work of the submarines in the defence of the Malay Barrier ended with the fall of Java on 9th March, 1942, and, together with the few surviving surface units of the Allied Fleets in the Far East, they withdrew, the British and Dutch going to Ceylon and the Americans to Australia. Vice-Admiral H. F. Leary who, after the dispersal of the ships, took command of the U.S. naval forces in the South-West Pacific, recommended to the Commander-in-Chief that the submarines should switch over to the attack on the enemy supply lines linking the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya with Japan, in other words, the blockade of the Empire.

Such of the submarines of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as were available had, in accordance with the war plan for this force, been implementing the blockade since the outbreak of war. The force consisted of six old "S" class and 16 Fleets; most of the former were on the West coast of the U.S.A., undergoing refit. The first boats went out from the United States base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, on 11th December, 1941, four days after the air raid with which Japan opened hostilities. Until more submarines became available, patrols were mainly concentrated at the focal points of shipping off the southern and economically most important parts of Japan, such as Yokohama, Nagasaki, the Bungo and Kii Channels, and Tsushima Strait. The calls on the force for reconnaissance and special operations, and the need for co-operation by every available submarine in the Battle of Midway early in June, 1942, delayed the Empire blockade. Nevertheless, from the time when the loss of the Malay Barrier set free the Asiatic Fleet submarines for participation in the blockade, until mid-Summer, 1942, when the blockade became effective, Japanese shipping losses were more often than not in the neighbourhood of 100,000 tons a month, mainly from submarines.

The Submarine Commands, after adjustments during the first three months of the war to meet changing circumstances, finally corresponded to those of the Pacific (see map). The ocean East of 110° E., the boundary between British and American responsibility, was divided into two theatres, the South-West Pacific, in which General D. MacArthur commanded all Allied forces, and the Pacific Ocean Area, in which Admiral C. W. Nimitz performed a similar function. The Pacific Ocean Area

was again subdivided into North, Central, and South Pacific Areas, together with a South-East Pacific Area in which, however, no active operations of war took place.

The main areas of patrol of Admiral Leary's South-West Pacific submarines were the Netherlands East Indies—Philippine waters and the South China Sea, which were covered by submarines working from Fremantle. The latter were joined in October, 1944, by British submarines, which co-operated in the patrols for the remainder of the war. From Brisbane, on the other side of Australia, the old "S" boats of the South-West Pacific Command patrolled the Australian Mandates—New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago—the Solomon Islands.

Admiral Nimitz's submarines also carried out certain patrols from Brisbane, though this base, being in General MacArthur's South-West Pacific Area, was outside his region of responsibility. These boats operated in the South Pacific Area. From Hawaii, Admiral Nimitz's Central Pacific submarines carried out patrols in Empire waters, including the important iron ore route from the Yangtze ports to Japan, and in the Japanese Mandates (Marshall and Caroline Islands). An advanced operating base at Midway was used to shorten by more than 1,000 miles the passage to the patrol areas off Japan. Admiral Nimitz was also responsible for the Aleutian patrols, carried out from Dutch Harbour. Both these submarine forces, South-West Pacific and Central Pacific, operated independently of one another, under Commander Submarines, South-West Pacific, and Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, respectively. The dividing line between their areas of responsibility, which was fixed at 30° North, roughly the latitude of Shanghai, in the early part of the war, was brought down to 18½° North, approximately the latitude of Hainan Island, before the war ended.

The early submarine patrols in the Pacific averaged six weeks at sea, half of which were spent on passage to and from the patrol area. A fortnight's rest and a week's exercises followed, before the boat sailed for her next patrol. After some five patrols a boat would return to U.S.A. for refit. In the South-West Pacific, the submarines were rather harder worked. In the Aleutians, one of the world's worst campaigning areas, conditions were so hard, particularly in the old "S" boats which initiated the patrols in that area late in January, 1942, that the submarines rotated between the North Pacific and San Diego, California, where they were used for training purposes.

#### MALFUNCTIONING OF AMERICAN TORPEDOES

From the beginning of hostilities patrol reports were received containing records of inexplicable misses of the target by torpedoes which were apparently running hot and straight. The *Sargo* had a string of 13 consecutive misses, the *Seadragon* 15. S.38, after having against great odds penetrated into Lingayen Gulf in December, 1941, to attack the Japanese Philippines Assault Force, had a string of four misses which gave the alarm and ruined her subsequent efforts. A percentage of the misses was no doubt due to the shortage of torpedoes at the war's outset which precluded firing "spreads." The trouble was tracked down after some months. Torpedoes were running deeper than their depth setting and were missing under the target. The remedy was to set them to run shallower.

The correction having been made, it quickly revealed two further unsuspected defects, viz., premature detonation and failure to detonate. The *Tunny*, presented with a target of three aircraft carriers, made a perfect attack and fired ten torpedoes, at least seven of which detonated prematurely. The *Tinosa* spent the whole of one

Summer day firing a series of eight torpedoes at the 19,000 ton tanker *Tonan Maru* which she had previously disabled. Before firing, each torpedo was removed from its tube and the adjustment checked. One after another the torpedoes hit the tanker fair and square, and one after another they bounced harmlessly off her sides without detonating.

Two types of torpedo were in principal use in the United States Navy. The old "S" boats were armed with a Mark X torpedo, the warhead of which detonated on impact. The large fleet type submarines carried the Mark XIV torpedo. This had a magnetic detonating device designed to explode both on impact and by induction when passing through the magnetic field of an iron or steel ship. The advantage of the magnetic exploder was that it saved—or was intended to save—the misses due to torpedoes which failed to hit. Where a warship was the target there was the added advantage that, if running deep, the torpedo might explode beneath the vessel's unarmoured and vulnerable under belly.

The *Tinosa's* experience with the *Tonan Maru* on 24th July, 1943, was the last straw. The war was then more than 18 months old and the Bureau of Ordnance, which was responsible for torpedoes, had been unable to remedy the defect. Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, ordered the magnetic exploders in all torpedoes in the Fleet to be inactivated, though in the South-West Pacific, which was under the supreme command of General MacArthur and therefore outside his jurisdiction, the Seventh Fleet continued to employ it for a further nine months, until in exasperation they, too, abandoned its use. This was a desperate remedy, or rather, no remedy at all; and Admiral C. A. Lockwood, who succeeded to the command of the Pacific Fleet submarines in January, 1943, after the death of Admiral English, decided to tackle the problem himself with the resources of the fleet. This was at the end of July, 1943, and so rapid was progress that no later than 30th September in that year the first submarine, the *Barb*, left for patrol equipped at last with a reliable magnetic exploder. In two months the Fleet had succeeded where for nearly two years the Bureau of Ordnance failed.

How was it possible for such grave defects to escape detection in peace-time? The answer lay in the fact that the torpedo was a costly weapon and was consequently never fired under war-time conditions, that is, to self destruction. When fired for training in peace-time torpedoes were always fitted with practice heads from which the explosive had been removed, and thus no check was provided on such defects as deep running, premature detonation, and failing to explode.

#### BALANCE OF SHIPPING BEGINS TO DECLINE, SEPTEMBER, 1942

Despite malfunctioning torpedoes and the sporadic nature of the blockade during the early months, the shipping tonnage available to Japan began to decline well within 12 months after the outbreak of war.

##### *Shipping available (excluding tankers)\**

December, 1941	...	...	5,500,000 tons
December, 1942	...	...	4,600,000 tons
December, 1943	...	...	3,700,000 tons
July, 1944	...	...	3,100,000 tons
April, 1945	...	...	1,250,000 tons

\* Japanese report quoted in *Japan's struggle to end the War*.

That total sinkings of little more than 600,000 tons, the aggregate of the first ten months of war, should have accomplished this, is a measure of the inadequacy of the Japanese governmental-industrial complex for war against Powers of the first order. The immediate cause of the decline was the failure to keep abreast of repairs to ships. Against sinkings of 613,413 tons up to the end of September, 1942, the Japanese could put 561,180 tons of captured or salvaged ships and 184,335 tons of new construction, a total of 745,515 tons, or 132,102 tons more than their losses. But whereas at the beginning of the war 200,942 tons of merchant shipping were unserviceable, by September, 1942, the figure had risen to 451,544 tons, an increase of 250,601.

That with so few submarines engaged in the blockade the losses should yet have been so high, was largely due to the failure of the Japanese to provide adequate protection for their merchant ships. Japan entered the war with an almost incredibly small number of escort vessels capable of making ocean passages, probably less than one-tenth of the number required to implement any regular system of convoys. The escort vessels were the Cinderellas of the fleet, worn-out vessels and craft converted from civilian use. If escorts were available they were used, but, though the sailing of ships was sometimes delayed for an escort, the only route on which submarines could be certain of finding ships under escort was the South China Sea, the area of the 1st Escort Squadron, through which ran the oil route from Singapore. The usual system in other areas was to sail ships in groups for mutual protection, accompanied perhaps by a single escort or none at all. Whilst it must be borne in mind that Japan, as a power of the second order, found difficulty in creating an adequate escort fleet in addition to her other naval commitments, there is little doubt that she underestimated the danger to her merchant shipping from submarine attack and began the construction of escort vessels too light-heartedly and too late.

Period (fiscal year 1st April-31st March)	Escort Vessels <sup>5</sup>	
	Construction Plans	Number Commissioned
1941 ... ..	0	0
1942 ... ..	4	2
1943 ... ..	44	35
1944 ... ..	190	112
1945 (to August) ...	25	18

Various reasons of a nature which could have been overcome by resolute action were given for the failure to fulfil the constructional plans. The initial deficiency may have resulted from a failure to appreciate that the submarine doctrine of the Allies differed radically from Japan's own, which prescribed operational employment with the fleet rather than attack on trade as the principal role of the submarine.

#### CAUSES AFFECTING SHIPPING LOSSES

By the end of 1942, the Japanese appear to have become aware of the serious outlook implied by the upward trend of shipping losses. The Navy had taken charge of all merchant ship building in the Summer of that year, and within nine months the shipbuilding index began to increase rapidly. The arming of merchantmen had begun early in 1943, but the manufacturing resources of the country were insufficient for rapid production of guns or, for that matter, any other war material

<sup>5</sup> Based on the *Campaigns of the Pacific War*.



in largest quantities, and expedients had consequently to be adopted, such as placing field guns on wheels on ships' decks, or even mounting dummy, wooden guns. The dilatoriness of the Japanese in adopting this essential measure is difficult to excuse.

Economical working of the available shipping was hindered by the organization of the merchant fleet in three separately operated pools, army, navy, and civilian. Air cover for merchant shipping was seldom available and, when provided, its efficient operation was vitiated by poor co-operation between the land-based air headquarters and the escort vessels. Though in this connection the undoubted animosity existing between the Army, including the Army Air Forces, and the Navy must be borne in mind, the principal obstacle was the difficulty of communication between aircraft and surface vessels engaged on anti-submarine work, a difficulty caused partly through the imprecise and cumbersome nature of the Japanese language and partly through the inadequacy of their technical devices. The lack of an organization comparable to the R.A.F. Coastal Command was badly felt. The inroads made on the merchant fleet soon resulted in a lack of homogeneity within convoys or groups of ships; fast ships were included with slow, and ships of long fuel endurance waited idly whilst those of low bunker capacity put into port to refuel. These were but instances of the inadequacy of Japan's resources for a war of the furious *tempo* to which the Americans pushed the Pacific operations when their full wartime production began to come off the assembly lines. Hampered as the Japanese were by material shortages and industrial-governmental shortcomings, their performance was creditable; but the shallowness of their military potential was to prove a fatal handicap.

The Japanese were badly trained in anti-submarine work and temperamentally unfitted for it. When hunting a submarine, they were far too ready to accept the presence of oil or debris as evidence of a kill; and it was not until late in the war that they adopted the doctrine of persistence in attack over a period of days, if necessary, until clear evidence of destruction or escape was obtained. Many Allied submarines, when cornered, escaped through the hunt being called off too soon. Lack of tenacity was a Japanese characteristic. There were many instances during the war of commanders of operational forces failing to maintain their object, and the shortcomings persisted down to the lowest ranks. The desperate resistance offered on the bloodstained beaches of Tarawa and Iwo Jima, or in the caves and lone fox-holes of Okinawa, owed its origin less to steadfastness of spirit than to the stigma that attached to the soldier who surrendered. The Japanese military spirit found its true expression in the banzai charge or suicide attack.

#### THE PATROL AREAS

Meanwhile, some months were still to elapse before the full weight of the Allied submarine effort could be brought to bear on Japan. During the drive through the Upper Solomons, the South-West Pacific submarines were employed to interrupt the Japanese surface operations and cut the supply lines to Rabaul, Eastern New Guinea, and the Solomons. They were largely used for minelaying, reconnaissance, surveying, the landing of coast watchers, and similar special operations.

The Aleutians, too, made calls on the Submarine Force. American public opinion was highly sensitive on the subject of the Aleutians. As seen in the atlas, these islands appear to furnish a convenient line of stepping stones to undefended Alaska, and they are, in fact, the shortest route from Japan to the U.S.A. The physical conditions render the area the world's worst campaigning ground, but that

does not appear on the map; and when in June, 1942, the Japanese bombarded Dutch Harbour, the U.S. eastern Aleutian base, and landed at the western end of the chain, there was an outcry for their immediate expulsion. As it was impossible to spare a fleet and landing forces to drive them out, bombing was resorted to, coupled with blockade by submarine.

The first six submarines to go up to the Aleutians were old "S" boats without air conditioning or steam heating. Their habitability was terrible.

"The submariners standing bridge watch saw little more than ice glaze and reeling water. Much of the time they could see no farther than the bow of the boat. When the islands were not embedded in winter fog they were whipped by the polar Williwaws which scourged the area. Even when the weather cleared, which was seldom, the hours of daylight were short and the horizon was engloomed."<sup>6</sup>

To the old "S" boats with antiquated equipment, low engine power, and lack of sonic depth-finding gear, the physical conditions constituted a greater danger than the Japanese counter-measures. S.27 was lost through being set by an unexpected current on to the rocks, 400 yards from the coast of Amchitka Island. The crew got across the surf in relays in a three-man rubber dinghy and sheltered for six days in a bombed and uninhabited village until rescued. S.35, swept by huge seas, had a two days' battle with fire caused by salt water setting up short circuits in the electric leads. Driven by flames and smoke from one compartment to another, the crew had finally to take refuge on deck, exposed to an icy December gale, whilst the submarine, without power and with her steering gear disabled, drove towards the rocks of Amchitka. In the last resort some of the crew re-entered the boat and managed to start the engines; and on Christmas Eve S.35 was brought to harbour.

Before the Summer was out no less than 18 submarines had been sent up to the Aleutians, a large proportion of the United States Pacific Submarine Force at that date, and including eight large fleet submarines. It was a poor hunting ground.

In these waters every vessel was either a warship or an auxiliary carrying reinforcements and supplies for the Japanese garrison of Attu and Kiska. There were no great oil tankers or merchantmen laden with rice and rubber as in the China Sea, or freighters loaded down with iron ore as in the Sea of Japan, which was entered by United States submarines for the first time in the Summer of 1943. Nevertheless, throughout the last six months of 1942, from the time the Japanese offensive opened in the Aleutians, a larger number of submarines operated from Dutch Harbour than from either Fremantle or Brisbane.

By the Summer of 1942, American submarines were conducting campaigns against merchant shipping in six main areas: in Japan's home waters, the South China Sea, Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea—Bismarcks, the Mandates, and the Aleutians.


*To be continued*

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Submarine operations in World War II, p.135.

e  
 t  
 l  
 r  
 l  
 n  
  
 s  
 h  
 d  
  
 +  
  
 10  
 11  
 12







jom.  
adva  
been

size o

reach  
Cava

the s

zone  
fly o  
Kae

met  
Pan  
ball

draw

limi  
acce

Alli

Com

in a  
fort  
dow

Aus  
of I

que

of

Pre  
air

fig  
air  
jet

## DIARY OF THE WAR IN KOREA<sup>1</sup>

**16th October.**—Little progress was made at the meeting of liaison officers at Panmunjom. Allied forces North of Yanggu consolidated recent gains and, in the central sector, advanced to within six miles of Kumsong. Nine enemy jet fighters were reported to have been shot down.

**17th October.**—Some progress was made at Panmunjom, though the question of the size of the neutral zones around the two base headquarters remained unsolved.

South Koreans attacked hills North of Yanggu. U.S. and South Korean troops reached a point within three miles of Kumsong. North-West of Yonchon, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division captured strongly prepared positions.

**18th October.**—Talks between liaison officers continued at Panmunjom, mainly about the size of neutral areas. Allied troops maintained their attack South of Kumsong.

**19th October.**—At Panmunjom, agreement was reached regarding the size of neutral zones round Munsan and Kaesong. Two points remained: (1) whether aircraft should fly over the neutral zones or not, and (2) the question of access corridors from Munsan and Kaesong to Panmunjom.

**20th and 21st October.**—It was agreed by liaison officers that a security corridor 400 metres wide would be established connecting Munsan and Kaesong with Panmunjom; Panmunjom itself, and possibly Munsan and Kaesong, to be marked by coloured barrage balloons.

A U.N. tank patrol entered Kumsong and attacked enemy positions before withdrawing.

**22nd October.**—After arranging that aircraft flights over the security zones should be limited, the U.N. and enemy liaison officers signed a security agreement, which was accepted by the U.N. Command.

Allied tanks again entered Kumsong and shelled enemy positions before withdrawing. Allied Infantry captured hills a mile from the town.

**23rd October.**—The liaison officers' security agreement was ratified by the enemy Command, and it was arranged to resume the armistice conference on 25th October.

Five enemy aircraft were destroyed, two other probably destroyed, and seven damaged in an air action between a large force of MIG-15s and U.S. jet fighters protecting Superfortresses. One Superfortress was lost and two damaged, and one U.S. fighter was shot down.

**24th October.**—U.S. tanks again raided Kumsong. Enemy jet aircraft engaged Australian and U.S. jet fighters over North Korea. Superfortresses bombed targets North of Pyongyang.

**25th October.**—The armistice negotiations were resumed at Panmunjom. The question of an armistice line was referred to a joint sub-committee.

Allied Infantry gained a mile against Chinese rear-guards South-East and South-West of Kumsong. U.N. aircraft destroyed a quantity of rolling stock.

**26th October.**—Discussions regarding an armistice line continued at Panmunjom. Pressure by Allied troops resulted in gains in central and North-West Korea. U.N. aircraft bombed enemy airfields, railways, and rolling stock.

**27th and 28th October.**—No progress was made at Panmunjom. Three enemy jet fighters were shot down, two probably destroyed, and 12 damaged without loss to Allied aircraft. Allied losses in recent days were two jets shot down in air combat, and five jets and one helicopter lost to ground fire.

---

<sup>1</sup> A sketch-map of Korea faces page 14.

29th October.—At Panmunjom, the sub-committee met without result. The 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards embarked at Liverpool for Korea.

30th October.—There was no progress at Panmunjom.

31st October.—At Panmunjom, the enemy offered to agree to an armistice line only two to three miles from that proposed by the U.N., i.e. along the line of contact.

The enemy drove Allied troops off hills South-East of Kumsong and held their gains despite counterattacks.

1st November.—The sub-committee at Panmunjom endeavoured to define existing military positions; both sides claimed Kaesong.

U.S. Marines, using helicopters, raided a stronghold behind the enemy lines.

2nd November.—No progress was made at Panmunjom.

3rd and 4th November.—The U.N. members of the Panmunjom sub-committee suggested that Kaesong be demilitarized, but the enemy delegation refused to discuss the proposal.

1st Bn. The K. O. Scottish Borderers and units of the 1st Commonwealth Division, withstood heavy attacks North-West of Yonchon until ordered to withdraw.

5th November.—The Allied sub-committee delegates gave up attempts to reach agreement on a buffer zone and proposed that the opposing armies should stop fighting where they might be when an armistice was signed. They also proposed that it should be left to a committee from each side to decide upon the line of contact when the time came and that a buffer zone of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles between the armies should then be established. They suggested that the full armistice delegation should discuss the other items on the agenda first.

U.N. troops gained ground North-West of Kamsong. North-West of Yonchon, Allied troops regained and lost hill positions taken by the enemy on 4th November. U.N. warships completed 100 days continuous bombardment of enemy positions in the Han river.

6th November.—At Panmunjom, the enemy sub-committee delegates refused to agree that the other agenda items should be taken first. The enemy captured another hill position in the Yonchon area.

7th November.—The Panmunjom sub-committee meeting ended in a deadlock. Allied troops regained the ground lost in the Yonchon area.

8th November.—No agreement was reached at Panmunjom.

9th November.—The Panmunjom sub-committee met again without result. U.N. troops repelled attacks North-West and West of Yonchon. Three MIGs were shot down and four badly damaged by Allied aircraft.

10th and 11th November.—No changes in the situation were reported.

12th November.—The Allied sub-committee delegates at Panmunjom adhered to the proposal that the cease-fire line must be the battle line existing at the time an armistice is ready for signing, while the enemy delegates insisted that the cease-fire line should be the present front line.

13th November.—At Panmunjom, the deadlock over the buffer zone continued.

14th November.—The enemy sub-committee delegates demanded a general cease-fire at once. The Allied members said that agreement must first be reached on the other items on the agenda.

15th November.—No event of importance took place.

16th November.—No agreement resulted from a session at Panmunjom. Local enemy attacks North of Yanggu and North of Yonchon caused Allied troops to withdraw. Probing attacks by the enemy in the central sector were repulsed.



*17th November.*—The U.N. delegates at Panmunjom accepted conditionally the present front line as the ultimate truce line to be embodied in the armistice agreement, provided that accord was reached on other armistice terms, including those concerning prisoners of war, within 30 days after ratification of the proposal. The enemy delegates asked for time to consider the matter.

*18th and 19th November.*—The enemy representatives said that they could not reply to the latest proposals before 21st.

Allied troops captured a hill South-East of Kumsong, and the 1st British Commonwealth Division, after recapturing a hill West of Yonchon, beat off enemy counter-attacks.

*20th November.*—No event of importance was reported.

*21st November.*—The enemy delegates agreed to the U.N. proposal in principle, but said that they wished both sides to withdraw two kilometres from the line of contact without specifying when this move should take place.

*22nd November.*—The U.N. delegates made it plain that there would be no withdrawal of Allied troops from the line until a complete armistice agreement had been signed.

In the Chorwon area, an enemy attack resulted in confused fighting, and North-West of Yonchon a two-battalion attack by Chinese was repulsed. Superfortresses bombed a new enemy airfield in North-West Korea.

*23rd November.*—Agreement was reached between the sub-committee delegates regarding the buffer zone line, the enemy accepting the U.N. revisions and the U.N. agreeing that if the armistice was not signed within 30 days the present line should be revised to include changes resulting from battle action. Liaison officers from each side were instructed to complete their delineation of the existing battle line.

An enemy attack North-West of Chorwon made a slight penetration of the Allied line at heavy cost to themselves.

*24th November.*—Allied troops retook a hill position West of Yonchon.

*25th November.*—The liaison officers mapping the battle line presented their report.

The hill position West of Yonchon was the scene of bitter fighting which ended in favour of the Allies. Enemy losses were severe. The 1st British Commonwealth Division was prominent in this action.

*26th November.*—Agreement was reached on the tentative cease-fire line, despite continuance of fighting in several locations in the centre and West.

*27th November.*—The provisional demarcation line was agreed upon at a plenary meeting of the armistice negotiators at Panmunjom. The negotiators began discussions on the supervisory system to check compliance with such armistice terms as might be drafted.

Air battles took place in North-West Korea in which four MIG-15 jet fighters were shot down and one U.S. F-86 was destroyed.

*28th November.*—The enemy delegates at Panmunjom rejected a U.N. proposal forbidding any build-up of strength after a cease-fire, and proposed a high-level conference on the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Korea.

Ground fighting ceased along the whole front.

*29th November.*—Ground fighting was resumed. Some 300 enemy aircraft were seen over North Korea. Three U.S. Sabre jets were damaged.

*30th November.*—No progress was made by the armistice delegates. U.S. Sabre jet fighters shot down nine enemy bombers and one MIG jet fighter. Allied pilots reported the destruction of some 300 enemy lorries.

*1st and 2nd December.*—Negotiations at Panmunjom reached a new impasse when enemy delegates rejected Allied proposals for supervision by joint teams, insisted on the

right to build airfields during an armistice, and demanded that the Allies should withdraw from islands on both coasts of North Korea.

Four U.N. fighters, including three R.A.A.F. Meteor jet fighters, were shot down and five MIG-15s were destroyed. Allied pilots claimed to have destroyed 295 enemy vehicles.

*3rd December.*—The enemy delegates apparently reversed their previous position of being opposed to joint inspection teams to supervise the carrying out of armistice terms. They also appeared to agree to a ban on the building up of military forces in Korea during an armistice.

Air forces were active over North-West Korea. The enemy recaptured a small island off the North-West coast.

*4th December.*—At a meeting of the sub-committee dealing with truce supervision, the enemy insisted on being allowed to construct airfields, on restricting neutral inspection to ports of entry, on prohibition of rotation of troops, and on no interference with or inspection of reconstruction work, all of which the United Nations Delegates refused to accept.

British and U.S. Marines raided the North-East coast and cut the enemy's communications, blowing up a tunnel. MIG-15 fighters were seen as far South as the Seoul area.

General Van Fleet presented the 3rd Battn., Royal Australian Regiment, with the U.S. Presidential unit citation for its part in stopping the enemy at Kapyong in April.

*5th December.*—Discussions at Panmunjom were inconclusive and confined to endeavours to define "ports" of entry and to decide which neutral countries should supervise the truce.

British and U.S. Marines carried out a second raid on the North-East coast. Five MIG-15 fighters were shot down and five damaged. Some 230 MIG-15s were seen during the day.

*6th December.*—The meeting of the armistice sub-committee delegates, in which the U.N. rejected demands for prohibition on rotation of troops and withdrawal from coastal islands North of the cease-fire line, and the enemy a modified programme for truce supervision, was without result.

Allied fighter-bombers attacked enemy field gun and front line positions.

*7th December.*—The U.N. delegates at Panmunjom said that they would discuss withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea as soon as all other armistice questions were disposed of. The enemy opposed a suggestion that a second sub-committee should make arrangements for exchange of prisoners.

*8th and 9th December.*—There was no agreement at Panmunjom. Enemy jet aircraft were seen in large numbers.

*10th December.*—The U.N. delegates demanded an answer by 11th December regarding negotiations for an exchange of prisoners of war. The enemy were insistent in their demands for an answer to their proposals for neutral supervision.

*11th December.*—The enemy delegates agreed that a second sub-committee should be formed to negotiate the exchange of prisoners of war, and this new sub-committee met for the first time. The U.N. delegates insisted that an exchange be made on a fair and equitable basis. At the other sub-committee meeting results were negative.

Allied investigation officers agreed that an attack had been made by a bomber in the Kaesong area, owing to a pilot's error.

*12th December.*—At the Panmunjom meetings the enemy and U.N. members made new proposals, the former with regard to exchange of prisoners and the latter with regard to truce supervision. The latter also offered to withdraw from islands off North Korea within territorial waters.

*13th December.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom. U.S. Sabre jets destroyed 12 enemy MIG-15s.

*14th December.*—The sub-committees met without result. Four enemy aircraft were shot down and three Allied fighters were brought down by ground fire.

*15th December.*—No event of importance took place.

*16th December.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. The doubling of the number of U.S. Sabre jet aircraft in Korea was announced.

*17th December.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom. Two Allied aircraft were destroyed by ground fire. Allied warships bombarded enemy ground forces South and East of Chinnampo.

*18th December.*—The enemy delegates having at last agreed, lists of prisoners of war were exchanged.

*19th December.*—Both sides protested at the compilation of the prisoners of war lists and asked for time to study them. The sub-committee on truce supervision made no progress.

Scattered encounters occurred on the battlefield, mostly in the West. U.N. attacks from sea and air continued.

*20th December.*—No event of importance took place.

*21st December.*—Protests regarding omission of names in prisoner of war lists continued. Allied delegates, as a major concession, offered to quit islands North of the 38th parallel. General Ridgway sent a message to the enemy's Cs.-in-C. asking them to admit Red Cross representatives to their prisoners of war camps.

*22nd December.*—The Allies proposed an immediate exchange of seriously ill and wounded prisoners. On the supervision issue, no progress was made.

The loss of 14 Allied aircraft during the week was reported, 13 due to A.A. fire.

*23rd December.*—The enemy refused to discuss an invitation to go to South Korea and see for themselves that 37,500 men whose names were removed from the U.N. prisoners of war list were in fact South Koreans.

It was reported that 506 U.S. aircraft had been lost and 1,293 U.S. airmen killed so far in the Korean War.

*24th and 26th December.*—General Ridgway was authorized to extend, up to 30 days if necessary, the 30-day period for agreement due to expire on the 27th. The enemy delegates supplied additional lists of prisoners of war which, they said, included those who had died, escaped, had been released, or had been killed by U.N. air raids or artillery fire.

*27th December.*—No extension of the 30-day period was asked for. No further progress was made by the prisoners of war sub-committee. In the supervision sub-committee, the enemy only gave a verbal pledge that they would not expand their air force after a truce was signed, but the U.N. delegates demanded this in writing.

There was some fighting in the East-central sector, in deep snow. Two enemy jet fighters were shot down.

*28th December.*—The meetings of the sub-committees at Panmunjom were fruitless. The enemy delegates again resisted the U.N. refusal to let them build military airfields during an armistice.

The enemy captured hill positions West of Korangpo.

*29th and 30th December.*—The U.N. delegates offered to withdraw their requirement for aerial observation provided the enemy accepted the general principle of mutual supervision without substantive change. They also offered to give up islands behind the enemy lines and to permit the rebuilding of a limited number of airfields.

They asked in return (a) a "freeze" on military build-up, permitting, however, a limited rotation of troops; (b) the restriction to civilian use of airfields rebuilt during a truce; (c) the opening of all main roads and railways throughout Korea to neutral observers.

*31st December.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom. U.N. troops were involved in hard fighting in attempting to recapture the hill positions West of Korangpo. Wonsan was shelled from the sea. British Commonwealth and U.S. warships bombarded enemy defences on the West coast, while carrier aircraft attacked gun positions, buildings, and railways near Chinnampo.

*1st January.*—There was no progress at the meeting on truce supervision. At the prisoners of war meeting, however, the enemy delegates said that they would supply information about U.N. soldiers previously reported missing, and also agreed in principle to a proposal for the repatriation of civilian prisoners.

Enemy aircraft dropped a few bombs on Kimpo airfield and near Inchon during the night.

*2nd January.*—A method of releasing prisoners of war on a man for man basis was proposed by the U.N. delegates.

Two U.S. aircraft were brought down by enemy ground fire.

*3rd January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. The Allies attacked at two points West of Korangpo, and warships and aircraft continued their bombardment of enemy positions and supply centres.

*4th and 5th January.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom.

*6th January.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom. U.S. Sabre jets destroyed five MIGs and damaged ten others. Six U.S. aircraft were reported as lost in the preceding week.

*7th January.*—The deadlock at Panmunjom continued. Two attempts by Allied troops to recapture hill positions in the West were unsuccessful.

*8th January.*—The truce sub-committees made no progress. Fighting continued West of Korangpo.

*9th January.*—At Panmunjom, the enemy delegates accepted all the U.N. conditions except prohibition of building military airfields during an armistice, on which condition the U.N. delegates insisted. There was no progress regarding exchange of prisoners.

Fighting, in which the 1st South Korean Division was involved, continued West of Korangpo.

*10th and 11th January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom.

*12th and 13th January.*—The deadlock at Panmunjom continued. Three Sabre jets were shot down and 13 other Allied aircraft destroyed by ground fire during the week.

*14th January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. A South Korean attack West of Korangpo and another Allied attack to the North-East were repulsed. Enemy positions in the Kansong area were shelled from the sea.

*15th January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. In improved weather, Allied aircraft returned to big-scale attacks on enemy targets.

#### FILM AND COMMENTARY

A Film and Commentary on "The Campaign in Korea" was given by Mr. William Courtenay, O.B.E., M.M., the War and Air Correspondent of the *Daily Graphic*, in the Lecture Theatre of the Royal United Service Institution, on Wednesday, 9th January, 1952.



## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION<sup>1</sup>

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

### UNITED NATIONS

**T**HE disarmament debates held by the United Nations Assembly during its Paris session have not been remarkable for their realism. Which came first, the hen or the egg, is a sane and useful controversy contrasted with the endless discussion as to whether the suggested banning of atomic weapons should precede or follow the creation of a "water-tight" system of inspection and control. After long maintaining that the ban should take precedence, Mr. Vyshinsky suddenly switched to the contrary thesis and, in so doing, was described by delighted commentators as "moving closer to the Western view." In truth, the Russian Foreign Minister and all the other delegates were moving nowhere, except in circles.

The position might be different were the Soviet Union a normal country where foreigners had the right to move about and mix with the population as freely as they may do in Great Britain and the United States. There is in Russia no vestige of such freedom. Every foreigner is vigilantly watched even in Moscow. Outside the city's bounds he is followed wherever he goes. Any idea that he might be able to penetrate into those vast regions administered by the M.V.D. on both sides of the Urals would be about as feasible, at the present time, as a journey to the moon. Thus, a United Nations inspecting team would be shown what the Soviet authorities desired it to be shown, and no more. It would be unlikely to pass within a thousand miles of where the real work was being done, or the main supply of bombs stored.

In Western countries, on the other hand, there are few restrictions on travel and very little chance of keeping secret the actual location of atomic plants, so that, with the aid of Communist fifth columnists, Russian members of an inspectorate would be in no doubt about what they wanted to see. It would indeed be ironic were the West, obeying a United Nations ban, to dump its stock of bombs in the sea while Western inspectors were being led by the M.V.D. to look at "cover" factories in the Ural Mountains! Had the possibility of that kind of situation arisen six or seven years ago, the West might conceivably have acquiesced. Our politicians and political commentators to-day being fortunately much wiser, if sadder, men, there seems little likelihood that such an extravaganza would be staged.

### THE FAR EAST

There is at present much speculation, especially in America, about Communist aims in the Far East. Alarmists have been busily warning the West of Chinese intentions directly to intervene in Indo-China and at other points beyond their own frontiers. Not only is there no evidence of anything of this kind, but such a move would be a violation of the policy which, so far, has paid Moscow and Peking handsome dividends. This policy has been to exploit, by every means short of actual war, the nuisance value of local Communist-inspired and Communist-led rebellions and other disruptive activities.

It would be foolish to ignore the tremendous success which has attended these tactics. France, weakened by all the vicissitudes of the last 12 years, has had to make a major effort to maintain herself in Indo-China, where she still has far to go before she will be able to claim complete mastery of the situation. Great Britain

<sup>1</sup> As deduced from reports up to 31st January.

has been embattled for years against Communist forces in Malaya. Communists have reduced Burma to almost complete chaos. They are in effective control of large areas of Southern India. In Ceylon and Indonesia, they are incessantly at work, perfecting their instruments of sedition. All these things have been achieved without sending into battle one Chinese or one Russian soldier. How foolish Moscow and Peking would be to endanger a position which they must find exceedingly pleasant to contemplate!

In time, no doubt, the lawful authorities in some of these vexed countries will put down actual armed rebellion. As long as Communism coheres in Asia, however, the threat of a renewal of the physical struggle will always exist, and that threat alone must tie down Western forces and cause a drain on Western strength. There seems to be only one means whereby the burden can be lessened, and that is by persuading the peoples of the threatened lands to adopt a less equivocal attitude towards their own defence. How far self-government, or the approach to it, will help in this task of persuasion, remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: it cannot dispense with the need for strong European leadership. Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny, whose untimely death is a grave loss to the Western world, lived long enough to prove that the day of the great Viceroy is not over.

#### KOREA

Only in Korea has there been a variation in Communist policy, and that was not because of a change in strategical principle, but because the policy in that particular area came to grief. The prompt, and no doubt unexpected, military action by the United Nations upset a plan devised in accordance with Moscow's general policy pattern for Asia. The Red axis would have been happy to leave Koreans to fight Koreans. Had their Northern protégés held their own after crossing the 38th parallel, instead of being driven to the Manchurian border, we may be sure that there would have been no Chinese intervention. In such a situation, force in reserve is often more potent than force deployed. The consideration which prompted the Chinese to enter the field was almost certainly the loss of prestige which Communism would have suffered throughout Asia had the West been allowed a complete triumph.

What do the Communists want now that they have, to some extent, redressed the military balance? Their point-by-point haggling at the conference table suggests that, whatever it may be in the future, their chief desire during recent months has been precisely what they have secured—not a truce, but truce talks. For some reason, not yet clear, they have decided to keep the West on tenterhooks. It would be, with submission, unrealistic to attach any great importance to the matters which form the subject of disagreement at these meetings. Their purpose is to protract the period of talking, perhaps not for any local gain, but to conform with the Communist global objective, whatever that may be. In the meantime, it cannot be said that Korea lacks its nuisance value for the East. Mr. Churchill told Congress of the resolute action that would be needed if the truce talks failed. It may come to that. A resounding defeat of the Chinese forces South of the Yalu River would transform the Korean situation and even—though this is less certain—greatly expedite the signing of an armistice.

#### EGYPT

There is little that happens nowadays in international affairs which does not underline the extraordinary nature of the times in which we live. His Britannic Majesty's Government maintains "friendly" relations with Egypt. Yet the award of decorations to the policemen who, losing their heads, opened fire on a British

patrol in Ismailia, encouraged the Egyptians to continue their attacks. Since then, a "liberation army," consisting of thugs and students, has entered the Canal Zone in strength sufficiently menacing to call for the employment of crack British troops, tanks, and artillery. Such a situation could not exist without the active support of the Egyptian Government. The advantages of waging an undeclared war of this kind is that the Power placed on the defensive may be continuously harassed, but is debarred from taking the offensive unless it is prepared to run the risk of being dubbed an aggressor.

Mr. Churchill told the United States Congress that he thought the position would be transformed were even a token international force sent to help the British in the Canal Zone. As a full Commonwealth division is in the Korean battle-line, such reciprocity, one might think, would present no insuperable difficulties. At the time of writing there is no evidence that other countries are anxious to share in this task. If a workable agreement is reached with Aly Maher Pasha their reluctance may redound to Britain's advantage—as well as to the advantage of the Egyptians. Despite periodic commotions, Britain and Egypt have been of inestimable value to each other for at least seventy years.

### FEDERATION IN EUROPE

The antagonism of the German Social Democrats to the terms on which Germany is being asked to participate in a European Army might seem to many people to be a further example of the post-war reversal of the roles of Left and Right. It may be, however, that no Parliamentary opposition in Germany would be able to resist the temptation of making political capital out of the requirements of the Pleven Plan. Dealing with the British attitude towards federation, Mr. Eden told his audience at Columbia University: "This is something we know in our bones we cannot do." Germany's present rulers no doubt feel some kind of compulsion to take part in drawing up blue-prints for a Federal Europe, but, faced with the actual necessity of carrying them out, the German people may decide that this is something which they, too, know in their bones they cannot do.

So insistently has federation been urged upon Western Europe, that the French, German, and Benelux leaders have been impelled to make some kind of response, but they cannot feel happy about the outcome. Not only must federation create more international problems than it solves, but it cannot avoid causing a fundamental political cleavage within each nation. Even should a federal structure be built, it could scarcely withstand the first real internal crisis. That is why many people in Western Europe have begun to urge upon their Governments the desirability of regulating their international relationships on the British model of strong working alliances.

## CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

### THE MEANING OF MILITARY UNIFORMS

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—The report on the lecture on Uniforms of the Army by Mr. James Laver\* was of interest. Mr. Laver points out that any alternative to khaki for ceremonial should be on traditional lines. This was not so in the blue policeman-like kit which he noticed at the Coronation. Nor is the "No. 1 kit" which a Uniforms Committee evolved. Even this uniform the Government, for one reason or another, has held up and failed to issue, except to a comparatively few officers and men. The truth is that scarlet, not blue, is the traditional colour of the backbone of the Army, the County Regiments of the Line!

The cost could be very little more than blue and, if necessary, the jacket or tunic could be of scarlet serge, not cloth, with regimental facings and stand-up collar. An open neck collar is unsoldierly in appearance in a ceremonial or "walking out" kit.

Both from the standpoint of esprit de corps and recruiting for the Regulars, a gradual issue to the troops at home is urgently needed. Swagger canes should be carried once more. It is false economy further to withhold an alternative to the drab and ugly battledress now used for all occasions.

Officers, too, should be able to purchase mess kit free of purchase tax. The Royal Navy and R.A.F. have a mess kit, not so the Army. Field-Marsals and General Officers should have an allowance towards full dress and cocked hats for ceremonial. A decked out blue patrol does not uphold the wearer's rank or the prestige of the Army. Other officers should be allowed to wear full dress on special occasions if they wish to do so. The Guards nearly lost their scarlet—it is understood. The traditional red coat of the Line Regiments should not be cast into the limbo of the past!

RUSSELL V. STEELE,  
Captain, late R.A.M.C.

21st October, 1951.

### MOBILE AIR FORCES

SIR,—I have just read with interest the article on "Mobile Air Forces" by Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst in your August, 1951, number, and as a famous war-time Tactical Air Force has recently been reconstituted, I should like, in the limited space available, to comment upon his remarks on page 459 concerning two ancillary units.

The modern Fuel and Ammunition Park is not called upon, save in most exceptional circumstances, to hold aviation fuel. The vast tonnages of turbine fuel consumed by jet aircraft which are required to be stored and distributed in the field today, bear no relation to what was needed for comparable numbers of piston-engined aircraft in the last war. Therefore all energies are now directed towards providing supplies in bulk; storage and distribution to airfields or forward collecting points by rail, road, canal, or pipeline is the responsibility of the Army, acting in close co-operation with the T.A.F. Headquarters. For these reasons, a modern S. & T. Column has little or no responsibility for the movement of aviation turbine fuel, for gone are the days of "flimsies." The requirement of lubricating oil for a gas-turbine engine is negligible and is therefore carried in Wing transport. It is essential that the Tactical Wing of to-day should be provided with a large number of bowsers, for without them the vital quick turn-round of fighters could never be achieved.

\* See Journal for August, 1951.



The supply of petroleum is perhaps the most complex logistic problem facing a modern Tactical Air Force, but unless a continuous flow can be guaranteed to meet the greatly increased rates of combat consumption of jet aircraft, the force will be tactical in name only.

B. S. CARTMEL,  
*Group Captain.*

25th October, 1951.

### MAGINOILITY

SIR,—As Major Wall and General Martel both accuse me of being "wrong in several points" in my paper on Maginobility\*, I hope you will allow me to reply.

General Martel does not say where I went wrong, but Major Wall lists five points. These can, I suggest, be reduced to the following three:—

(i) I said that the ground was favourable for tank action. Major Wall says it was not, because the St. Quentin canal "crossed the whole front . . . 500–5,000 tanks would have made no difference, not one could have crossed the obstacle, which was unjumpable."

(ii) I said that "not all of our tanks had broken down or been knocked out on the first day." Major Wall says that "we had a hard job to find one fit to move."

(iii) I said that the "Germans at this time had no anti-tank weapons." Major Wall says that the Germans made "devastating shooting with field guns."

As to the first point, both Earl Haig's despatches and the official history of the Cambrai operations say that after the break-through on 20th November, the intention was to advance northwards and to roll up the German line. It was not necessary to cross the canal to do this. The canal did not cross this part of the front. That the ground was favourable is shown by the statement in the official history (p. 288) that "once the advance had cleared the elaborate trench systems . . . the pace of the tanks much exceeded that of the infantry."

As to the second point, the official history records that 476 tanks were present on the Cambrai battlefield. Of these 378 were "fighting" tanks, though not quite all of these went into action on 20th November. The losses on that day are given as 65 knocked out by direct hits, 71 by mechanical troubles, and 43 by ditching and other causes (p. 90). There were therefore nearly 200 tanks available on 21st November, and probably more on the following day.

As to the third point, the Germans at this time had no special anti-tank weapons other than armour-piercing bullets. Their field artillery could, and certainly did, engage the tanks with success, but the Germans had lost much of the field artillery on the 20th. The proportion of guns to tanks on 21st November must have been much the same as on the previous day. Why then did they shoot so much better on the 21st?

It may be added that the explanation offered in the official history for the failure of the tanks after 20th November is that the co-operation between the infantry and the tanks was bad. Perhaps it was, but was it any better on 20th November, when everything went well? After a day's practice, and after capturing most of the German fortifications, it ought to have been easier on the 21st.

"F.S.B."

2nd December, 1951.

(This correspondence is now closed—EDITOR.)

### THE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

SIR,—Only a bold man will challenge Professor H. A. Smith, for whom my respect is high, on a question of international law, but I venture to point out that he is in error when he states in his article, "The Defence of Superior Orders," in your JOURNAL for November, that Russia "has not accepted the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925." It is true that she did not sign (or ratify) that agreement but she did accede to it; my authority

\* See JOURNAL for May, 1951.

is the list of parties to it given in the *Manual of Military Law*, Chapter XIV, as revised in 1936. His further statement that in a war with Russia all the belligerents are entirely free to use the methods prohibited in 1925 is therefore questionable. The matter is one of practical importance.

10th December, 1951.

J. M. SPAIGHT.

SIR,—I have no doubt that Dr. Spaight, as usual, is perfectly right. My mistake may be explained, though perhaps not excused, by saying that in the South of France I have no access to libraries and I relied upon an earlier edition of the *Manual*.

This correction being accepted, the legal situation is still obscure and we cannot feel that we have any real security against the resumption of gas and bacteriological warfare. Great Britain, followed by other States, has ratified the Geneva Protocol (1930) with the reservation (a) that it is binding only in relation to States effectively bound by it, and (b) that it ceases to be binding if the enemy or his allies fail to observe the prohibitions. This means, in effect, that all the belligerents must be fully prepared for the sudden resumption of gas warfare. It will be remembered that in 1935 the Italians resorted to gas in "reprisal" for alleged atrocities committed by the Ethiopians.

If H.M. Government, rightly or wrongly, should decide that we were justified in resorting to the use of gas, the enemy would doubtless consider this to be a "war crime," and all the officers concerned would be held personally responsible.

The United States were not an original party to the Protocol, and without access to references I cannot say whether they have subsequently acceded.

16th December, 1951.

H. A. SMITH.

#### SHOOTING IN THE ARMY

SIR,—May I venture a few comments on Lieut.-Colonel Tregear's article\* which everyone interested in good shooting will welcome?

It is good shooting with the rifle that is so important, for it is a fact that, once a man can shoot well with his rifle, he will readily become a good shot with other weapons. The converse, however, is not true. I think that bad shooting is largely due to the fact that men are rarely thoroughly and properly taught initially. Insufficient time is devoted to the subject and the best use is not always made of the time available.

I contend the technical business of learning to shoot must be entirely divorced from fieldcraft. It is essential to concentrate on the essentials and cut out frills. There are three basic essentials to good shooting—holding, aiming, and trigger operation (not "pressing")—which cannot be mastered in a few 40 minute periods. These subjects must be given in short periods of ten, 15, or 20 minutes and spread over a duration of several weeks. Other essential subjects must be taught—the firing of the shot, the use of a rest (not the use of cover), the elevation tables, the build-up to snapshooting, etc. Unless and until these have been mastered frills should be cut out. There is *no short cut* to the business of learning to shoot.

Shooting is not a subject that can be mastered and then put aside. Even when men are trained, constant regular practice is necessary to keep hand and eye in. Partly, this can be done with .22, but an excellent way is the carrying out of a "daily ten minutes," at which every manjack, with no exception whatever, turns out.

The ideal to be aimed at is when every man, from the C.O. downwards, can be trusted to turn out on his own, or with his comrade, and practise what he most needs—the rock steady hold, the instant operation of the trigger once this hold is achieved and the aim is correct, and so forth. This happy state of affairs was certainly achieved by one unit before the war.

The standard of coaching is deplorable, because it is seldom taught. A series of lecture demonstrations should be given by an expert in the miniature range during winter

\* See Journal for November, 1951.

months to all officers, n.c.o.s, and selected privates. These should comprise the examination and "tuning up" of the rifle, zeroing, the minute of angle elevation table, demonstrations of coaching in grouping and application practices, and problems set in the form of "spotted shoots." These are all essential subjects of which a coach must have a thorough knowledge. Thus the theory of the art of coaching will be learned and practical experience only will be required. But the coach who has been thoroughly versed in the above will hardly be a bad coach, even in his first practical attempts on the range.

I do not consider thirty yards ranges are of great value, they are usually noisy, dirty, dusty, firing points are cramped and uncomfortable, light values differ from the open range, etc. The ideal conditions so necessary for teaching shooting are sadly lacking. It is usually preferable, after plenty of miniature range work, to carry out all .303 shooting on the open range.

I consider most Tests of Elementary Training a sheer waste of time. For example, aims laid approximate to the centre of a figure target, handicapped by the "abortion" of the official rest, are hardly a test of accurate aiming. The groups men fire in the miniature range provide most of the answers required, and far better ones too. Handling ability, loading, etc., can be quickly assessed by a good instructor on the open range.

In general, far more appreciation should be given to the fact that shooting is not only a primary duty of a soldier, but is also an excellent and fascinating sport. This aspect offers tremendous scope.

Finally, I must stress the need for keenness and enthusiasm, which must come from the top. That means it must come from the General Staff.

May I also point out the advent of an automatic rifle (self-loader is the term I prefer) will not do away with mastering the basic essentials—holding, aiming, trigger operation.

G. E. THORNTON,

*Lieut.-Colonel (retired) late Royal Sussex Regiment  
and Small Arms Schools.*

6th January, 1952.

#### NAVY NOTES

SIR,—With reference to Commander Pitt Palmer's letter of 2nd September, 1951,\* you may be interested to have the facts about the two appointments to Instructor Rear-Admiral that have so far been made.

Instructor Rear-Admiral Sir Arthur Hall was granted the rank of Instructor Rear-Admiral on a personal basis while holding the appointment of Director of the Education Department on 19th January, 1941. It was not, however, until the Order in Council of 31st May, 1951, that the rank of Instructor Rear-Admiral was authorized for the Head of the Instructor Branch as part of the Branch's establishment. Instructor Captain W. A. Bishop was consequently promoted as from 30th March, 1951. The title of "Director of the Education Department" was changed to "Director of the Naval Education Service" on 11th May, 1951.

W. A. BISHOP,

*Instructor Rear-Admiral,*

*Director of the Naval Education Service.*

16th January, 1952.

---

\* See Journal for November, 1951, page 641.

## GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

### NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

**EXTENSION OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.**—As a result of the decision taken at Ottawa to admit Greece and Turkey to membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Council Deputies, meeting in London on 22nd October, signed a protocol extending the area covered by the original Atlantic Pact so as to include European Turkey, as well as the whole Mediterranean Sea. A communiqué announced that the protocol would be submitted to the 12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Governments for ratification and that, after such ratification, the United States Government, on behalf of all the member Governments, would formally invite Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

**COMMAND APPOINTMENTS.**—On 1st November, it was announced by S.H.A.P.E. that General René Bertrand, of the French Army, would serve as assistant to Admiral Carney in the Southern Zone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Command.

On 28th November, it was announced that Vice-Admiral Léon-Marie Sala, C.-in-C. of French Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, had been appointed Allied Naval Commander in the Western Mediterranean.

The latter announcement stated that it had been agreed to set up a naval command area in the Western Mediterranean under a French Admiral, within the framework of the Naval Command of General Eisenhower's southern flank, and that another command for an area covering the sea approaches to Italy, under an Italian Admiral, was contemplated. The appointment of Vice-Admiral Girosi, of the Italian Navy, was reported later. It was pointed out by a spokesman at S.H.A.P.E. that both these admirals would be subordinate commanders under Admiral Carney in his two-fold capacity of C.-in-C. Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and C.-in-C. Naval Forces allocated to General Eisenhower in Southern Europe.

**DEFENCE COLLEGE.**—The North Atlantic Treaty Defence College in France was opened on 19th November in the presence of General Eisenhower, M. Bidault, French Minister of State in charge of Defence, and Vice-Admiral Lemonnier, of the French Navy, who is the first Commandant.

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

The following were selected to attend the 1952 course, which started in January :—

**ROYAL NAVY.**—Captain H. C. Browne, C.B.E., D.S.O. ; Captain D. P. Dreyer, D.S.C. ; Captain R. C. M. Duckworth, C.B.E. ; Captain R. A. Ewing, D.S.C. ; Captain(E) J. G. C. Given, C.B.E. ; Captain E. D. G. Lewin, D.S.O., D.S.C. ; Captain R. I. A. Sarell, D.S.O. ; Captain R. H. Wright, D.S.C.

**ARMY.**—Brigadier T. B. L. Churchill, C.B.E., M.C. ; Brigadier K. G. Exham, D.S.O., A.D.C. ; Brigadier R. C. M. King, D.S.O., O.B.E. ; Colonel R. E. Lloyd, D.S.O., O.B.E. ; Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. McNeill, M.B.E. ; Brigadier M. S. K. Maunsell, C.B.E., D.S.O. ; Brigadier F. G. A. Parsons, O.B.E. ; Colonel D. W. Price, C.B.E., B.A. ; Colonel A. R. Purches, O.B.E., A.M.I.Mech.E. ; Brigadier G. D. Renny, D.S.O. ; Brigadier G. A. Thomas, O.B.E.

**ROYAL AIR FORCE.**—Air Commodore J. D. Baker-Carr, C.B.E., A.F.C. ; Air Commodore D. H. F. Barnett, C.B.E., D.F.C. ; Group Captain C. Broughton, C.B.E. ; Group Captain E. S. Butler, O.B.E. ; Group Captain R. C. M. Collard, D.S.O., D.F.C. ; Air Commodore T. C. Dickens, C.B.E. ; Group Captain M. L. Heath, O.B.E. ; Group Captain H. H. Hilliar, C.B.E. ; Group Captain W. C. Sheen, D.S.O., O.B.E.

**CANADA.**—Colonel F. A. Clift, D.S.O., E.D. ; Air Commodore M. M. Hendrick, O.B.E., C.D., R.C.A.F. ; Group Captain J. G. Stephenson, O.B.E., A.F.C., C.D., R.C.A.F. ; Dr. O. E. Ault, Canadian Civil Service Commission.



**AUSTRALIA.**—Captain W. H. Harrington, D.S.O., R.A.N.; Colonel J. G. N. Wilton, D.S.O., O.B.E., A.M.F.; Group Captain W. H. Garing, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.A.F.; Mr. H. K. H. Cook, Department of Commerce and Agriculture.

**NEW ZEALAND.**—Colonel L. W. Thornton, O.B.E.; Mr. R. V. J. Johnson, N.Z. Treasury.

**INDIA.**—Brigadier D. Som-Dutt, Indian Army; Mr. H. C. Sarin, Indian Civil Service.

**PAKISTAN.**—Major-General M. Hayaud Din, M.B.E., M.C.; Mr. M. A. Husain, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**CIVIL SERVICE (FOREIGN SERVICE).**—Mr. J. S. H. Shattock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Counsellor; Mr. D. J. Cheke, M.A., First Secretary.

**CIVIL SERVICE (COLONIAL SERVICE).**—Mr. E. W. M. Magor, M.B.E., Assistant Secretary, Secretariat, Kenya.

**HOME CIVIL SERVICE (ADMINISTRATORS).**—Mr. F. C. Herd, Assistant Secretary, Admiralty; Mr. G. S. Whittuck, Assistant Secretary, Air Ministry; Mr. G. W. Tory, Counsellor, Commonwealth Relations Office; Mr. G. R. Downes, Assistant Secretary, Post Office; Mr. N. V. Meeres, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Supply; Mr. M. M. V. Custance, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Transport; Mr. I. Montgomery, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

**HOME CIVIL SERVICE (SCIENTISTS).**—Mr. D. J. Garrard, Principal Scientific Officer, Ministry of Defence; Mr. B. V. Williams, Senior Principal Scientific Officer, Ministry of Supply.

**UNITED STATES.**—Colonel E. D. Peddicord, U.S. Army; Colonel James P. Hannigan, U.S. Army; Colonel Orin H. Rigley, Jnr. U.S.A.F.; Mr. Robert Graham Miner, State Department Promotion Board.

#### HOME GUARD

The Home Guard Bill, implementing the Government's intention of re-establishing the Home Guard as announced in the late King's Speech at the opening of the new Parliament, was enacted on 7th December, 1951.

#### DESPATCHES

A Despatch submitted to the Secretary of State for Air in September, 1946, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Guy Garrod, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean and Middle East, and Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Forces, in connection with the part played by the Allied Air Forces in the final defeat of the enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre, March to May, 1945, was published on 29th October as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 23rd October, 1951.

### DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

#### AUSTRALIA

**DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF RECRUITING.**—Lieut-General Sir Horace Robertson, K.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed Director-General of Recruiting.

**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, B.C.O.F.**—Lieut-General W. Bridgeford, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., has been appointed C.-in-C., British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan.

#### SOUTH AFRICA

##### SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES

An agreement between South Africa and the United States for the supply of American military equipment to the Union was announced in Pretoria on 10th November, 1951. The Union had previously stated that, in the event of war, it would side with the anti-Communist Powers against Communism in the defence of Africa, and it had been declared

eligible to receive reimbursable military assistance from the United States under the amended Mutual Defence Assistance Act.

### MALAYA

#### HIGH COMMISSIONER

It was announced on 15th January that General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer had been appointed High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya. In addition to the normal civil responsibilities of his office, he will direct all military and police operations, and for the period of the emergency only it is proposed to appoint a Deputy High Commissioner to relieve the High Commissioner of the detailed work of administration.

General Sir Rob Lockhart, who succeeded Lieut-General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations in November, will become Deputy Director when General Sir Gerald Templer arrives.

### FOREIGN

#### KOREA

For a diary of the war in Korea see page 99.

### NETHERLANDS

#### PARTICIPATION IN THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN ARMY

It was announced in The Hague on 8th October that the Netherlands Government had decided to participate as a full member in the negotiations for the creation of a European Army, and that it would take part in future discussions on the same footing as Belgium, France, Western Germany, Italy and Luxemburg. The Netherlands had previously been represented only by an observer.

### SIAM

#### MILITARY COUP

A military *coup d'état* was carried out in Bangkok on 29th November—three days before the return from Europe of King Rama IX—by a group of senior Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, who overthrew the Government, dissolved Parliament, and appointed a Provisional Executive Council consisting of General Phin Chunhawan, C-in-C. of the Army, two other generals, three admirals, and three air-marshals, including the C-in-C. of the Air Force. They gave as the reason for their action the Government's failure to suppress corruption and to solve the problem of Communism, which, they alleged, had widely penetrated the Cabinet and Parliament.

On 6th December, the King signed a proclamation approving the restoration of the 1932 Constitution (under which half the members of the People's Assembly were elected and half appointed by the King on the Government's advice), subject to amendments by the National Assembly, and reappointing Marshal Songgram as Prime Minister with power to form a Cabinet. The strong military influence in the new Government was not only reflected by the appointment of General Phin Chunhawan as Deputy Premier, but also by the appointment of senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers to the portfolios of Communications, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Education.

### SPAIN

#### ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The creation of an Atomic Energy Commission under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, General Juan Vigon, was announced by the Spanish Government on 24th October, 1951.

**TIBET****CHINESE TROOPS ENTER LHASA**

It has been reported from Kalimpong, on the Indo-Tibetan frontier, that Chinese Communist forces entered Lhasa in September and established their headquarters in the eastern suburbs.

**UNITED STATES**

**TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY.**—A proclamation formally ending the state of war between the United States and Germany was signed by President Truman on 24th October. A Congressional resolution to that effect had been adopted by the House of Representatives on 27th July and by the Senate on 18th October.

**TROOPS TAKE PART IN ATOM BOMB TEST.**—On 1st November, United States troops for the first time took part in one of the atom bomb tests in the Nevada Desert where experiments are being carried out to determine how nuclear detonations can be employed in tactical military operations. The participation of combat and service troops and a large number of observers representing the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps involved observation of the detonation, observation of the effects on test items and equipment, and observation of psychological and physiological reactions.

**YUGOSLAVIA****UNITED STATES MILITARY AID AGREEMENT**

On 14th November, 1951, an agreement was signed in Belgrade under which the United States agreed to furnish military aid to Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Act, whilst Yugoslavia, in addition to agreeing to apply this aid for the furtherance of the purposes of the United Nations Charter, agreed to facilitate the production and export of raw and semi-finished materials required by the United States.

---

**MEMORIAL TO THE LATE FIELD-MARSHAL LORD BIRDWOOD**

The death of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood made many of his friends and admirers feel that there should be a Memorial to his name, preferably in London.

They also felt that such a Memorial should be a practical one and that it would be incomplete unless an opportunity to support was given to all those with whom his activities and services had been associated, particularly in Australia, New Zealand, etc.

A strong Appeals Committee has assembled under the Chairmanship of Lord Halifax, and including distinguished representation of the old Indian Army, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, etc. This Committee unanimously decided that a Memorial the late Field-Marshal would greatly have appreciated would be the endowment of bedrooms in the Victory (Ex-Services) Club which has, already, 400 Indian Army members, 275 Australian and 50 New Zealand Ex-Service members. This idea has the full support of the present Lord Birdwood.

Donations—large or small—should be sent to the "Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood Memorial Fund", c/o The Earl of Halifax, 73, Seymour Street, London, W.2.

## NAVY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI

**AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE LATE KING.**—The following officers were appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to the late King from the dates stated :—

Captain (S) J. A. Hussey, O.B.E., R.N., in place of Captain (S) E. D. T. Churcher, C.B.E., R.N., placed on the Retired List (20th October, 1951).

Commodore H. R. Lane, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., to be a Royal Naval Reserve Aide-de-Camp, in succession to Captain W. B. Tanner, R.D., R.N.R. (9th December, 1951).

**APPOINTED HONORARY CHAPLAIN TO THE LATE KING.**—The Rev. J. C. Waters, O.B.E., R.N., in succession to the Rev. E. G. M. Crocker, R.N., placed on the Retired List (11th October, 1951).

**APPOINTED HONORARY PHYSICIANS TO THE LATE KING.**—Surgeon Captain M. Brown, R.N., and Surgeon Captain J. H. B. Crosbie, R.N. (7th November and 30th October, 1951, respectively).

---

#### BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

The late King was pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, bearing date the 5th day of November, 1951, to appoint the following to be Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom :—

Right Hon. James Purdon Lewes Thomas.

Admiral of the Fleet Bruce Austin, Baron Fraser of North Cape, G.C.B., K.B.E.

Vice-Admiral Alexander C. G. Madden, C.B., C.B.E.

Vice-Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Vice-Admiral the Right Hon. Louis F. A. V. N., Earl Mountbatten of Burma,

K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O.

Vice-Admiral Edmund W. Anstice, C.B.

Vice-Admiral Guy Grantham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Rear-Admiral Edward M. Evans-Lombe, C.B.

Commander Allan H. P. Noble, D.S.O., D.S.C.

Kenelm S. D. Wingfield Digby, Esq.

Sir John Gerald Lang, K.C.B.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas succeeded Lord Pakenham as First Lord ; Commander Noble, Lieutenant L. J. Callaghan as Parliamentary and Financial Secretary ; and Mr. Wingfield Digby, Mr. W. J. Edwards as Civil Lord, on the change of Government.

On 20th December, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, G.C.B., D.S.O., assumed the duties of First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff in succession to Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser.

#### HONOURS AND AWARDS

##### NEW YEAR HONOURS

The following were included in the New Year Honours List :—

**G.C.B.**—Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

**K.C.B.**—Vice-Admiral Maurice J. Mansergh, C.B., C.B.E. ; Vice-Admiral (E) the Hon. Denis Crichton Maxwell, C.B., C.B.E.



**C.B.**—Rear-Admiral P. G. L. Cazalet, D.S.O., D.S.C.; Rear-Admiral J. H. F. Crombie, D.S.O.; Rear-Admiral W. W. Davis, D.S.O.; Surgeon Rear-Admiral F. G. Hunt, C.B.E., K.H.P.; Rear-Admiral St. J. A. Micklethwait, D.S.O.; Rear-Admiral (E) G. C. Ross, C.B.E.; Rear-Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, D.S.O.; Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B.E., R.M.

**C.B. (Civil).**—P. N. N. Synnott, Under-Secretary, Admiralty.

**D.B.E.**—Commandant Mary Kathleen Lloyd, O.B.E., Hon. A.D.C., Director, Women's Royal Naval Service.

**K.B.E.**—Vice-Admiral Philip K. Enright, C.B., C.B.E.

#### FLAG APPOINTMENTS

**HOME FLEET.**—Rear-Admiral W. G. A. Robson, D.S.O., D.S.C., was in October appointed Flag Officer (Flotillas) Home Fleet, to take effect in December, 1951. With the appointment of Flag Officer (Flotillas) Home Fleet (short title F.O.F.H.) the appointment of Flag Officer Commanding 2nd Cruiser Squadron lapsed. Cruisers of the Home Fleet, other than the flagship of the Flag Officer (Flotillas) Home Fleet, H.M.S. *Superb*, were added to the command of the Flag Officer Commanding 3rd Aircraft Carrier Squadron, who then became known as Flag Officer Heavy Squadron, Home Fleet (short title, F.O.H.S.).

**ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE.**—Vice-Admiral C. A. L. Mansergh, C.B., D.S.C., is to be President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in succession to Admiral Sir Harold R. G. Kinahan, K.B.E., C.B., the appointment to take effect in March, 1952.

**FLAG OFFICER MALAYA.**—It was announced on 22nd November that Captain A. F. Pugsley, C.B., D.S.O., was to be granted the acting rank of Rear-Admiral and appointed Flag Officer Malaya and Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Singapore, in succession to Rear-Admiral H. W. Faulkner, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to take effect in December. Rear-Admiral Faulkner was invalided home. Captain Pugsley was promoted to Rear-Admiral from 8th January, 1952.

**ASSISTANT TO D.C.N.S.**—Rear-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed to be Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, from January, 1952.

**IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE.**—Rear-Admiral S. H. Carlill, D.S.O., has been appointed to be Senior Naval Member of the Directing Staff of the Imperial Defence College, in succession to Rear-Admiral R. M. J. Hutton, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in April, 1952.

**MIDDLE EAST.**—Rear-Admiral G. H. Stokes, C.B., D.S.C., has been appointed to be Senior British Naval Officer and Flag Officer (Liaison) Middle East, in succession to Rear-Admiral I. M. R. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in March, 1952.

**MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.**—Rear-Admiral G. F. Burghard, D.S.O., has been lent to the Ministry of Supply as Deputy Controller of Electronics, from January, 1952.

#### PROMOTION AND RETIREMENTS

The following were announced with effect from 15th October, 1951 :—

Vice-Admiral Sir Angus E. M. B. Cunninghame-Graham, K.B.E., C.B., to be placed on the Retired List.

Acting Vice-Admiral C. T. M. Pizey, C.B., D.S.O., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet and reappointed.

The following was announced in *The London Gazette* on 30th November :—

Rear-Admiral (L) S. L. Bateson retires (23rd December, 1951).

The following were announced in *The London Gazette* on 23rd October and 1st January respectively :—

Surgeon Rear-Admiral L. F. Strugnell, C.B., retires (8th November, 1951) ; Surgeon Rear-Admiral W. J. Colbourne, C.B., retires (30th October, 1951).

#### HALF-YEARLY LISTS

The Admiralty announced the following promotions and retirements to date 8th January, 1952 :—

To be promoted Rear-Admiral in H.M. Fleet :—

Captain Stephen Hope Carlill, D.S.O., A.D.C.  
 Captain Jocelyn S. C. Salter, D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C.  
 Captain Graham H. Stokes, C.B., D.S.C., A.D.C.  
 Captain Geoffrey F. Burghard, D.S.O., A.D.C.  
 Captain Maxwell Richmond, D.S.O., O.B.E.  
 Captain (Acting Rear-Admiral) Anthony F. Pugsley, C.B., D.S.O.  
 Captain (Commodore 2nd Class) Gerald V. Gladstone.

To be placed on the Retired List in the rank of Captain :—

Captain Arthur F. St. G. Orpen, O.B.E., D.S.C., A.D.C.  
 Captain Reginald F. Nichols, A.D.C.  
 Captain Thomas A. C. Pakenham, A.D.C.  
 Captain Henry B. Ellison, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.  
 Captain Derrick H. Hall-Thompson.  
 Captain George F. Renwick.  
 Captain Gilbert R. Waymouth, C.B.E.  
 Captain John G. Hewitt, D.S.O.

All the Rear-Admirals are reappointed on promotion.

Captain A. F. St. G. Orpen is recalled to the Active List and reappointed in his present appointment to serve in the rank of Captain, R.N. (Retired).

The following promotions were announced to date from 31st December, 1951 :—

*Commander to Captain.*—M. J. Ross, D.S.C. ; M. F. Andrew, O.B.E. ; H. N. C. Willmott, D.S.O., D.S.C. ; R. W. F. Northcott, D.S.O. ; R. Whinney, D.S.C. ; K. Williamson, D.S.O. ; J. Howson, D.S.C. (Acting Captain) ; M. L. Hardie, D.S.C. ; G. F. M. Best ; B. C. Durant, D.S.C. ; P. J. Cowell, D.S.C. ; A. D. Robin, D.S.C. (Acting Captain) ; A. J. T. Roe, D.S.O., O.B.E. ; R. E. N. Kearney, O.B.E. ; O. G. Cameron, D.S.C. ; R. F. T. Stannard, O.B.E., D.S.C. ; H. S. Mackenzie, D.S.O., D.S.C. ; I. W. T. Beloe, D.S.C. ; J. P. Scatchard, D.S.C. ; R. E. Hutchins, D.S.C.

*Commander (E) to Captain (E).*—C. G. Webley, O.B.E. ; C. G. Gosling, O.B.E. ; D. F. H. Chandler, O.B.E., D.S.C. ; A. Kirkconnel, O.B.E. ; R. R. Shorto, D.S.C. (Acting Captain (E)).

*Commander (L) to Captain (L).*—G. R. B. Pattison ; G. C. F. Whitaker.

*Instructor Commander to Instructor Captain.*—A. W. Turvey.

*Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.*—E. W. Bingham, O.B.E. ; W. R. S. Panckridge.

*Surgeon Commander (D) to Surgeon Captain (D).*—E. R. Longhurst.

*Commander (S) to Captain (S).*—H. C. Lockyer ; H. R. Harold, O.B.E. ; N. E. Denning, O.B.E. ; R. W. Jones ; H. M. S. Strachan-White, O.B.E.

## EXERCISES AND CRUISES

**N.A.T.O. EXERCISE.**—The first in a large programme of naval exercises, in which Powers associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will participate in 1952, was arranged to take place late in January off the East Coast. A combined force of British, French, and Netherlands minesweepers was to proceed to sea from Harwich to sweep exercise mines laid by aircraft of the R.A.F. Bomber Command operating from the R.A.F. Station at Upwood. Fast patrol boats from Felixstowe were also to lay mines. Similar exercises will be held during the Summer months, including some organized for the training of officers and men of the Reserves.

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—British and French naval forces met at St. Raphael and Golfe Juan for a combined exercise known as "Symphonie Deux" which lasted for two weeks in October. The Allied fleet consisted of 49 ships, including two aircraft carriers (one of the Royal Canadian Navy), three cruisers, 21 destroyers and frigates (one of the Royal Canadian Navy), ten submarines, and ten minesweepers. In addition, about 100 aircraft of the Royal Navy, the French Naval Air Arm, and the French Air Force took part. Vice-Admiral Pothuau, Commander of the French Naval Squadron, directed the exercise and British units of the Mediterranean Fleet were under the command of Vice-Admiral P. B. R. W. William-Powlett.

**SUEZ CANAL ZONE.**—On the conclusion of the second Summer cruise of the Mediterranean Fleet on 17th October, units of the Fleet were re-disposed to deal with the situation in Egypt. The cruiser *Gambia*, on her way to the East Indies to relieve the *Mauritius*, was halted at Port Said and was later joined by the destroyers *Chequers* and *Chevron*. The cruiser *Liverpool* and fast minelayer *Manxman* also left Malta. Four destroyers from the 4th Flotilla, Home Fleet, the *Aigincourt*, *Aisne*, *Corunna*, and *Julland*, were temporarily attached to the Mediterranean Fleet in view of its commitments and because the destroyers *Saintes* and *Armada* were due home to recommission in December. The aircraft carrier *Triumph* left Portsmouth on 5th November with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, for Port Said, returning to Portsmouth on 22nd November. The cruiser *Cleopatra* arrived at Malta from the United Kingdom on 29th November to join the 1st Cruiser Squadron, Mediterranean; and the *Glasgow* arrived on 17th December, bringing the squadron to its full strength of four cruisers.

From mid-October, officers and men of the Royal Navy assumed responsibility for the handling, berthing, and unberthing of ships in the Canal Zone. Up to the end of December they had assisted some 2,600 ships, representing 16,000,000 tons of shipping of 23 nations. On the return of the *Gambia* to Malta after five weeks in the Canal Zone, she was complimented on her good work in a personal message from the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill.

**EAST INDIES.**—The cruiser *Mauritius* returned to Chatham on 18th December under the command of Captain A. H. Wallis, who commanded the naval forces in the Shatt-el-Arab during the Abadan crisis, and who has been succeeded as Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, by Captain T. E. Podger, previously in command of the cruiser *Kenya*. The tank landing ship *Suvla* returned to Portsmouth in December from the Persian Gulf. On her way home the 1st Royal Marine Assault Flotilla, consisting of six L.C.A.'s, was disembarked at Port Said to help provide harbour services for maintaining the flow of ships through the Suez Canal. The survey vessel *Owen* left Portland on 29th October for the Persian Gulf to join the survey vessel *Dalrymple* in hydrographic duties to improve the charts of the Gulf, especially of the Trucial Coast in the South, where there is a large number of small islands, shoals and reefs.

**FAR EAST.**—The aircraft carrier *Glory*, after being replaced in Korean waters by the Australian carrier *Sydney*, arrived at Sydney on 23rd October for rest and refit until December. The frigate *Black Swan* returned to Devonport in December after more than six years in the Far East. The aircraft carrier *Warrior* returned to Portsmouth in December from a trooping voyage to the Far East. The aircraft carrier *Vengeance* was ordered to leave England in mid-January for a similar voyage, taking aircraft, stores, and personnel.

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.—The new Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes, paid official visits to Washington and Ottawa, arriving with his flagship the *Sheffield* at Norfolk, Virginia, on 23rd November, and proceeding from Washington to Ottawa on 4th December. The frigate *Burghead Bay* arrived on 4th January at the Argentine port of La Plata, 35 miles South-East of Buenos Aires, on a courtesy visit.

SOUTH ATLANTIC.—The most extensive combined exercises in South African waters since the war were concluded in October under the operational command of Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Packer, Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic. The cruiser *Bermuda* and frigates *Nereide* and *Actaeon* co-operated with the South African ships *Jan Van Riebeeck*, *Bloemfontein*, *Transvaal*, and *Pietermaritzburg* in anti-submarine operations, replenishments at sea, surface and anti-aircraft firings, torpedo firings, and minesweeping exercises. During a visit of the Commander-in-Chief in the *Bermuda* to Dakar in November, opportunity was taken to carry out combined naval and air reconnaissance and anti-submarine exercises at sea with the French Naval Air Squadron which forms part of the forces in French West Africa.

#### PERSONNEL

MINE WATCHING SERVICE.—During a debate on Defence in the House of Commons on 6th December, the Prime Minister announced that the Government had decided to set up and begin the recruitment in 1952 of a Royal Naval Mine Watching Organization. Details of the new Service were announced by the First Lord at a Press Conference at the Admiralty on 11th January.

ENTRY TO DARTMOUTH.—On 14th November, the First Lord stated in the House of Commons that the Admiralty had begun a review of the system of entry of cadets into the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, which had been operating for three years. It is not likely that he will be able to announce the completion of the review for some time.

#### MATERIEL

H.M.S. *EAGLE*.—The new aircraft carrier *Eagle* began her trials from Belfast at the end of October. The first flight from the ship took place in the Portsmouth area on 3rd December. The *Eagle* has an overall length of 803½ feet and a beam of 112½ feet. Her full peace-time complement will be 2,000 officers and men. The armament includes sixteen 4.5 inch guns in twin turrets and numerous multiple and single 40-mm. Bofors guns.

AFFRAY SALVAGE ABANDONED.—On 14th November, the First Lord announced in the House of Commons that no further operations would be carried out by the Navy on the wreck of the submarine *Affray*. In a lengthy statement on the reasons for this decision, Mr. Thomas said there was insufficient evidence to enable him to say with certainty why the *Affray* was lost. Whatever the cause of the disaster, it is clear from the survey of her hull that no attempt at escape was made and that the end came swiftly.

TERMINOLOGY.—On 4th January, the Admiralty announced that to facilitate communications between the various naval forces of the N.A.T.O. member countries, it has been found necessary to introduce a standard nomenclature, and in future small formations of any type of ship, whether they be aircraft carriers, submarines, coastal forces, etc., will be known as squadrons. Two or more squadrons of destroyers or smaller types may be grouped together to form a flotilla. A squadron or flotilla may include any additional ships assigned as flagship or tenders.

#### NAVAL AVIATION

NEW CATAPULT.—A high performance catapult capable of launching the most modern carrier-borne aircraft is being developed by the Admiralty. A prototype was built in the light fleet carrier *Perseus* in 1949. During 1950-51, highly satisfactory preliminary trials



took place in home waters, indicating that the catapult is likely to be among the most important developments in naval aviation since the 1939-45 War. To continue trials with the co-operation of the U.S. Navy and to enable American aviation experts to assess the potentialities of the new catapult, H.M.S. *Perseus* left at the end of December for Philadelphia and Norfolk, Virginia. During a visit of six weeks she was to launch U.S. naval aircraft of different weights and performances. The catapult uses the principle of the slotted cylinder and has no rams or hydraulic purchases. The inventor of the slotted cylinder catapult is an R.N.V.R. officer, Commander (E) C. C. Mitchell, O.B.E., of Messrs. Brown Brothers and Company, Limited, Edinburgh, who have designed and built the catapult in the *Perseus*.

**U.S. SKYRAIDER AIRCRAFT.**—The first shipment of Skyraider aircraft to be given to the Royal Navy by the United States under the Military Aid Programme arrived at Glasgow at the beginning of November in the s.s. *American Clipper*. This initial delivery consisted of four aircraft, but a "very substantial number" is to be made available. The Skyraider is the American standard strike aircraft modified for long range purposes. Equipped with search radar, it will primarily be used in anti-submarine operations. The first four aircraft were formally handed over by Rear-Admiral W. F. Boone, U.S.N., Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic, at a ceremony at the King George V Dock at Glasgow on 10th November, and received by the Flag Officer Flying Training, Rear-Admiral W. T. Couchman, D.S.O., O.B.E., in the presence of the Rear-Admiral Reserve Aircraft, Rear-Admiral (E) Sir William S. Jameson, K.B.E., C.B.

### ROYAL MARINES

**COMMANDANT GENERAL.**—It was announced on 1st November, 1951, that Major-General H. T. Tollemache C.B., C.B.E., will relieve General Sir Leslie Hollis, K.C.B., K.B.E., as Commandant General in May, 1952.

**PLYMOUTH GROUP.**—Major-General R. F. Cornwall, C.B.E., relieved Major General J. E. Leech-Porter, C.B., C.B.E., as Major-General, Royal Marines, Plymouth Group, on 1st November, 1951.

**PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.**—Major-General J. E. Leech-Porter, C.B., C.B.E., to Retired List; Colonel (local Major-General) J. C. Westall, C.B.E., to be Major-General; Colonel R. F. Cornwall, C.B.E., to be local Major-General (1st November, 1951). Major-General W. I. Nonweiler, C.B.E., to Retired List; Colonel (local Major-General) R. F. Cornwall, C.B.E., to be Major-General (23rd November, 1951).

**HALF-YEARLY PROMOTIONS.**—The following were among the promotions made to date 31st December, 1951:—

*Lieutenant-Colonel to Colonel.*—J. L. Moulton, D.S.O., O.B.E.; M. Archdall.

**3 COMMANDO BRIGADE.**—The 3rd Commando Brigade has now completed 18 months service in Malaya. At the beginning of January the Brigade had accounted for 147 bandits killed and 431 captured, with successes increasing steadily. The following casualties have been incurred: killed—4 officers and 14 other ranks.

**APPOINTMENT TO U.S. MARINE CORPS SCHOOL.**—Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Drysdale, D.S.O., M.B.E., R.M., who returned to the United Kingdom at the end of October from 41 Independent Commando, Korea, will be taking up an appointment as an Instructor at the U.S.M.C. School, Quantico, early in the New Year.

**LAST R.M. DETACHMENT FROM NEW ZEALAND.**—The return of the R.M. Detachment from H.M.N.Z.S. *Bellona* last December marked the end of Royal Marines service in New Zealand ships which started in 1924. A Royal Marines Band is remaining until it is replaced by New Zealand seamen.

## DOMINION AND COMMONWEALTH NAVIES

## AUSTRALIA

NEW YEAR PROMOTIONS.—The following were announced by the Commonwealth Naval Board to date 31st December, 1951 :—

*Commander to Captain.*—J. Plunkett-Cole.

*Commander (E) to Captain (E).*—R. G. Parker, O.B.E.

COASTAL DEFENCE CRAFT.—Mr. McMahon, the Navy Minister, announced on 19th December that the Federal Government had approved the construction of 14 coastal defence craft for the Royal Australian Navy. Some main engines and equipment would be ordered in Britain.

ROCKET TESTS.—A party of Royal Navy rocket specialists arrived at Darwin, Australia, by air from Britain at the beginning of November for a stay of four weeks, during which they were to attend guided missile tests. The party comprised Commander H. G. Barnard and Lieutenant-Commander T. G. Davison, from the Naval Ordnance Department; Commander P. J. S. Hardinge and Commander W. T. C. Ridley, from the Ministry of Supply's Guided Weapons Department; and Mr. L. W. R. Robertson, Manager of the Armaments Division of Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft, Limited.

## CANADA

NEW YEAR PROMOTIONS.—The following were announced by the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, on 1st January :—

*Commander to Captain.*—P. D. Budge, D.S.C., A. G. Boulton, D.S.C.

*Commander to Captain.*—R.C.N. (Reserve).—R. I. Hendy.

N.A.T.O. OBLIGATION.—Vice-Admiral E. R. Mainguy, the new Chief of Naval Staff, stated in Ottawa on 17th December that the Canadian Navy's major role in the obligations undertaken by Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is anti-submarine warfare, and training at sea in the coming year would be directed at maintaining efficiency in this role. Submarines would again be borrowed from the Royal Navy and the United States Navy for exercises in which would be used anti-submarine escorts and the carrier *Magnificent* and her aircraft.

## CEYLON

## APPOINTMENT

Appointments in the rank of Captain announced by the Admiralty in October included that of Captain J. R. S. Brown, R.N., to the *Highflyer* on loan service to the Royal Ceylon Navy as Captain of the Navy.

## INDIA

## APPOINTMENT

Captain G. A. French, R.N. (retired) has been recalled to active service and lent to the Indian Navy, to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief and to serve in the rank of Commodore Second Class while holding the appointment.

## FOREIGN NAVIES

## ITALY

## SHIPS FROM U.S.A.

On 6th December, the Italian Navy received an accession of two destroyers and six gunboats which had been given by the United States under the North Atlantic Treaty. The vessels were handed over at Brindisi by Mr. Dunn, the American Ambassador, in the presence, among others, of Admiral Carney, U.S.N., and Signor Pacciardi, Minister of Defence.

## PERU

## GUNBOATS ARRIVE

The new gunboats *Maranon* and *Ucayali*, built for the Peruvian Navy at the Thornycroft shipyard at Woolston, Southampton, and fitted with British Polar Diesel engines, arrived at their destination at Iquitos, on the Upper Amazon, early in October. The voyage of about 4,000 miles from Southampton to Para and the further 2,000 miles up the Amazon to Iquitos, was completed in 44 days. A telegram received from the Minister of Marine at Lima said: "Gunboats arrived smartly and have impressed greatly for their excellent construction and neat appearance. I am happy to utter that Thornycroft's should be proud for this." A 600-ton floating dock built by the same firm has also arrived in Peru.

## UNITED STATES

ADMIRAL FECHTELER.—Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, arrived in London on 4th November. He had conferences with Mr. Churchill and with the First Lord, Mr. Thomas, and First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, among other senior British representatives concerned with defence.

USE OF ATOM BOMBS.—At a Press conference in Washington on 25th October, after his return from a visit to North Africa and Europe, Mr. Dan Kimball, Secretary of the Navy, said he would "guess" that the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is prepared to use atomic bombs if necessary in the defence of Western Europe. He said that the Fleet had been built up to 60 or 70 ships, double its size a year ago. The U.S. Navy was developing Port Lyautey, in North Africa, which it was using under an arrangement with France.

Addressing a Navy League meeting in Memphis on 6th December, Admiral Fechteler said that "an atomic bomb or many atomic bombs" could be delivered anywhere on the seas "to a target within the radius of action of carrier-based aircraft—a distance of some 600 miles."

CARRIER RECOMMISSIONED.—The 11,000-ton aircraft carrier *Tripoli*, which had been idle since 1949, was recommissioned on 5th January at a shipyard in Brooklyn, where she is being overhauled. She will carry fighter aircraft to Europe under the Mutual Defence Assistance programme.

VISITS TO SPAIN.—On 27th December, the Navy Department announced that 35 ships of the United States Sixth Fleet were to visit eight Spanish ports between 9th and 15th January. The force included three cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and 12 destroyers. The ports to be visited were Barcelona, Palma, Valencia, Alicante, Cartagena, Almeria, Malaga, and Tarragona. Admiral Gardner, Commanding the Fleet, referred in cordial terms to the growing friendship between America and Spain when he received the Spanish authorities on board his flagship, the cruiser *Des Moines*, on his arrival at Barcelona on 9th January. The Admiral's force, manned by over 20,000 officers and men, is the largest foreign fleet to visit Spanish harbours since the civil war.

---

## ARMY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI

The Queen, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, visited the 1st Battalion, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Strensall Camp, on 31st October.

The Queen, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, was present, on 16th November, at a Service of Dedication in Manchester Cathedral of the restored Chapel of The Manchester Regiment.

The Duke of Gloucester, on behalf of the late King, held an Investiture at Buckingham Palace on 31st October.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel of the Regiment, visited the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, at Colchester on 19th November.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, The Royal Scots, visited the Regimental Depot, Glencorse, on 26th October.

**APPOINTED AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE LATE KING.**—Brigadier D. H. V. Buckle, C.B.E., late R.A.S.C. (8th September, 1951), vice Brigadier H. C. Goodfellow, C.B.E., A.M.I.Mech.E., promoted.

**APPOINTED HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO THE LATE KING.**—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) A. Sachs, M.D. (9th November, 1951), vice Major-General K. A. M. Tomory, C.B., O.B.E., M.B., retired.

**APPOINTED HONORARY SURGEON TO THE LATE KING.**—Major-General J. C. Collins, C.B.E. (14th December, 1951), vice Major-General J. M. MacFie, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., retired.

**APPOINTED COLONELS COMMANDANT.**—Of The Royal Tank Regiment, Major-General N. W. Duncan, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st January, 1952), vice Major-General Sir Percy Hobart, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired; of the Royal Army Dental Corps, Major-General A. B. Austin, C.B., F.D.S., R.C.S. (4th October, 1951), vice General Sir Ronald F. Adam, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., resigned.

**APPOINTED COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.**—Of The Royal Norfolk Regiment, Colonel (temporary Brigadier) C. J. Wilkinson, D.S.O. (26th August, 1951), vice Colonel (honorary Major-General) E. C. Hayes, C.B., deceased.

**REPRESENTATIVE COLONELS COMMANDANT, 1952.**—The following have been appointed Representative Colonels Commandant of their respective Corps and Regiments for the year 1952 :—

*Royal Armoured Corps (Cavalry Wing).*—Major-General R. A. Hull, C.B., D.S.O. (*R.T.R. Wing*).—Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.

*Royal Tank Regiment.*—Major-General N. W. Duncan, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

*Royal Regiment of Artillery.*—Lieut.-General Sir Charles Allfrey, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

*Corps of Royal Engineers.*—Major-General Sir Eustace Tickell, K.B.E., C.B., M.C.

*Royal Corps of Signals.*—Major-General R. F. B. Naylor, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

*Royal Army Service Corps.*—Major-General Sir Cecil Smith, K.B.E., C.B., M.C.

*Royal Army Medical Corps.*—Major-General J. C. A. Dowse, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B.

*Royal Army Ordnance Corps.*—Major-General Sir Leslie H. Williams, K.B.E., C.B., M.C.

*Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.*—Major-General Sir E. Bertram Rowcroft, K.B.E., C.B., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.E.E.

*Royal Army Dental Corps.*—Major-General A. B. Austin, C.B., F.D.S., R.C.S.



## HONOURS AND AWARDS

## VICTORIA CROSS

It was announced on 28th December, in a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 25th December, 1951, that the late King had been graciously pleased to approve the award of the Victoria Cross to:—

14471590 *Private William Speakman, Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment), attached to the 1st Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers, in recognition of gallant and distinguished services in Korea.*

## NEW YEAR HONOURS

The following awards were included in the New Year Honours List:—

*G.C.B.*—General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Bart., *G.B.E.*, *K.C.M.G.*, *K.C.V.O.*, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, *M.C.*, *A.D.C.*

*K.C.B.*—Lieut.-General Sir Arthur A. B. Dowler, *K.B.E.*, *C.B.*; General Sir Ouvry L. Roberts, *K.B.E.*, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*

*C.B.*—Major-General C. Bullard, *C.B.E.*; Major-General R. D. Cameron, *C.B.E.*, *M.C.*, *M.B.*, *K.H.S.*; Major-General M. Lea-Cox, *C.B.E.*; Brigadier (acting) D. I. Crawford, *D.S.O.*, *T.D.*, *A.D.C.*; Major-General D. Dawnay, *D.S.O.*; Major-General M. B. Dowse, *C.B.E.*; Major-General H. R. B. Foote, *V.C.*, *D.S.O.*; Major-General H. F. S. King, *C.B.E.*; Major-General C. H. Norton, *C.B.E.*; Major-General J. M. S. Pasley, *C.B.E.*, *M.V.O.*; Major-General J. H. N. Poett, *D.S.O.*; Major-General J. E. Witt, *C.B.E.*, *M.C.*

*K.B.E.*—Lieut-General C. B. Callander, *C.B.*, *M.C.*; Lieut-General A. M. Cameron, *C.B.*, *M.C.*; Lieut-General (acting) R. C. McCay, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*; Lieut-General L. G. Whistler, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*

*Royal Red Cross, First Class.*—Major Yolanda K. Davey, *Q.A.R.A.N.C.*

## APPOINTMENTS

**WAR OFFICE.**—Major-General W. A. Scott, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, appointed Director of Weapons and Development (7th January, 1952).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. H. O. Wilsey, *C.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*, appointed Director of Infantry, with the temporary rank of Major-General (February, 1952).

Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, appointed Director Territorial Army and Cadets (March, 1952).

Major-General F. Harris, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *M.C.*, *M.B.*, *K.H.S.*, appointed Director-General, Army Medical Services, with the rank of Lieut-General (1st April, 1952).

Brigadier W. H. D. Ritchie, *C.B.E.*, appointed Director of Quartering, with the temporary rank of Major-General (April, 1952).

**MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.**—Major-General G. P. Walsh, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*, appointed Assistant Controller of Supplies (Munitions) (7th January, 1952).

**UNITED KINGDOM.**—Brigadier F. K. Escritt, *O.B.E.*, appointed a Deputy Director, Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (11th October, 1951).

Major-General G. W. Lathbury, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, *M.B.E.*, appointed Commandant, Staff College, Camberley (5th November, 1951). Substituted for the notification in the November, 1950, *JOURNAL*.

General Sir Frank E. W. Simpson, *K.C.B.*, *K.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*, *B.A.*, appointed Commandant, Imperial Defence College (1st January, 1952).

Major-General C. M. Barber, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, appointed *G.O.C.-in-C.* Scottish Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut-General. (February, 1952).

Major-General E. O. Herbert, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *M.C.*, appointed Commander 44th Infantry Division (T.A.) and Home Counties District (March, 1952).

Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Northern Command (May, 1952).

FRANCE.—Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E., appointed to temporary employment with the British Military Delegation to the European Army Conference, Paris (Major-General) (24th September, 1951).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Brigadier M. S. Wheatley, C.B.E., M.I.E.E., appointed Chief Signal Officer, with the temporary rank of Major-General (10th October, 1951). Substituted for the notification in the August, 1951, JOURNAL.

Lieut.-General F. W. Festing, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., British Troops in Egypt (April, 1952).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General G. C. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed temporary Commander, British Forces, Hong Kong, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (13th October, 1951).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) R. C. Cruddas, D.S.O., appointed Commander, Land Forces, Hong Kong, with the temporary rank of Major-General (15th November, 1951).

WASHINGTON.—Major-General W. A. Dimoline, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Head of The Service Advisers to the United Kingdom Delegation and United Kingdom Representative on The Military Staff Committee of the United Nations (29th September, 1951).

#### PROMOTIONS

*Lieut.-General.*—

Major-General to be temporary Lieut.-General:—G. C. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (13th October, 1951).

*Major-Generals.*—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—H. C. Goodfellow, C.B.E., A.M.I.Mech.E., A.D.C. (7th September, 1951); S. A. Cooke, O.B.E. (8th September, 1951); R. W. Goodbody, D.S.O. (14th September, 1951); H. C. Phipps, C.B., D.S.O. (29th October, 1951); A. J. Beveridge, O.B.E., M.C., M.B., K.H.P. (8th November, 1951); C. P. Jones, C.B.E., M.C. (7th December, 1951); J. C. Collins, C.B.E. (13th December, 1951).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—M. S. Wheatley, C.B.E., M.I.E.E. (10th October, 1951); F. K. Escritt, O.B.E. (11th October, 1951); W. E. G. Hemming, C.B.E. (18th October, 1951); K. Bayley, C.B.E., A.D.C. (8th November, 1951); R. C. Cruddas, D.S.O. (15th November, 1951); R. P. Harding, D.S.O. (20th December, 1951).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General C. M. F. White, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th October, 1951); Major-General K. A. M. Tomary, C.B., O.B.E., M.B., K.H.P. (8th November, 1951); Lieut.-General Sir Arthur A. B. Dowler, K.B.E., C.B. (29th December, 1951); Major-General J. M. MacFie, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., K.H.S. (10th January, 1952); Major-General J. D. Shapland, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (11th January, 1952).

#### REVERSION TO RETIRED PAY

Major-General S. B. Rawlins, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (3rd December, 1951).

#### BREVET PROMOTION TO LIEUT.-COLONEL

On 29th November, the War Office announced that the Army Council had decided to re-introduce the system of brevet promotion to Lieut.-Colonel with effect from 1st July, 1951. A number of such promotions were published on 30th November in the Second Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 27th November, 1951.

## OFFICERS FOR MALAY REGIMENT

The War Office has announced that Officers are urgently required to meet the expansion of the Malay Regiment.

Former officers of the late Indian Army are invited to apply for re-employment in this Regiment. Ex-emergency commissioned officers who are accepted will be granted short service commissions; ex-Regular officers if accepted will be re-employed on conditions similar to those for short service commissions.

A substantial increase in special pay for service with the Malay Regiment has recently been introduced. Ex-Regular officers will be allowed to retain their Indian Army pensions, including the Indian Element, and the compensation which they received on leaving the Indian Army.

Applications should be sent to the Under Secretary of State for War, M.S.2(c), The War Office, London, S.W.1, who will supply any additional information required.

## NEW SHORT REGULAR ARMY ENGAGEMENT

The War Office has announced a new short Regular Army engagement.

A man aged between 17½ and 30 years may now join the Regular Army for 3 years with the Colours and 4 years on the Reserve. At the end of his 3 years he may either return to civilian life or stay in the Army, whichever he wishes.

This new engagement will relieve a man due for call up of his liability under the National Service Act should he prefer to enlist on this Regular engagement instead.

## CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS IN 1952

The last notices warning those Reservists who will be required for training this year were posted on 19th January. All classes of Army Reservists who have not received a warning notice can presume that they will not be required this year, unless they have failed to notify the War Office of any change of address or happen to be away from home.

## FULL DRESS FOR TERRITORIAL ARMY BANDS

The War Office has announced that the Army Council has given permission for the sashes and scarlet of full dress uniform to be worn by those T.A. Bands and Drums already in regimental possession of the uniforms.

This full dress will be worn on official and other special occasions at the discretion of General Officers Commanding-in-Chief until the new No. 1 Dress is issued.

## Q.A.R.A.N.C. DRAFTS FOR THE FAR EAST AND GIBRALTAR

The first drafts of other ranks of Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps to serve in the Far East embarked in the *Empress of Australia* on 24th November, 1951, at Liverpool.

The draft, consisting of two Corporals and 28 Privates, was under the charge of two Q.A.R.A.N.C. officers during their voyage to Singapore. On arrival they were posted to Military Hospitals, where they are continuing their training as potential State registered nurses.

On the same day one Warrant Officer and 11 other ranks of the same Corps left the Q.A.R.A.N.C. Depot at Liphook, Hants, on their way to Gibraltar by air. They are the first Q.A.R.A.N.C. other ranks to serve there.

## WAR MEMORIALS

## 17TH/21ST LANCERS

The 17th/21st Lancers War Memorial in the Royal Garrison Church, Aldershot, was unveiled on 28th October by the Colonel of the Regiment, Major-General R. A. Hull, and dedicated by the Chaplain-General, Canon F. L. Hughes.

## DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

## CANADA

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Brigadier M. P. Bogert, D.S.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Director-General of Military Training at Army Headquarters.

Brigadier J. V. Allard, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., has been appointed Vice-Quartermaster General of the Canadian Army.

Colonel N. S. Cuthbert has been appointed Director of Military Intelligence at Army Headquarters.

**25TH INFANTRY BRIGADE GROUP.**—General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, commended the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group for the part this formation took in the fighting between 3rd and 8th October, 1951.

**27TH INFANTRY BRIGADE GROUP.**—The final contingent of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group sailed from Halifax for Germany on 13th December.

**EXERCISE "EAGER BEAVER".**—This six month combined Canadian-United States Engineer exercise commenced on 15th January in Yukon Territory. Working under arctic conditions and Spring thaws, the troops are testing equipment and airstrip construction methods and are studying snow compaction problems, construction of field defences, demolitions, and cold weather administrative problems.

## AUSTRALIA

**HONOURS AND AWARDS.**—The following awards were included in the New Year Honours List :—

*C.B.*—Major-General L. E. Beavis, C.B.E., D.S.O.

*K.B.E.*—Major-General S. R. Burston, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D., F.R.C.P.(Lond.), F.R.C.P.(Edin.), F.R.A.C.P.

*Royal Red Cross, First Class.*—Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) Lucy H. Edwards, R.A.A.N.C.

**PRESIDENTIAL CITATION.**—On 9th November, it was announced by the Minister for the Army, Mr. Francis, that the late King had approved acceptance of the Presidential Citation for the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.

The Battalion was cited by the President of the United States in recognition of its magnificent action on 24th and 25th April, 1951, when, with other units of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade, it stopped the Chinese break-through near Kapyong in the central sector in Korea.

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Major-General R. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed G.O.C., Northern Command.

Major-General V. C. Secombe, C.B.E., has been appointed temporarily as G.O.C., Eastern Command.

**INCREASE OF AUSTRALIAN ARMY.**—It was reported from Canberra on 11th January that the Australian Government has decided to increase the strength of the Regular Army from 27,000 to 33,000, and to create new Citizen Force units to provide a total Citizen Force establishment of 97,500 as soon as possible.

The Minister for the Army said that the additions to the Regular Army would be used mainly to supplement technical and specialist units supporting an increased field force already agreed on, to provide instructors for National Service recruits, and to furnish Regular cadres in increased number for the Citizen Force units, which would be composed of National Service men completing their initial 14 weeks' basic training.

**BRITISH OFFICERS REQUIRED FOR AUSTRALIAN REGULAR ARMY.**—The Minister for the Army has announced that applications have been invited in the United Kingdom from British Army ex-officers to fill 100 vacancies in the Australian Regular Army. Applicants must be under 35 years of age except in special cases.



First class sea passages for officers and their families will be provided. Successful applicants will be appointed initially to short service terms, and a bond of £A500 will be required as a guarantee that the term will be completed if advantage is taken of free sea travel. Responsibility for the provision of accommodation in Australia for wives and families will rest with the officers themselves.

### MALAYA

**REINFORCEMENTS FROM EAST AFRICA.**—The 1st (Nyasa) and 3rd (Kenya) Battalions, King's African Rifles, arrived in Malaya in January. These troops are all voluntarily enlisted and they will serve in Malaya for 18 months.

**FIJI BATTALION IN MALAYA.**—It was announced in Singapore on 23rd October, that the British Government had accepted an offer from the Government of Fiji of an infantry battalion to help in the suppression of Communist terrorism in Malaya. The battalion, which was voluntarily enlisted, has arrived in Malaya and will serve there for two years.

### FOREIGN

#### ITALY

##### CONTRIBUTION TO N.A.T.O. FORCES

On 6th December, the Italian Defence Minister announced that Italy would place a third Alpini brigade at the disposal of S.H.A.P.E. in addition to the three infantry divisions, two Alpini brigades, and one armoured brigade earlier placed at General Eisenhower's disposal.

### UNITED STATES

##### REDUCTION IN DIVISIONAL STRENGTH

On 8th December, the United States Army Department announced that the manpower strength of United States Army divisions would be reduced by cutting down the number of non-combatants (e.g., cooks, orderlies, etc.), with a view to turning some of these categories into fighting soldiers. The future strength of divisions (previous strength in parentheses) would, it was stated, be as follows:—Infantry—18,211 (18,855); Armoured—15,629 (16,053); and Airborne—17,131 (17,488).

### BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1952

The subject for the 1952 competition is as follows:—

"During the last war a number of unorthodox units were raised for special operations. They included Special Air Service units, the Long Range Desert Group and the Long Range Penetration Group (Wingate Expedition). Discuss the use of these small forces and the value you consider was obtained from their use. Do you consider that such forces will be useful in the future and, if so, discuss the type of operations on which you consider they might be usefully employed either in North West Europe or in Middle Eastern territories?"

Copies of the rules for this competition can be obtained from the Editor of *The Army Quarterly*, c/o W. Clowes and Sons, Ltd., Little New Street, London, E.C.4.

## AIR NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI

APPOINTED AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE LATE KING.—Air Commodore J. H. Edwardes-Jones, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C. (1st July, 1951); Group Captain R. L. M. Hall, O.B.E. (4th July, 1951).

### HONOURS AND AWARDS

#### THE STANDARD

With the approval of the late King, the Standard has been awarded to the following squadrons in recognition of their completion on 1st December, 1951, of 25 or more years of existence in the Royal Air Force, Royal Auxiliary Air Force, Royal Flying Corps or Royal Naval Air Service.

ROYAL AIR FORCE.—Nos. 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 26, 29, 32, 33, 41, 43, 58, 99, 101, 111, 201, 202, 203 and 205.

Nos. 120 and 617 Squadrons, Royal Air Force, which have not been in existence for 25 years, have also been awarded the Standard as a mark of the late King's appreciation of outstanding achievement in operations.

ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT.—No. 2 Armoured Car Squadron.

ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE.—No. 502 (Ulster) Squadron, No. 600 (City of London) Squadron, No. 601 (County of London) Squadron, No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron and No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron.

#### NEW YEAR HONOURS

The following awards were included in the New Year Honours List:—

K.C.B.—Air Chief Marshal Sir William Forster Dickson, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C.; Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur P. M. Sanders, K.B.E., C.B.

C.B.—Air Vice-Marshal G. R. C. Spencer, C.B.E.; Air Vice-Marshal H. G. White, C.B.E., M.I.Mech.E.; Acting Air Vice-Marshal J. A. Easton, C.B.E. (retired); Air Commodore H. D. Spreckley, O.B.E.; Air Commodore S. R. Ubee, A.F.C.; Group Captain E. D. M. Nelson.

G.B.E.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.F.C.

K.B.E.—Air Marshal A. C. Stevens, C.B.; Acting Air Marshal C. W. Weedon, C.B., C.B.E., M.A., M.I.Mech.E., A.F.R.Ae.S.; Air Vice-Marshal V. E. Groom, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C.

#### APPOINTMENTS

IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE.—Air Vice-Marshal C. B. R. Pelly, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., to be Royal Air Force Instructor (December, 1951).

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Vice-Marshal W. L. Dawson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) (January, 1952).

Air Marshal Sir John Baker, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C., to be Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (March, 1952).

Air Commodore L. Dalton-Morris, C.B.E., to be Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Signals), with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (1st March, 1952).

FIGHTER COMMAND.—Air Commodore H. P. Fraser, C.B.E., A.F.C., to be Senior Air Staff Officer (9th January, 1952).

FLYING TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal E. B. Addison, C.B., C.B.E., M.A., M.I.E.E., to be Senior Air Staff Officer (1st March, 1952).

TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Marshal V. E. Groom, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., to be A.O.C.-in-C. (July, 1952).

TRANSPORT COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal C. E. N. Guest, C.B., C.B.E., to be A.O.C.-in-C. (May, 1952).

R.A.F. STAFF COLLEGE.—Air Commodore W. E. Cheshire, C.B.E., to be Commandant (February, 1952).

MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Sanders, K.B.E., C.B., to be A.O.C.-in-C. (May, 1952).

Air Vice-Marshal D. F. W. Atcherley, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding No. 205 Group.

FAR EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Marshal Sir Thomas M. Williams, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., to be Commander-in-Chief (May, 1952).

#### PROMOTIONS

*To be Air Chief Marshals.*—Air Marshal Sir Arthur P. M. Sanders, K.B.E., C.B. (16th October, 1951); Air Marshal Sir John W. Baker, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C. (2nd January, 1952).

*To be Acting Air Marshal.*—Air Vice-Marshal G. E. Gibbs, C.I.E., C.B.E. (November, 1951).

*To be Acting Air Vice-Marshal.*—Air Commodore J. G. Hawtrey, C.B.E. (12th October, 1951).

The following were included in the half-yearly promotions with effect from 1st January, 1952 :—

*Air Vice-M Marshals to be Air Marshals.*—V. E. Groom, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C.; Sir John Boothman, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C. (Acting Air Marshal).

*Air Commodores to be Air Vice-M Marshals.*—A. McKee, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); the Earl of Bandon, C.B., D.S.O. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); J. G. Hawtrey, C.B.E. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); G. W. Tuttle, C.B., O.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); E. C. Huddleston, C.B., C.B.E. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); C. P. Brown, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); E. D. D. Dickson, C.B.E., M.D., Ch.B., F.R.C.S.(E), D.L.O., K.H.S. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal).

#### RETIREMENT

Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., is placed on the Retired List on account of medical unfitness for Air Force service (26th November, 1951).

#### OPERATIONS

MIDDLE EAST.—In the first two months since the outbreak of violence against British Forces in Egypt, Valettas of the Middle East Transport Wing and Hastings of Transport Command flew well over 1,000,000 miles in carrying Army and R.A.F. reinforcements and supplies from England, Cyprus, North Africa, and Jordan to the Canal Zone, and in evacuating families. In addition to troops, 380 vehicles and 282,416 lb. of military equipment and supplies were carried. Nearly 600 R.A.F. and several hundred Army families were flown back to the United Kingdom.

MALAYA.—During December, 1951, the Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force made their 2,000th air strike against terrorists in Malaya. During the last year, helicopters of the Far East Air Force Casualty Evacuation Flight evacuated from the jungle nearly 100 army, police, and civilian casualties.

## TRAINING

**R.A.F. OFFICERS TRAINED AS PILOTS IN CANADA.**—At the end of October, 1951, at the R.C.A.F. Station, Gimli, Manitoba, Air Marshal Curtis, Chief of the Air Staff, R.C.A.F., presented 25 R.A.F. officers with their pilots' badges. These were the first R.A.F. trainees to obtain their pilots' badges in Canada since the end of the war-time British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

**BASIC FLYING TRAINING SCHOOLS.**—Two new basic flying training schools for R.A.F. National Service pilots were opened in December, 1951. Two such schools are already operating and a fifth will open in February, 1952. These schools are all equipped with Chipmunk aircraft fitted for dual instruction with radio and blind flying instruments.

**FLYING TRAINING FOR R.A.F. REGIMENT OFFICERS.**—Permanent R.A.F. Regiment officers may now volunteer for flying training and, after a period of service with the General Duties (Flying) Branch of the Royal Air Force, will be able to return to their original ground defence duties.

## RESERVES

**ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE CONFERENCE.**—The Under-Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Nigel Birch, presided at a conference held at the end of November to discuss questions arising from the recent three months' call-up of fighter squadrons. In addition to the commanding officers of squadrons and members of the Air Council, the Earl of Limerick (Chairman of the Council of Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations), Air Marshal Sir Basil Embry (A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command) and Air Marshal J. D. I. Hardman (A.O.C.-in-C., Home Command) were present. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal the Hon. Sir Ralph A. Cochrane, said that the standard of training achieved and the response of squadrons to the call-up had exceeded all expectations.

**AUXILIARIES AND RESERVE ORGANIZATION.**—The new directorate of Auxiliaries, Reserves and Air Cadets, which has been set up in the Air Ministry to advise the Air Council in matters affecting these Forces—a function hitherto performed by the A.O.C., Home Command—will be headed by Air Vice-Marshal W. M. Yool, C.B., C.B.E., who has now taken up his new appointment. The duties of the Director will be to advise and to co-ordinate. The Air Training Corps will continue to be under the command of the A.O.C.-in-C., Home Command.

**CLASS H RESERVISTS.**—By the end of October, 1951, 4,200 Royal Air Force National Service reservists belonging to Class "H" reserve had been called up for their 15 days' training. They had completed their two years' full-time training earlier that year.

**COOPER TROPHY.**—No. 615 (County of Surrey) Squadron, based at Biggin Hill and equipped with Gloster Meteor 8 aircraft, won the 1951 competition for the Cooper trophy for aerial marksmanship.

**LEES TROPHY.**—No. 1024 Squadron of the A.T.C., based at Ryde, Isle of Wight, won the 1951 Lees Trophy in competition with 750 other A.T.C. squadrons. The trophy is given to the squadron obtaining the most marks for training, administration, sport, and shooting, and for the numbers joining the R.A.F.

## MATERIEL

**CANBERRA JET AIRCRAFT FOR BOMBER COMMAND.**—No. 101 Squadron has now been equipped with Canberra jet aircraft and the pilots of the squadron have already flown several hundred hours on this type. No. 617 Squadron is now being equipped with Canberras and a number of other Bomber Command squadrons will be equipped with the same type during the year.



**LOCKHEED P2V-5 NEPTUNES FOR COASTAL COMMAND.**—During the next twelve months at least 50 Lockheed Neptunes are expected to be flown from the U.S.A. for the use of Coastal Command. They will be used for coastal reconnaissance and anti-submarine duties. The first two Neptunes arrived at St. Eval on 13th January, 1952. In 1946, a modified P2V aircraft set up a world record by flying 11,235 miles in a straight line.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

**CONFERENCE OF COMMONWEALTH AIR FORCES.**—A conference of representatives of Commonwealth Air Forces was recently held in London. Matters of mutual interest to the Commonwealth Air Forces arising out of the conference of Commonwealth Defence Ministers last June were discussed.

**L. G. GROVES MEMORIAL PRIZES AND AWARDS.**—The L. G. Groves Memorial Prizes and Awards for 1951 have been awarded as follows :—

*Prize for Air Aircraft Safety.*—Wing Commander S. H. Jordan, O.B.E., for the development of special de-misting and de-icing equipment.

*Prize for Meteorology.*—Dr. R. C. Sutcliffe, O.B.E., B.Sc., Ph.D., for his contribution to the science of forecasting and his influence on meteorological research.

*Award for Meteorological Observers.*—Flight Lieutenant D. Carlson, for the enthusiasm he has shown during the past three years on meteorological duties.

**THE DACRE TROPHY.**—A trophy to be awarded annually to the Regular squadron of Fighter Command showing the greatest efficiency in weapons training has been presented to the Royal Air Force by Air Commodore G. B. Dacre, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.L. (retired), and Mrs. Dacre, J.P., in memory of their son, Flying Officer Kenneth Fraser Dacre, D.F.C., who was killed in action over Germany in 1943.

**LAURENCE MINOT BOMBING TROPHY.**—In the 1951 competition, No. 7 Squadron, Bomber Command, beat No. 617 in the final test. The latter were the previous holders. Both squadrons are equipped with Avro Lincolns and were judged on their average accuracy.

**CAMROSE BOMBING TROPHY.**—In November, 1951, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, presented the Lord Camrose Trophy to No. 109 Squadron as the best marker squadron of the Command.

#### DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

##### CANADA

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Air Commodore W. E. Kennedy, A.F.C., has been appointed Assistant Vice-Chief of the Royal Canadian Air Staff ; Air Commodore H. Godwin, C.B.E., has been appointed A.O.C., R.C.A.F., Air Materiel Command, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal ; Air Commodore J. G. Kerr, C.B.E., A.F.C., becomes Commander of the Tactical Air Group, Edmonton ; Air Commodore F. S. Carpenter, A.F.C., is appointed Chief of Training at R.C.A.F. Headquarters.

**R.C.A.F. TAKES OVER R.A.F. STATION.**—On 15th November, 1951, R.A.F. Station, North Luffenham, was taken over by the R.C.A.F. for the formation of several R.C.A.F. fighter wings which will be integrated with the air contingent on the Continent under General Eisenhower. Eleven day-fighter squadrons, equipped with Canadian-built F-86 Sabre aircraft, are being sent to the United Kingdom to form these wings.

**JET FIGHTER SQUADRON FOR U.K.**—Another R.C.A.F. jet fighter squadron is leaving Canada during February, 1952, to begin a tour of duty overseas. This is No. 441 Squadron from St. Hubert, P.Q., and it will be stationed in the United Kingdom.

**NEW FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL.**—Another flying training school—No. 1 Advanced Flying School—was opened at Saskatoon on 1st January, 1952.

**AUSTRALIA**

**NEW CHIEF OF THE AUSTRALIAN AIR STAFF.**—Air Marshal G. Jones, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., Chief of the Australian Air Staff, is retiring early this year. He will be replaced by Air Vice-Marshal J. D. I. Hardman, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., who is on loan from the Royal Air Force for two years. Air Vice-Marshal Hardman will be granted the acting rank of Air Marshal.

**NEPTUNE AIRCRAFT FOR THE R.A.A.F.**—A squadron of Lockheed P2V Neptune long range bombers is being formed in Western Australia. The Neptunes are being flown over from the United States *via* Honolulu, Canton Islands, and Fiji. The range of these bombers is 2,500 miles at 200 knots.

**R.A.A.F. DAKOTAS IN KOREA.**—Operating between Korea and Japan, Dakotas of No. 30 Communication Unit, R.A.A.F., have transported almost 18,000 personnel and have flown to and from Korea 1,300,000 lb. of mail and almost 2,000,000 lb. of freight in less than a year. They have also evacuated thousands of wounded United Nations Service men back to Japan.

**R.A.A.F. TO BE EXPANDED.**—Mr. McMahon, Australian Minister for Air, announced that 4,000 more men would be enlisted into the R.A.A.F. This expansion was mainly for the purpose of placing R.A.A.F. squadrons operating in Malaya and Korea on a war footing.

**JET TRAINERS FOR R.A.A.F.**—It has been announced that the D.H. Vampire trainer is to be ordered for the R.A.A.F. The first two will be built in England, but others will be built at the de Havilland factory in New South Wales.

**NEW ZEALAND**

**FIRST JET SQUADRON.**—New Zealand's first squadron of jet fighters has now become operational. Twelve Vampires of No. 14 Squadron, R.N.Z.A.F., are being delivered to Ohakea after test flights at Whenuapai.

**DETACHMENT TO LEAVE MALAYA.**—A detachment of No. 41 (Transport) Squadron, which has spent two years on active duty in Malaya, is returning to New Zealand shortly to rejoin its parent unit and to re-equip with new aircraft. Its Dakotas will be replaced by Bristol Freighters.

**RHODESIA****NEW SPITFIRE SQUADRON**

Eleven more Spitfires intended for the Southern Rhodesian Air Force's new squadron, based at Cranborne, are being flown from England by pilots from the Southern Rhodesian Air Force and the Southern Rhodesian Auxiliary Air Force. The first squadron of 11 Spitfires was flown out to Rhodesia last March.

**INDIA****NEW C-IN-C., INDIAN AIR FORCE**

It has been announced that the British Government has made available to the Government of India the services of Air Vice-Marshal (acting Air Marshal) G. E. Gibbs, C.I.E., C.B.E., as Chief of Staff and C-in-C. of the Indian Air Force.

**FOREIGN****ETHIOPIA****AIRCRAFT FROM UNITED KINGDOM**

The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force has received its first Fairey Firefly Mk. 1 aircraft from the U.K. Four fighter-reconnaissance and one trainer aircraft of this type were flown out to Ethiopia at the end of September by Ethiopian pilots, led by a Swedish flying instructor. All the Fireflies are equipped for carrying bombs and rockets. They are being used in an "Attack" unit stationed at Bishoftu, near Addis Ababa. Further aircraft of this type will be supplied later.

It is understood that ten Saab B-17 single-engined light bombers have been purchased in Sweden. Some are likely to be used in operational units, but most of the aircraft of this type will probably be used for operational training. Ethiopian air and ground crews are said to be keen and adaptable. From all accounts it would appear that, under the guidance of their Swedish advisers, the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force is rapidly becoming an efficient, if very small, fighting service.

### HOLLAND

#### SERVICING OF DUTCH FIGHTERS

It was reported in the Dutch Press that a large workshop for the repair of Thunderjet fighters is being erected at Schipol airport. The workshop is being constructed and operated jointly by K.L.M. and the Dutch Air Force and will service the Thunderjets of most of the Western European Atlantic Pact countries.

### IRAQ

#### TRAINING WITH R.A.F.

For the third year in succession Royal Air Force and Iraqi Air Force Fighter squadrons have co-operated in a three-week period of training and liaison at the R.A.F. airfield at Habbaniya, near Baghdad.

The squadrons carried out combined air exercises in which Vampire jets of the R.A.F. and piston-engined Furies of the R.I.A.F. reached a high level of co-operation, flying together in air-to-air and air-to-ground firing exercises, high and low level interception, high speed bombing attacks, and sorties in support of ground troops.

The visit of the Iraqi Air Force squadrons culminated in a combined R.A.F. and R.I.A.F. demonstration on Habbaniya's air ranges, watched by H.R.H. The Regent of Iraq, the Prime Minister, the British Ambassador, the C.-in-C., M.E.A.F., and over a hundred high Iraqi officials, ministers, and officers. Vampires and Furies ended the demonstration in a Royal Salute, flying in combined formations symbolizing the close ties of friendship that exist between the two Air Forces.

### NORWAY

#### NEW AIR FORCE C.-IN-C.

Lieutenant-General Bjarne Øen, C.B.E., has resigned his appointment as C.-in-C. of the Air Force and is to take up a new appointment under N.A.T.O. He is succeeded by Colonel F. Lambrechts, D.F.C., Area Commander, Western Command. Colonel Lambrechts has had much flying experience in the Service and also, prior to the war, in Civil Aviation. During the war he commanded No. 333 Squadron of the Norwegian Air Force, equipped with Catalina and Mosquito aircraft and based at Leuchars.

### PORTUGAL

#### DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND SPARES

Twenty-four tons of spares for Harvard and Thunderbolt aircraft recently arrived in Lisbon by sea. This is the largest load of air force equipment to reach Portugal under the Mutual Aid and Defence Programme. An initial delivery of eight Harvards has been made to Portugal, but as yet no Thunderbolts have arrived, though some are expected.

### UNITED STATES

**NEW SPEED AND ALTITUDE RECORDS.**—The U.S. Navy has announced that its supersonic experimental plane, the Douglas Skyrocket, has exceeded all airspeed and altitude records. For security reasons no details were given, but according to the American press the announcement implied that the Skyrocket's speed was over 1,000 m.p.h. and the altitude reached was 12 to 13 miles.

**SQUADRON OF PILOTLESS BOMBERS FORMED.**—The U.S. Air Force has announced that a squadron of pilotless bombers was formed in Florida on 1st October, 1951, the first of their kind in the Air Force. These pilotless bombers are known as Matadors (H.61).

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

**Brassey's Annual.** Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (William Clowes & Sons, Ltd.) 50s.

The preface of the 1951 *Brassey*, the 62nd year of publication, contains an explanation and an apology from the senior editor, Rear-Admiral Thursfield. Admiral Thursfield has been the editor of *Brassey* for the last 14 years and, when the scope of the book was changed last year from that of a purely naval Annual to one which now embraces all three fighting Services, he co-opted the assistance of two joint editors to look after the sections devoted to Army and Air Force matters. The first two chapters in each section are normally written by the respective editors, but this year Admiral Thursfield was suddenly stricken down by a serious illness and, for the first time, was unable to provide his usual contribution. He has now happily recovered. Meanwhile his colleagues held the fort and, as he gratefully acknowledges, he was able to rest assured that the make-up of the volume was in competent hands.

The Annual comprises 31 chapters, each a complete article in itself. The subject matter of the first ten chapters is chiefly that which is common to all three Services. They include aspects of general strategy and defence problems, and show how high policy is intimately connected with them; three are devoted to affairs in the Far East, and one (the "Korean Scene" by a newspaper correspondent) again finds a place in the Army section, though this time it is the tactical lessons of that campaign which are examined. In "The Pattern of Future War" the writer postulates that all wars arise mainly from one root cause—"Man must eat to live, and if he cannot eat he will fight." Then come three sections, each of seven chapters, devoted to the Navy, Army, and Air Force respectively. Finally, a reference section comprises the Command Papers on Defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), and abstracts of the three Service Estimates presented to Parliament, concluding with a nominal list of the principal officials of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, U.S.A., and Atlantic Pact Countries of Western Europe, together with the Heads of British Service Missions in foreign countries and the Service Attachés of all nations. The inevitable time-lag between the writing of an article and its appearance in print sometimes militates against a last-minute correct picture of the events which are described.

Within the space allotted it is not possible to refer to each article individually, but it will be seen that the reader gets appreciably more this year for his money: the present volume contains 460 pages as against 363 in the previous number. When scanning the names of the authors of the various articles, many of the same "old faces" appear, besides an occasional newcomer, either anonymously or under his own name. Their contributions in every instance worthily maintain the high standard which has always characterized *Brassey's Annual*, whether under the old arrangement or the new. The fear expressed in the slightly pessimistic note on which the reviewer of the 1950 volume in this JOURNAL ended has, so far as it relates to the present issue, proved to be groundless.

**Hitler's Strategy.** By F. H. Hinsley. (Cambridge University Press.) 18s.

This book draws extensively on the German documents used at the trials at Nuremberg in 1946, and on the "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs." The latter, released by the Admiralty in 1948, throws much light on the German strategy of the 1939-45 War. Yet it would be wrong to regard such documentary sources as an infallible guide to Hitler's reasoning, for when in conference he had the pernicious habit of seeming to agree with each Chief of Staff in turn, whereas his ultimate decisions did not necessarily conform to any of their ideas. His uncontrolled power, his dictatorial methods, and the readiness of his entourage to submit to his supposed genius—these were the real weaknesses of the German system.



Mr. Hinsley's attempts to elucidate the course of German strategy in terms of Hitler's successive frustrations are not always convincing. Thus, in November, 1940, when he was already planning the attack on Russia, Hitler's reasoning is interpreted as follows:—

"If 'Sea Lion' and the invasion of Southern Ireland were impracticable, and if operations against Gibraltar seemed unlikely to give him any victory over Great Britain, the next best thing would be a quick and stupendous victory elsewhere."

But in another passage the author asserts that "in Hitler's mind 'Sea Lion' was never more than a colossal bluff." In the Spring of 1941, with plans for the Russian campaign far advanced, the mind of the dictator is dissected in these terms:—

"It is a measure both of Hitler's desperation and of his over-confidence that in this situation, having first raised an attack on Russia from the level of possibility to the level of necessity, he then made, not a virtue, but two virtues of the necessity. He would not attack Russia simply in order to undermine Great Britain by removing Germany's last enemy on the Continent; he would also attack her in the hope that precisely by this action the United States would be deterred from entering the war."

Documentary sources can never entirely explain Hitler's political and strategic reasoning. The aberrations of his mind are a subject for the psychopathist rather than the historian. While Mr. Hinsley has made an intelligent interpolation from the documents, he has given us no new criterion for the history of these cataclysmic events.

#### NAVAL

**Jane's Fighting Ships, 1951-52.** Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman, A.M.I.N.A., A.I.Mar.E. (Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd.) 84s.

A new edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* is always something of an event in the naval year. This, the 53rd annual edition, is fuller than usual with pictures, plans, and descriptions. It is, alas, also more expensive; so that those who wish to follow the activities of the navies of the world will have to dig still deeper into their pockets. One wonders whether, perhaps, a slightly less lavish display might not have answered the purpose and yet kept the price down.

Most readers will naturally turn first to those pages in which the ships of Great Britain are pictured. Pride of place is taken by the new *Eagle*, the largest British aircraft carrier ever built. She is commissioning into the fleet this year, and a sister ship, the *Ark Royal*, is now fitting out. The *Hermes* class of light fleet carrier is still fitting out and the *Hercules* class shows no progress since last year.

Of most interest, perhaps, is the photograph of the new *Relentless*, promoted now to the frontispiece. Formerly a fleet destroyer, she and the *Rocket* were stripped to their bare hulls and rebuilt to be the first fast anti-submarine frigates in the world. Gone now is that typical destroyer profile, and with the forecastle deck extended aft, a completely new superstructure, two short lattice masts, and no forecastle gun, the two ships set a new pattern in the Royal Navy. They give the impression of great power and speed.

Turning from Great Britain to the United States, one is at once struck by the overwhelming way in which that country has reconstituted her Navy since the rapid run-down of the immediate post-war years. These pages give an idea of the immense power of the U.S. Navy in every type of ship. A new class in the U.S. Navy is the destroyer leader, of which the *Norfolk*, a prototype hunter-killer, formerly rated as a cruiser, is the most interesting. She is due to be commissioned in June of this year. With a displacement of 5,530 tons, she will easily be a new "record" for destroyers. So also will be the four *Mitscher* class of 3,675 tons, which have been rated up to destroyer leaders.

The Russian navy remains something of an enigma. There is still nothing definite about the new battleship, supposed to be in commission, or her three sisters, believed to be building. Much the same can be said about the Russian submarine fleet. The editor has a note that no fewer than 370 are in commission, with a further 120 building, and he

includes a further note to the effect that the new programme of construction is reported to include three battleships, 20 cruisers, 120 destroyers, and 1,000 sea-going submarines.

It would be pleasant to continue, in this review, the examination of the various navies as set out in the new *Jane's*, but space does not allow such a practice. So it must be sufficient to record that this is a most lavish production with a great wealth of new photographs, plans, and silhouettes. Both the editor and the publishers can be justly proud of the 1951-52 *Jane's*.

**The Life and Letters of David Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet.** By Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers, C.B.E., D.S.C. (Hodder and Stoughton.) 25s.

As Mr. C. S. Forester suggests in his introduction, the story of Lord Beatty's career is only credible because it is true: Beatty won the D.S.O. for service on the Nile when he was 25; was promoted to commander for services during the Ömdurman Campaign when he was 27; and for service at Tientsin during the Boxer troubles he was promoted to captain at 29. He was promoted to rear-admiral at 38, an Order in Council being needed because he had not completed the six years' sea service then required of a captain, and he took command of the Grand Fleet when still under 45. When he finally left the Admiralty in 1927, after seven and a half years as First Sea Lord, he was only 56.

When Beatty was appointed in command of the battle-cruisers in 1913, there were some who thought he was too young, had advanced too fast, and lacked experience. But the ships, the armaments, and the tactics were all new and, apart from the Russo-Japanese war, there was no recent battle experience to guide commanders. If Beatty did lack experience in the peacetime fleet he had, which was far more valuable, the vision to foresee the task of the battle-cruisers in war, the drive to train them, and the spirit to lead them. His leadership of the battle-cruisers made him a national hero, though he himself was rarely satisfied with the achievements and cold analysis does show that he might sometimes have acted more advantageously.

The author, who served on Beatty's staff from August, 1915, until the end of the war, is exceptionally well qualified to write of the Admiral at the height of his fame as a great war leader. For the rest he has had the use of private letters, journals, and papers; in addition to Admiralty records, published books, and the personal recollections of many of the Admiral's shipmates. Beatty wrote almost daily to his wife whenever they were apart, and in places the story is told by quoting extracts from these letters in sequence. They are almost wholly concerned with naval matters, which must have been trying for Lady Beatty who evidently felt that she should come before the Service in her husband's thoughts.

The author's admiration for his chief illumines the whole book. Given the same material a less partial writer might have presented a different picture, but it is questionable whether it would have been more valuable. Lord Beatty was a leader, and it is the business of a leader to compel the loyalty and admiration of those he commands. Admiral Chalmers tells admirably how well Beatty succeeded in this.

**Roger Keyes. The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes.** By Cecil Aspinall-Oglander. (The Hogarth Press.) 25s.

It was a remarkable coincidence that recently produced biographies of Beatty and Keyes within a few days. To the general public both men were strikingly alike. Both possessed enormous dash and courage; both were born fighters prepared to take risks, but behind Beatty's dash was a cool and calculating brain that never risked ship or man unless the occasion warranted it. Keyes's biographer tries to portray Keyes as a man of equal calibre, but in administrative matters Keyes lacked the greatness of Beatty.

As a small boy Keyes, overcoming parental opposition, joined the *Britannia* in 1885, and early in 1899 was in command of the destroyer *Fame* at Hong Kong. Here his great fighting qualities, notably his capture of Hsi-Cheng fort with a handful of bluejackets during the Boxer Rising, won him promotion to commander at the age of 28.

Promoted captain in 1905, Keyes took part in the Heligoland Bight battle in August, 1914, as Commodore, Submarines, and in 1915 played a fighting part in the Dardanelles operations. Returning to the United Kingdom, disappointed and frustrated by the Dardanelles failure, he joined the Grand Fleet shortly after Jutland and was promoted rear-admiral in April, 1917. The start of 1918 found him in command at Dover with the allotted task of stopping U-boats from passing the Strait. Zeebrugge followed in April. General Aspinall-Oglander tries hard to prove that Keyes was largely responsible for saving this Country from the desperate menace of the U-boats. In fact, however, the menace had been overcome months earlier by the introduction of general convoy. Zeebrugge was a splendid and spectacular achievement which did much to raise national morale, but as an anti-submarine operation it failed. After it, U-boats continued to pass freely in and out of the Bruges-Zeebrugge Canal. The dragon's tail, though twisted, still remained dangerous.

In 1925, Keyes became Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The author does his best to absolve him from any blame for the unfortunate affair in the *Royal Oak*, but leaves the impression that with better handling the episode would not have flared into a *cause célèbre* that did much to deprive Keyes of his life-long ambition to become First Sea Lord.

Still hoping for the supreme appointment, Keyes accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. In 1930, he was promoted Admiral of the Fleet and four years later was elected Member of Parliament for North Portsmouth.

Although he had retired from the Royal Navy, Keyes was destined to exercise further active command, for during the 1939-45 War he was for a time Chief of the newly-formed Combined Operations Directorate. He was raised to the peerage in 1943 and outlived the war, but died peacefully in his sleep late in 1945 after an adventurous and active life. The picture the author gives is that of a great admiral but it is perhaps a pity that he sees only the greatness and none of the limitations of his gallant subject.

**Main Fleet to Singapore.** By Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. (Faber and Faber.) 18s.

Captain Grenfell's new book tells the story of the loss of H.M. Ships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, set in the background of the tangled skein of the Eastern War. That is to say, he fills in the salient points of the larger picture and discusses the disaster in its two aspects, that of the development of Singapore as a naval base and the implications of that development, and that of the strategical decisions taken when an attack on Singapore seemed probable.

The story of Singapore itself is an unhappy one. For some years after 1918 it became a political shuttlecock and its development was seriously retarded. Captain Grenfell deals with this aspect of the case adequately and shows it in its proper relation to the growth of Japan as a naval Power. Singapore was, in many ways, much more than a naval base at the foot of the Malayan Peninsula, it was at the same time a key point in the scheme for Dominion defence in the eastern hemisphere. Australia and New Zealand depended upon it for their defence against attack, and their nervousness at the growth of Japanese power had been largely allayed by the assurance that the main fleet of Great Britain could and would reach Singapore, in the event of an emergency, within 80 days.

The second aspect of the loss of these two ships is the strategical one. Captain Grenfell has a large bone to pick with the then Defence Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, over the decisions that were made in this case. He propounds his theory of sea-air warfare with much conviction and makes a strong and convincing enough case for it. But it is probably still much too early yet to attempt a lucid history of this unhappy period, and it must fall to some later historian to piece together the many decisions that were taken and to weigh them in the balance of strategic necessity. The State Papers which will give the full story have as yet another 30 or more years to run before they will become available for study, and to attempt to write real history before they become public is to make bricks without all the straw that is available. Captain Grenfell has certainly done

a great deal with the material at his disposal, but his indictment should be read with the realization that it can be no more than a provisional assessment.

Within the limits thus arbitrarily imposed, the book has a considerable interest for any student of the Far Eastern campaign. So far as it goes, it is authoritative as to facts, though perhaps not as objective as to views as it might be. But the book is controversial enough to make it both readable and interesting, and it will serve to keep alive and to enhance the various conflicts of opinion which still surround this Campaign.

### ARMY

**This Happy Breed.** By Reginald Hargreaves. (Skeffington & Son.) 18s.

Major Hargreaves has taken as his theme the man of war, rather than the deeds of war. He has set his mind, and his pen, the task of inquiring into the sort of man who went to fight for England in the days that are gone, why he enlisted, how he lived, what he thought, sometimes what he did.

This sort of thing is not to be found in the history books, whose chronicle must inevitably be concerned with the main flood of history. It is in letters and diaries, in old orders and papers that have long lain mouldering, unnoticed and unscanned, in the national or private archives, in journals or in reports to long-forgotten newspapers, that these oddments are to be found. Major Hargreaves has directed his research into many curious paths, has looked into the odd, darkened corners of our military story, has forsaken the main road of Army history and wandered down the byways in search of new material for his story.

His book reflects that research, and is full of the odd quirks and humours of the soldier of past days. That is a part of its charm, and a large part at that. But in addition it is all good history, and that fact also adds to its fascination. For this is the very stuff of Army life in the XVIIth, XVIIIth, and XIXth centuries, history that is as alive and sparkling to-day as it was in the days of its making.

*This Happy Breed* is a book that cannot fail to charm a great variety of readers. Many of the studies have appeared in various magazines and journals; to present them now in book form is a happy event that should give them the wider circulation they deserve.

**Peninsular Cavalry General, 1811-1813.** Edited by T. R. McGuffie. (George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd.) 15s.

"Writing officers" were one of the annoyances Wellington complained of in the Peninsula: their letters home put weapons into the hands of the meddlers. Major-General Long, commander of a cavalry brigade from Campo Mayor to the Pyrenees, was a "writing officer"; though he insisted to his readers "that I do not want my correspondence to be communicated out of the Family Circle, and more particularly to Military Officers. They have not all sense enough to know what may with propriety be retailed."

A set of his letters has been preserved in the manuscript library of the Royal United Service Institution. Mr. McGuffie had the erudition to realize their importance. He has edited them with perspicacity and has added an illuminating biography.

Robert Ballard Long was well-educated—a credit to his old school, Harrow. His letters show shrewd observation, and their style is clear and entertaining. About fox-hunting in the Peninsula he wrote, "Nothing annoys them [the French] so much as the indifference which the British show upon all occasions—even when they calculate that we have no right to feel at our ease. It is an invasion of their just prerogative to frighten the world out of its senses." But he saw the danger in this fox-hunting spirit. It taught cavalry officers, when in pursuit, to "advance so far and with such speed as to destroy all order, blow their horses, and necessarily become the prey of fresh Troops brought against them."

Piquancy is given to the letters by Long's inability to suffer personal injustice with philosophy. This brought him into damaging conflict with Marshal Beresford and the Prince Regent. Wellington cannot have been altogether sorry when this querulous officer was ordered home; though he lost a General of proved ability in the field.



**The 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.** By Major-General R. Evans, C.B., M.C. (Gale & Polden, Ltd.) 21s.

Some regimental histories are of limited interest to those outside the regiment. This is not the case here. This book is of absorbing interest, not only to cavalrymen but to all types of soldiers, past and present. It should be read, too, by all civilians who take an interest in military studies, particularly by those whose views of cavalry may have been jaundiced by injudicious doses of a certain school of military literature. This book is the perfect answer to that foolish tendency among some literary "experts" on the art of war to sneer at the "huntin', racin', and polo" proclivities of our cavalry.

It is a simply told account of how two regiments with ancient and honourable traditions met two crises of reorganization within a space of about ten years and came through triumphantly. Though staff officers, who have long been away from regimental service, surprisingly often forget what regimental traditions mean to good soldiers, yet most old soldiers know how easy it is for "esprit de corps" to be ruined by clumsy tampering. In the amalgamation of these two proud regiments there was no lack of tactless *gaucherie*, but that cavalry spirit, which some modernists deride, refused to be daunted by such set-backs. In the combined regiment, a regimental spirit was born which inherited intact the finest traditions of its parent units.

In 1937 the second crisis came—mechanization. It was tackled in the same cheerful spirit as amalgamation, and just as successfully, as the Regiment's record in 1939-45 brilliantly showed. As the author has described them, they were "men schooled to use initiative, to act offensively, to ride down their enemy in the same spirit as they had shown when their weapons were the horse and the sword."

**The Coldstream Guards, 1920-1946.** By Michael Howard and John Sparrow. (Oxford University Press.) 63s.

This work is mainly concerned with the services of the Regiment overseas during the 1939-45 War. There is, however, a short chapter covering the years 1920-1939; another gives a brief account of the units which remained at home. The main body, divided into eight sections in chronological order, describes the services of battalions in each theatre of war separately. This seems the most convenient method of dealing with five battalions, two of which, the 1st and 4th were converted to armour in 1941 and 1942 respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were in the original B.E.F., the 2nd also fought in Tunisia and Italy. The 3rd, stationed in Egypt at the outbreak of war, served in Wavell's campaigns, with the Eighth Army, and afterwards in Italy. The 1st and 5th Battalions formed part of the Guards Armoured Division in North-West Europe, and here the narrative is combined, as both Battalions were in the same Brigade. The 4th Battalion also served in that theatre as a unit of the 6th (Independent) Guards Tank Brigade.

The reader cannot fail to be impressed by this clear and sober account of gallantry, and by the Regiment's determination to remain, as always, *Nulli Secundus*. The book should be widely read, for it contains many examples of the outstanding effect of *esprit-de-corps* and discipline, such as, for instance, the 3rd Battalion's break-out when Tobruk surrendered in 1942.

This volume of over 600 pages is well arranged and references to dates are readily accessible. Twenty clear sketch-maps are placed in the text and eight folding maps at the end. In addition to the Roll of Honour, there are eight appendices and an index.

**The History of the Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's) 1919-1945.** By George Molesworth. Published by the Regimental Committee.

The volume begins, after a brief retrospective chapter entitled "The Brave Days of Old," by recording the events of the period between the wars. The text contains some apposite comments on the value of regimental history as a means of inspiration, and remarks on the experimental work of the 2nd Battalion.



After the outbreak of war, the Regiment expanded to nine battalions. The 1st Battalion served in India and Burma, the 2nd in Gibraltar, Italy, and Greece, the 4th and 7th in North-West Europe. One of the new units became a battalion of the Parachute Regiment and served in 6th Airborne Division. The remainder, with the exception of the 30th which served abroad as a garrison battalion, performed draft-finding and other duties at home.

The earlier chapters give the records of each battalion in chronological order in what is practically diary form, interspersed with surveys of the progress of the war as a whole. One chapter describes the services of the 1st Battalion in the Arakan, May, 1943, to April, 1944. The unit, under strength at the outset, was, the author records, reinforced during operations by untrained drafts of officers and other ranks from all kinds of sources. Later chapters deal with the history of the other battalions in Italy and North-West Europe. Some records of Allied Dominion Regiments are also included.

Much devoted work must have gone into this book but it is open to question whether the arrangement adopted is the best, even for purely regimental consumption. It is a handsome volume of some 285 pages, including thirty sketch maps and twelve appendices. There is no index.

**Cap of Honour.** By David Scott Daniell. (George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd.). 17s. 6d.

This book traces the history of The Gloucestershire Regiment (28th/61st Foot) from 1694, when the 28th was formed, up to 1950, when the amalgamated 1st Battalion (28th/61st) upheld the regimental tradition for tenacity by its memorable stand on the Imjin River in Korea: "the strength of the Battalion on April the 22nd was 917 all ranks; on April the 25th it was 234."

These plain words from the last paragraph of the book exemplify the general tone throughout. In soldierly language, without any melodramatic trimmings, it unfolds a tale of stubborn fighting and cheerful endurance of lethal climatic conditions in all parts of the world where British arms have fought. Those who have served in The Gloucestershire Regiment, or have family ties with it, will read this story with irrepressible pride. But the book has a much wider appeal than mere regimental association.

Though it is the story of an infantry regiment with more Battle Honours than any other in the British Army, it is, none the less, a story that is typical of the finest traditions of Infantry as an arm. From the picturesque days of Fontenoy, through the wars when Infantry was still the "queen of battlefields" to our drab 1918 conception of the "P.B.I.," the story proves beyond argument the truth of that old sentence in F.S.R.: "Infantry is the arm that in the end wins battles." As a gunner I can say this without bias!

Those who can lightheartedly disband old units and mingle their mutilated remains with those of other units, will do well to read this book. For it shows regimental tradition in the making, when regiments were big families, moving all over the world with their wives and children, even taking them at times into battle. Army wives of to-day should read what their forebears endured, cheerfully, as a matter of course. Of such men, women, and children the British Empire was built.

**The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry War Chronicle. Vol. III.**

Edited by Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. E. H. Neville, Bt., M.C. (Gale and Polden, Ltd.)

This is the third of a four-volume war history of The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. It takes the story on from July, 1942, to May, 1944, and deals with the activities of all the Regimental formations, including the Depot, during this period.

The chronological method adopted in the book is to advance the whole story in periods of six months. Thus the activities of each unit during that period are set down, the chronicle rounded off, and the process repeated for the next six months. Each period is introduced by a brief synopsis giving a background picture of the war as a whole.

Although this method ensures a steady chronological record of the whole Regiment throughout the war, it also splits up the individual stories throughout the volume. Thus, in the present volume, each unit has four separate instalments of its history, fairly widely separated from each other. This tends to make reading a little difficult and patchy.

The volume contains seven maps and three appendices, gives Orders of Battle and the 7th Battalion organization, and includes a list of decorations and awards covered by the first three volumes of the history.

#### AIR

**Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1951-1952.** Compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgeman. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd.) 4 gns.

This "milestone of military aviation" attains at least the quality and quantity of previous issues: there are 476 pages; 850 illustrations, 472 of which are new; and addenda dated 30th September, 1951, which illustrate some of the novelties released during the Society of British Aircraft Constructors' Display in September, at Farnborough. These aircraft include the Avro and Handley Page research monoplanes, Hawker and Supermarine jet-fighters, and the 4-jet bombers recently produced by Vickers and Short & Harland. The huge transport aircraft built by Blackburn and General is also illustrated in its latest form with bogie main landing-gear units.

As usual, the five parts of the book form, in each field, a complete record of aeronautical progress for the twelve months past; these parts are devoted to Service Aviation, Civil Aviation, Airframes, Aero-Engines, and Airships. For military-minded men, there is more than enough dramatic quality in the Airframe Section to provide material for a brief review.

More than any other previous volume of "Jane" this one shows the slow building up of a defensive power in the air much more formidable than ever previously recorded, a defensive power which might deter a potential aggressor. In the issue of a year ago, for each page of Russian aircraft and engines, there were 13 pages of British and American types; this time there are twice as many—353 British-American pages to 13 Russian.

For the first time, the nuclear-powered aircraft is mentioned, to be built in the U.S.A. by Fairchild, and engined by the General Electric Company, "who entered the gas turbine field about 1895;" and whose work on the aircraft supercharger qualified them to undertake in the U.S.A. the manufacture of the Whittle engine, aided by a small team of engineers from Power Jets Limited. The American firm of Marquardt has produced a ram-jet engine of 15,000 horsepower, which form the basis for a very large guided missile, doubtless provided with an atomic warhead. A guided missile squadron has been formed in the U.S.A. to operate the Glenn Martin Matador, to name only one of the dozen types produced in that country, in addition to perhaps four on this side of the Atlantic: a little one was shown at Farnborough. Larger missiles are being made by several British firms.

Modern 4-jet bombers built in the U.S.A. are stated in their journals to be suitable for carrying the atomic bomb, and the same journals aver that four British 4-jet bombers are similarly designed. The first "Atom Bomber" was the Boeing B.47, which flew 2,000 miles at a speed of 607 miles per hour. It is in quantity production at four of the greatest firms; it weighs 92 tons, but a scaled up version, B.52, weighs 175 tons, and has recently been ordered in quantity. At 600 miles an hour, the horse-power developed by 8 large Allison turbines, likely to be applied to B.52, would be 120,000, twice that of B.47.

Famous design teams and vast production resources have been applied to the output of anti-submarine aircraft of all types, including those of Blackburn and General, Fairey, Short Brothers and Harland, Convair, Grumman, Lockheed, and Martin. The three British wheeled aircraft and the Convair 60-ton boat have turbo-props; two Grumman Guardians work as a pair, one to search and one to kill, as the electronic equipment

needed to find the Schnorkel is quite bulky ; the Martin Marlin has two Wright Turbo-Cyclone engines, in which each large radial engine is followed by three exhaust turbines. The Lockheed Neptune, with ordinary piston engines, is being supplied to the Royal Air Force. An early model flew 11,000 miles without refuelling.

It is astonishing to find, in this monumental work produced at high pressure, hardly a single error : the only one noticeable is at the foot of page 185c. The book is invaluable to all concerned with design, production, and operation of aircraft ; it is indispensable to the man who only writes about them.

**The Dam Busters.** By Paul Brickhill. (Evans Brothers, Ltd.) 15s.

The Dam Busters was the name won by 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force, in breaching the Moehne and Eder dams. The idea of making this raid was conceived, early in the war, by an aeronautical engineer, Barnes Wallis, the designer of the Vickers' Wellington. At that time there was no type of aircraft bomb capable of doing significant damage to such targets, but Barnes Wallis was aware of the shattering force which shock waves could exert in earth or water. With this knowledge, he set out to design a new type of bomb, far larger than any previously contemplated and relying upon this principle for its effect. Fortunately, he was not only an outstanding scientist but a very persistent man. When he was told that anyone who thought of a ten-ton bomb must be mad, he embodied his ideas in a treatise and posted copies to 70 prominent people in science, politics, and the Services, to the consternation of the Security Branch. Eventually, Barnes Wallis's suggestions were adopted and 617 Squadron was formed to carry out the operation against the dams, a most hazardous one, demanding extremely skilful low flying and completely accurate bomb aiming. Led by Wing-Commander Guy Gibson, who was afterwards awarded the V.C. for his part in the raid, 617 Squadron air crews achieved a brilliant success. Half of them did not return, but German war industry had received a devastating blow. *Après moi le deluge*, the Squadron's grimly felicitous motto, was selected by the King personally when he visited them after their great feat of arms.

The outstanding level of achievement, reached at the outset, was fully maintained—it could hardly be excelled—and in doing so 617 became one of the most famous bomber squadrons in the Royal Air Force. They were employed, for the most part, in special missions, frequently with Barnes Wallis's new bombs, and developed novel methods of attack and a standard of bombing accuracy hitherto deemed impossible. Leonard Cheshire, V.C., D.S.O., D.F.C., and Willie Tait, D.S.O., D.F.C., are numbered among their wartime commanders, and their subsequent battle honours included the sinking of the *Tirpitz*, the destruction of the underground V weapon sites from which the Germans had intended to bombard London with giant guns, and the blasting of the U-Boat pens.

With so much of interest to draw upon, the author has selected his material with skill and illustrated it with some excellent photographs. Perhaps the best part of the book consists in the descriptions of the men concerned ; on the one hand, the scientist and designer, on the other, the pilots and their crews who endured great mental strain and faced extreme danger to use so well the weapon which the scientist had placed in their hands.

## ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(\*Books for Reference in the Library only)

### GENERAL

- \*BRASSEY'S ANNUAL.** The Armed Forces Year-Book 1951. Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield. Medium 8vo. 460 pages. (Clowes, 1951.) 50s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- IN THE BALANCE.** Speeches 1949 and 1950 by Winston S. Churchill. Edited by Randolph S. Churchill. Demy 8vo. 456 pages. (Cassell, 1951.) 25s.
- CASTLEREAGH.** By Ione Leigh. Demy 8vo. 383 pages. (Collins, 1951.) 21s.
- LLOYD GEORGE.** By Thomas Jones. Demy 8vo. 330 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1951.) 21s. Presented by the Publishers.
- JOHN GERARD.** The Autobiography of an Elizabethan. Translated from the Latin by Philip Caraman. Demy 8vo. 287 pages. (Longmans, 1951.) 18s.
- MARSHAL WITHOUT GLORY.** By Ewan Butler and Gordon Young. Large Post 8vo. 287 pages. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1951.) 15s.
- MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN.** By Alan Campbell-Johnson. Medium 8vo. 383 pages. (Robert Hale, 1951.) 25s.
- NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.** His Rise and Fall. By J. M. Thompson. Medium 8vo. 411 pages. (Blackwell, 1952.) 35s.
- PETAIN: Patriot or Traitor?** By Sisley Huddleston. Demy 8vo. 270 pages. (Dakers, 1951.) 15s.
- RECOLLECTIONS OF THREE REIGNS.** By Sir Frederick Ponsonby. Medium 8vo. 365 pages. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951.) 25s.
- GEORGE WASHINGTON.** A Biography. Volume III—Planter and Patriot, 1758–1775. Volume IV—Leader of the Revolution, 1775–1777. By Douglas Southall Freeman. Medium 8vo. 600/736 pages. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951.) 30s. each volume.
- CRY KOREA.** By Reginald Thompson. Demy 8vo. 303 pages. (Macdonald, 1951.) 16s.
- HITLER'S STRATEGY.** By F. H. Hinsley. Demy 8vo. 254 pages. (Cambridge University Press, 1951.) 18s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.** United Kingdom Civil Series. FOOD. Volume I—The Growth of Policy. By R. J. Hammond. Royal 8vo. 436 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1951.) 25s.
- PETER MOEN'S DIARY.** Large Post 8vo. 146 pages. (Faber, 1951.) 10s. 6d.
- DARE TO BE FREE.** By W. B. Thomas. Large Post 8vo. 256 pages. (Allan Wingate, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- THE "CAINE" MUTINY.** By Herman Wouk. Large Post 8vo. 494 pages. (Jonathan Cape, 1951.) 15s.
- U.N.O. AND WAR CRIMES.** By Viscount Maugham. Demy 8vo. 143 pages. (John Murray, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.** 2 volumes. By F. P. Walters. Royal 8vo. 833 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1952.) 60s.
- BRITAIN AND THE DOMINIONS.** By W. R. Brock. Crown 8vo. 522 pages. (Cambridge University Press, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- BRITISH HONDURAS.** Past and Present. By Stephen L. Caiger. Demy 8vo. 240 pages. (Allen & Unwin, 1951.) 18s.
- THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF CANADA.** A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present. By C. P. Stacey. Large Post 8vo. 184 pages. (The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1940.) Presented by the Author.



- KINGDOMS OF YESTERDAY. By Sir Arthur Cunningham Lothian. Demy 8vo. 228 pages. (John Murray, 1951.) 21s.
- IT HAPPENS IN RUSSIA. Seven years forced labour in the Siberian goldfields. By Vladimir Petrov. Demy 8vo. 470 pages. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951.) 21s.
- THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE. By Stephen Crane. Foolsap 4to. 159 pages. (The Folio Society, 1951.) 17s.
- FURTHER ENGLISH VOYAGES TO SPANISH AMERICA 1583-1594. Translated and Edited by Irene A. Wright. Demy 8vo. 314 pages. (The Hakluyt Society, 1951.)
- THE NEW MILITARY AND NAVAL DICTIONARY. Edited by Frank Gaynor. Medium 8vo. 295 pages. (Philosophical Library, New York, 1951.) \$6. Presented by the Publishers.
- WORLD GEOGRAPHY OF PETROLEUM. Edited by Wallace E. Pratt and Dorothy Good. Royal 8vo. 464 pages. (Princeton University Press, 1950.) \$7.50.
- ETERNAL WAVE. By John Scott Hughes. Demy 8vo. 143 pages. (Temple Press, 1951.) 15s.
- THE SHAPE OF SHIPS. Being the story of the development of ships from the earliest times to the present day. By William McDowell. Demy 8vo. 232 pages. (Hutchinson, 1950.) 8s. 6d.

## NAVAL

- \*JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1951-52. Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman. Foolsap folio. 546 pages. (Sampson Low, 1951.) 84s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF DAVID, EARL BEATTY. By Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers. Medium 8vo. 488 pages. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1951.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- ROGER KEYES. Being the Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover. By Cecil Aspinall-Oglander. Demy 8vo. 478 pages. (Hogarth Press, 1951.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- NELSON'S BAND OF BROTHERS. By Ludovic Kennedy. Large Post 8vo. 352 pages. (Odhams Press, 1951.) 16s.
- WOODEN WALLS IN ACTION. By Frank C. Bowen. Super Royal 8vo. 144 pages. (Halton, 1951.) 21s.
- SEA SLANG. A Dictionary of the Old-Timers' Expressions and Epithets. By Frank C. Bowen. Foolsap 8vo. 154 pages. (Sampson Low, c.1930.) Presented by the Author.

## ARMY

- THE KING'S GUARDS. Horse and Foot. By Henry Legge-Bourke. Large Post 4to. 168 pages. (Macdonald, 1952.) 30s.
- THE STORY OF THE FIFTH ROYAL INNISKILLING DRAGOON GUARDS. Compiled by Roger Evans. Demy 8vo. 445 pages. (Gale & Polden, 1951.) 21s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*42ND ROYAL TANK REGIMENT 1938-1944. Compiled from contributions made by former members of the Regiment. Crown 4to. 37 pages. (Published privately.)
- \*THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS 1920-1946. By Michael Howard and John Sparrow. Royal 8vo. 593 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1951.) 63s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*THE RECORD OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS 1650-1950. Crown 8vo. 91 pages. (Published by the Regiment, 1950.) Presented by the Coldstream Guards.

- \*THE DEVONS. A History of the Devonshire Regiment 1685-1945. By Jeremy Taylor. Demy 8vo. 338 pages. (The White Swan Press, Bristol, 1951.) 15s.
- \*THE HISTORY OF THE SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY (PRINCE ALBERT'S) 1919-1945. Compiled by George Molesworth. Crown 4to. 285 pages. (Regimental Committee, Somerset Light Infantry, 1951.) Presented by the Regiment. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- CAP OF HONOUR. The Story of the Gloucestershire Regiment, 1694-1950. By David Scott Daniell. Demy 8vo. 344 pages. (Harrap, 1951.) 17s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*THE COLOURS OF THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT. A HISTORY OF THE MONUMENTS, MEMORIALS AND COLOURS OF THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT IN LICHFIELD CATHEDRAL. WAR MEDALS AND DECORATIONS OF THE OFFICERS, THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT (38th AND 80th FOOT) 1705-1914. 3 Volumes. Typescripts. Compiled and presented by Lieut.-Colonel M. B. Savage, C.B.E., D.S.O.
- \*THE OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY CHRONICLE. Volume III—July, 1942-May, 1944. Edited by Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. E. H. Neville, Bt. Demy 8vo. 382 pages. (Gale & Polden, 1951.) Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*A HISTORY OF THE 2ND ROYAL LANCERS (GARDNER'S HORSE). From 1922 to 1947. Compiled by Brigadier E. W. D. Vaughan. Demy 8vo. 196 pages. (Sifton Praed, 1951.) Presented by the Officers and Men of The Regiment.
- REPORT BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN, FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF TUNIS, TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 12th December 1944 to 2nd May 1945. Medium 8vo. 66 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1951.) 3s.
- THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945. THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY. By Eric Linklater. Demy 8vo. 480 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- PHANTOM WAS THERE. By R. J. T. Hills. Demy 8vo. 344 pages. (Edward Arnold, 1951.) 21s.
- EASTERN EPIC. Volume I. September 1939-March 1943. Defence. By Compton Mackenzie. Large Post 8vo. 623 pages. (Chatto & Windus, 1951.) 30s.
- FAMOUS BRITISH GENERALS. Edited by Barrett Parker. Demy 8vo. 242 pages. (Nicholson & Western, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- PENINSULAR CAVALRY GENERAL (1811-1813). The Correspondence of Lieut.-General Robert Ballard Long. Edited by T. H. McGuffie. Demy 8vo. 304 pages. (Harrap, 1951.) 15s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE LETTERS OF PRIVATE WHEELER 1809-1828. Edited by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. Demy 8vo. 287 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1951.) 18s.
- MEMORIES OF THREE WARS. By Brigadier The Viscount Dillon. Demy 8vo. 145 pages. (Allan Wingate, 1951.) 15s.
- MEMOIRS OF A JUNIOR OFFICER. By Lieut.-Colonel M. C. A. Henniker. Demy 8vo. 292 pages. (Blackwood, 1951.) 12s. 6d.

AIR

- \*JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 1951-52. Compiled and Edited by Leonard Bridgman. Foolsap folio. (Sampson Low, 1951.) 84s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- FLIGHT TODAY. By J. L. Nayler and E. Ower. Demy 8vo. 172 pages. (Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 1951.) 7s. 6d.


McCorquodale, London, S.E.












# **RANGEFINDERS**


## **SUBMARINE PERISCOPES**

## **FIRE CONTROL APPARATUS**

OPTICAL SIGHTING INSTRUMENTS  
PRISMATIC BINOCULARS, etc., etc.



Hand-held Rangefinders  
8 inch and 18 inch base



In addition to their large manufacturing capacity Barr & Stroud Ltd. have a highly-trained technical staff with up-to-date equipment for carrying out a wide variety of research, development and design.

# **BARR & STROUD LTD**

ANNIESLAND, GLASGOW, W.3.

15 Victoria St., London, S.W.1

"The R.U.S.I. Journal" is published in February, May, August and November of each year.

Registered for Transmission to Canada by Canadian Magazine Post.

S  
:

o  
1  
al  
or  
e  
n.

1